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Abstract 
A wide number of contributions to the peacebuilding literature have decried the 
limitations and constraints of liberal peacebuilding, to such an extent that the 
very term has begun to assume vaguely pejorative overtones. Concerns for the 
health and well-being of liberal peacebuilding have accumulated to the extent 
that Roland Paris has issued a plaintive call for liberal peacebuilding to be 
‘saved’ (2010). In this thesis, I critically engage with the comprehensive 
approach, one of the central mechanisms that has enabled liberal 
peacebuilding to redefine and rearticulate its terms of reference. I begin from 
the assumption that the comprehensive approach does not anticipate the post-
liberal peace that has been heralded by some observers (see Richmond, 2011); 
quite the contrary, it instead provides the basis for reformulation or adaptation 
within the terms that have been established by liberal peacebuilding. In 
continuing to hold out this tantalising possibility, the comprehensive approach 
continues, more than 20 years after its first articulation, to cast a seductive spell 
over its adherents. In this thesis, I critically assess how the comprehensive 
approach framework has been engaged and developed by one of its leading 
proponents (the British Government). I break the approach down into three 
dimensions of comprehensiveness (deepening, contextuality and 
complementarity), with a view to illustrating how the textual reproduction of each 
dimension has been accompanied by a set of contradictions and tensions. In 
doing so, I propose to explore how discursive ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ has 
been accompanied by a range of contradictions and tensions. In unravelling 
these contradictions, I then draw upon Foucauldian concepts and themes to 
argue that each and every advancement of freedom (whether through the form 
of empowerment, participation or contextual engagement) has been 
considerably more ambiguous than the standard narrative of the 
comprehensive approach – which reproduces the impression of an incremental 
progression – would have us believe. In questioning and probing the proposition 
that the comprehensive approach overcomes or reconciles the contradictions 
and tensions of liberal peacebuilding, I instead suggest a disconcerting 
reversion to prior points of reference.  
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The Comprehensive Approach, Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding and a Research Agenda 
Introduction 
In the years since the early 1990s, when the thawing of the Cold War 
precipitated the emergence of an international consensus upon conflict 
intervention, liberal peacebuilding has consolidated into the pre-eminent 
framework of reference that guides and sustains the post-conflict conduct of 
international, regional and state actors. In their engagements with post-conflict 
contexts, peacebuilding actors have largely operated within a liberal framework 
of reference. This framework is ubiquitous to the extent that unfamiliar 
observers could be forgiven for equating liberal peacebuilding with 
peacebuilding per se.   
Liberal peacebuilding can be traced back to the Liberal Peace.MacGinty 
defines the Liberal Peace as ‘the concept, condition and practice 
whereby leading states, international organisations, and international 
financial institutions promote their version of peace through peace-
support interventions, control of international financial architecture, 
support for state sovereignty and the international status quo’ (2008, 
143).  
The Liberal is a broad tradition within the field of international relations 
that holds that ‘certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be 
more peaceful, both in their domestic relations, and in their international 
relations, than illiberal states are’ (Newman, Paris and Richmond 11).  
The ‘Liberal peace’ provides the predominant contextual ‘background’ 
against which peacebuilding discourse is framed. It is not always explicitly 
invoked; in many instances, it functions as an unspoken set of assumptions, an 
implicit framework of reference that appears to be almost beyond question or 
contestation. Its deeply ideological character is underlined by its unquestioning 
reproduction of the central wisdom of the contemporary age – the belief that  
that liberal market democracy is superior to all other forms of governance (Paris 
2002, 638).  
Despite the fact that it is deeply rooted in ideological foundations, liberal 
peacebuilding is not a static form; quite the contrary – it has, over the course of 
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its history, consistently evidenced a highly impressive capacity for reinvention. 
In acknowledging this capacity, MacGinty observes that liberal peacebuilding 
has been modified in recent decades through the mainstreaming of human 
rights, the rise of the human security perspective, the growing influence of 
conflict resolution NGOs, and the incorporation of alternative frameworks for 
dispute resolution (2008, 145).  
In engaging with this broad theme of reformulation, I attribute discursive 
‘broadening’ and ‘widening’ to the pervasive and sustained influence of the 
comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach (somewhat 
confusingly, practitioners sometimes use the term interchangeably with ‘whole-
of-government’ or ‘integrated’) is a policy axiom that has gained ground within a 
range of policy spheres (not just post-conflict peacebuilding). The British 
Government’s Stabilisation Unit, in a document entitled ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’, observes that it seeks to ‘promote a shared understanding of the 
situation and common aims and objectives’. It also ‘develop[s] structures and 
processes to help align planning and implementation’ and ‘establish[es] 
relationships and cultural understanding’ (2006). While the comprehensive 
approach is not intrinsically liberal, it has nonetheless become closely 
associated with the practice of liberal peacebuilding.  
The comprehensive approach therefore provides the background against 
which the practice of post-conflict intervention has developed. A separate 
Stabilisation Unit document, entitled ‘The Integrated Approach is Essential’ 
(2010) (policy practitioners use the words ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ 
interchangeably), equates the comprehensive with improved levels of inter-
departmental co-operation and coordination.  
Upon closer reflection, this appears to be a somewhat narrow 
interpretation of comprehensiveness. In the course of this thesis, I will 
understand the comprehensive approach in broader perspectives, arguing that 
it anticipates a deepened democratisation, a more sustained engagement with 
context and a heightened integration of constitutive elements. Conceivably, 
under certain circumstances, improved inter-departmental co-operation could 
produce each one of the aforementioned developments; however, it would, from 
the perspective that I advance, be a profound error to equate the two.  
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In this thesis, I break the comprehensive approach down into three 
dimensions. I want to establish how each of a specific liberal peacebuilding 
actor interprets and articulates each dimension. With a view to answering this 
question, I analyse how each dimension is articulated within key comprehensive 
approach documents. This will in turn enable me to assess how and to what 
extent the contradictions and tensions of liberal peacebuilding (which are set 
out in more detail in the Literature Review) are reconciled.  
I aim to contest an established narrative of liberal peacebuilding which 
suggests a teleological progression that is achieved through the reconciliation 
of opposites. This reading equips liberal peacebuilding with a clear sense of 
momentum, anticipating a transgression of prior limitations and a movement 
towards a more complete, holistic or comprehensive approach.  
It should be stressed that I do not question or challenge the proposition 
of a comprehensive approach. Its ontological basis is not a concern or 
preoccupation. Rather its existence is instead taken for granted, with a view to 
establishing how to what extent it succeeds in overcoming the tensions of 
liberal peacebuilding.  
In drawing upon critical accounts and perspectives, my analysis is rooted 
within a prior understanding that the liberal peace is inherently conflictual in 
character. By virtue of the fact that tensions and contradictions are structurally 
rooted, liberal peacebuilding discourse can qualify, mitigate or understate, but 
cannot overcome them entirely. The essential task of a critical analysis is 
therefore to strip away constructions and facades, with a view to revealing the 
underlying reality.  
As the Literature Review demonstrates in more detail, a number of 
important critical contributions trace the tensions and contradictions of liberal 
peacebuilding back to the prevailing neo-liberal order. For critical observers, 
liberal peacebuilding is more concerned with ensuring the reproduction of this 
order than with addressing human needs. From this perspective, the essential 
task of analysis is not to ensure a more complete reproduction but to strip away 
the façade and reveal the reality in its true dimensions. From this perspective, 
problem-solving approaches appear doomed to reproduce both tension and the 
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conditions of their own failure. Herein lies the significance of the initial question: 
liberal peacebuilding does not overcome or ‘reconcile’ conflicts but instead 
reproduces and reconfigures them.  
Liberal peacebuilding is predicated upon a diametrically opposed 
understanding: by incorporating the comprehensive approach into their 
engagements with post-conflict contexts, peacebuilding actors will be able to 
‘reconcile’ tensions. For these actors, the comprehensive approach is not only 
an aspiration to be achieved (see DfID, 2010b, MoD, 2009), but is already an 
observable feature, being manifested in both discourse and practice. In the 
Literature Review I demonstrate this by considering how ‘narrow’ frameworks of 
reference have been superseded by ‘broadened’ counterparts, a development 
evidenced by internal adjustments within each of the three component parts of 
post-conflict peacebuilding (democracy promotion, development and security).  
Each one of these adjustments serves as an affirmation of the liberal 
optimism that is deeply imbued within liberal peacebuilding. It originates within 
liberal ideology (the belief that societal tension can be overcome through the 
advance of rationalism and reason), technocracy (in which the process of 
rationalisation incrementally absents contingency) and peace theory (which 
equates positive peace with the amelioration of tension and contradiction).  
Liberalism, as the guiding ideology of the Enlightenment, reads human 
history as a teleological progression towards a previously suppressed reason, 
the concrete realisation of which will further embed ‘progress’ and ‘rationality’. 
This ideological predisposition is also clearly evidenced in liberal encounters 
with violence: the liberal mindset is almost entirely incapable of comprehending 
the ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’, the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ in anything 
other than binary opposition. Within this mindset there is a deeply rooted and 
persistent tendency to view violence as a pathology which is alien, external or 
antithetical to itself (Cramer 2006). Violence is not part of development or 
progress but is instead an aspect of the primordial, regressive and 
underdeveloped.  
Cramer (2006) has suggested that this perspective highlights a clear 
blind spot within liberal ideology. He argues that, far from being diametrically 
opposed to liberal practices and forms, violence is instead imbued within 
development and the advancement of the modernist project (also see Moore 
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2000). David Chandler and Mark Duffield, both of whom have highlighted the 
tensions and contradictions that are inherent to the liberal world order, similarly 
question whether the liberal peace can resolve its own contradictions, let alone 
those of the objects to which it is directed. Liberal peacebuilding is, for these 
observers, tied up with various forms of discipline and regulation, being 
predisposed to functionalise or instrumentalise the contextual, the local and the 
specific (Richmond 2011, 14).  
A substantial part of the debate of the liberal peace can be traced back 
to a more general debate about liberalism. Critical observers have suggested 
that the liberal project, far from being concerned with the realisation of 
individuality and heterogeneity, is in fact concerned with universalisation and 
rationalisation representing, in both respects, an essential imposition. The 
critique of the empirical record of liberal peacebuilding (see Paris 2010, 337) 
therefore overlaps with principled objections (e.g. to its technocratic character or 
its failure to sufficiently engage with local concerns and priorities).  
In responding to these criticisms, liberal peacebuilding has found a 
source of reinvention within the comprehensive approach to conflict 
engagement and intervention. This is why, upon reading through policy 
documents, we so frequently encounter the proposition of a convergence upon 
three key innovations: firstly, a deepened or more substantive framework of 
democratic reference; secondly, a more sustained integration of context; and 
finally a more complete ‘reconciliation’ or integration of each constitutive 
element (democracy promotion, development and security).  
Each of these three innovations precedes and sustains the proposition of 
a comprehensive approach. In asking how each dimension is reproduced at the 
level of the policy document, I propose to identify precisely how the application 
of a comprehensive approach framework has enabled a specific actor (the 
British government) to reconcile the tensions of liberal peacebuilding.  
I will situate this question within a specific context; namely, critical 
contributions that have sought to present the liberal peace as rigid (Barkawi and 
Laffey 1999, 412) and internally contradictory (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 424; 
Bickerton 2007, 93; De Guevara 2010, 116). Tension, for these observers, is 
something that is intrinsic to liberal peacebuilding. The proposition of a final 
reconciliation or enclosure is, from this perspective, an essentially ideological 
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assertion (see Chandler 2002 and 2006; Bickerton 2007) that has little or no 
grounding within the empirical reality of the liberal peace.  
The issues that surround the general problematic of reconciliation can be 
more completely conceptualised with reference to the work of Roland Paris 
(2011). Although Paris treats liberal peacebuilding with considerable care and 
sympathy (indeed, his work could broadly be characterised as an attempt to 
salvage liberal peacebuilding from its internal contradictions. While he remains 
aware of the complications that accompany the project of reconciliation, he 
ultimately returns to the proposition that, through improved sequencing, liberal 
peacebuilding can iron out its tension and contradictions, ultimately graduating 
towards more integrated forms of conflict engagement and intervention.  
In common with Paris, I propose to enlarge and apply this concept of 
‘tension’, conceiving of it as the basis for a more sustained engagement with 
the general problematic of reconciliation. Precisely because there are so many 
tensions and contradictions associated with liberal peacebuilding, I propose to 
narrow down and focus upon three specific tensions. These are:  
1. The tension between democratic engagement and 
managerial/technocratic oversight.  
2. The tension between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’. 
3. The tensions between democracy, development and security.  
This thesis will consider how policy documents engage with, and 
overcome, each of these tensions. In the established narrative of the 
comprehensive approach, the first tension has been ‘reconciled’ by a deepened 
or more substantive form of democracy; the second by an acknowledgement of 
the ‘internal’, ‘contextual’ or ‘local’; the third by a heightened engagement with 
the interlinkages which conjoin democracy, development and security.  
In ostensibly reproducing each of these shifts, liberal peacebuilding 
appears, at first glance, to have refuted the insinuation that it is rigid, enclosed 
or inflexible. It appears to have undergone an internal reinvention, adapting 
itself in response to critical contributions and insights. This reinvention appears 
as the acknowledgement of three key axioms that have been incorporated into 
peacebuilding orthodoxy. These are:  
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1. That technocratic and top-down frameworks of engagement are 
inherently limited. Peacebuilding actors need to seek to engage local 
actors at all stages of the peacebuilding intervention, acting in 
accordance with a substantive model of democratic engagement in 
the process.  
2. That solutions should not be conceived and applied across different 
contexts. General solutions will, by virtue of the fact that they are 
insufficiently rooted within the specificity of the individual context, 
ultimately only reproduce the conditions of their own failure. Local, 
regional and international actors should look to engage context at all 
stages of their intervention, thereby resisting the temptation to impose 
external perspectives. 
3. In engaging in post-conflict context, peacebuilding actors should seek 
to integrate the different aspects of their intervention, ensuring that 
each component is mutually reinforcing. Actors concerned with 
democracy promotion, development and security should take care to 
ensure that their interventions are mutually reinforcing and ultimately 
defined in relation to a common purpose.  
 
In integrating each of these lessons into their policy frameworks and 
procedures, peacebuilding actors have worked towards a more substantive 
model of democracy promotion, a heightened engagement with context and a 
more sustained integration of each constitutive elements of the peacebuilding 
ensemble.  
 I will ask how each of these lessons has been engaged and incorporated 
into key policy documents. I will not ask whether each dimension is present; 
rather, I will instead seek to engage with the various subtleties, ambiguities and 
nuances that accompany their textual reproduction. Once this is achieved, I will 
then provide an evaluation of the extent to which the initial tension has been 
reconciled.  
In engaging at each of the three points, I seek to demonstrate that the 
three discursive shifts do not overcome the given tensions; rather, they are 
instead reproduced, albeit in mediated form.  The discourse of liberal 
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peacebuilding, I suggest, ultimately reproduces the very same tensions that it 
ostensibly overcomes or reconciles.  
To be more specific, my analysis of deepening will suggest, alongside 
the ascribed transition, the persistence of technocratic and managerial 
overtones. My discussion of contextuality will similarly highlight the recurrence 
of reiteration of externalised and generic reference points; finally, my analysis of 
complementarity will draw attention to instances in which democracy and 
development are incorporated upon differential terms. In each of these 
instances, my core contribution is to question the initial progression into 
question and insert a more nuanced or qualified counterpart in its place.  
 In the remainder of this introductory chapter I will set out the different 
components of my analytical framework. First of all, I will define the 
comprehensive approach and peacebuilding, thereby setting out my terms of 
reference from the outset. I will then jusfity my specific emphasis upon the 
British government before proceeding to set out my research question, 
contribution and approach.  
The Comprehensive Approach: An Overview 
The general framework of a comprehensive approach is not, we should 
first recognise, distinctive to the peacebuilding field. NATO has called for a 
comprehensive approach to crises (2016) and the OECD sought, over the 
course of the 1990s, to achieve a more comprehensive approach to 
development. Comprehensiveness is therefore a broadly shared agenda that 
cuts across policy firewalls, providing an explanation of past failures and an 
anticipation of future successes. Comprehensiveness functions as a generally 
acknowledged ‘truth’ which inculcates a certain style of thought and practice, 
representing a progression beyond prior limitations (see Smith 2004, 56 and 
Chopra and Hohe 2004, 253).   
 The comprehensive approach is perhaps most appropriately described 
as a policy axiom, an article of policy truth made to function. Gawerc traces the 
comprehensive approach back to a general ‘consensus within the 
peacebuilding field’ which holds that ‘a peace process is more likely to succeed 
and be sustainable if it is comprehensive and accompanied by multi-track 
diplomacy and public involvement’ (2006, 442). Gawerc therefore makes two 
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significant contributions: firstly, she establishes that the comprehensive 
approach is a convergence upon a particular policy prescription; secondly, she 
situates the comprehensive approach within a wider process of institutional 
learning (also see OECD 1997; Pugh 2004, 39; Bellamy 2004, Gawerc 2006 
and Ahmed 2007) which has produced a ‘new understanding of the concept of 
peace and security’ (UN 2001). 
In operating within the parameters established by this ‘new 
understanding’ practitioners liberate themselves from the suffocating confides of 
technocratic frameworks. Paris (2002) therefore invokes an established 
consensus when he criticises the belief that peacebuilding interventions are 
essentially ‘technical (or non-ideological) exercise[s] in conflict management’. 
David Chandler, striking a similarly strong note of disapproval, references 
instances in which ‘Western states and international institutions reinterpret 
economic, social and political problems in other parts of the world as questions 
which are largely amenable to technical administrative solutions’ (2006, 7).  
Within the peacebuilding field, the wider project of comprehensiveness 
first began to attain increased prominence and importance with the publication 
of the hugely influential UN report, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, in 1992. This report anticipated a 
fundamental overhaul of the established system of global governance. It did not 
therefore seek to reproduce the established institutions and practices of the 
international system. Quite the contrary, it sought to invert the Westphalian 
state order (see Duffield 2003, 291; Newman et al (2009, 7) and established 
novel governance structures and arrangements.  
In the post-Cold War, the divide between the internal and the external no 
longer functioned as the basis of international order. Rather, the impact of intra-
state conflicts upon the international system instead contributed to a wide 
recognition that this distinction could, in the interests of international peace and 
security, no longer be sustained. Emerging challenges necessitated new tools 
and instruments that could help to consolidate the international liberal order – 
post-conflict peacebuilding and development were both key instruments in this 
respect. In acknowledging the growing strategic significance of development,  
Duffield invoked a ‘technology of security that is central to liberal forms of power 
and government’ (2007, preface, VII).  
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Here Duffield successfully captures the ways in which liberal 
technologies of government, which are ostensibly concerned with the creation 
of various freedoms, are closely bound up with external surveillance and 
management. These technologies work through and within local agents, thus 
reinforcing and strengthening the broader apparatus of liberal governance. 
They do not exert direct control or coercion, but instead imply more subtle forms 
of management and oversight.  
In highlighting how the development and security agendas have 
coalesced, Duffield demonstrates how development has become securitised 
and directed towards the consolidation of the established status quo. This 
provides a critical reading of a trend that An Agenda for Peace had described in 
more depth. Equally significantly, this document also introduced readers to two 
key concepts: the comprehensive approach and post-conflict peacebuilding. In 
their subsequent usage by international actors the two concepts came to be 
used interchangeably, in a way that furthered the impression that they were 
synonymous and even tautological (a comprehensive approach to questions of 
peace and insecurity implied peacebuilding; peacebuilding appeared as a 
comprehensive approach).  
 As the 1990s progressed, both concepts began to seep into the 
operational frameworks and working practices of national, regional and 
international actors. Increasingly economic institutions, such as the OECD (refer 
to the work of its Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-
operation) and the World Bank came to engage with the challenges and 
complexities of statebuilding and peacebuilding. At the domestic level, state 
actors also sought to integrate their approaches. Decompartmentalisation – the 
need for government departments to break down ‘firewalls’ and work across 
each other (Smith 2004, 33) –asserted itself as an increasingly pressing 
imperative, being enacted in a range of bureaucratic contexts. 
The ‘comprehensive approach’ therefore originally emerged in a policy 
context, being conceived as the basis for more integrated and cohesive 
approaches to conflict intervention. However, it has, by virtue of the cross-
fertilisation of the academic and policy fields, become a feature of the general 
peacebuilding literature. It is therefore relatively straightforward to find allusions 
to the comprehensive approach within the peacebuilding literature. Gawerc, for 
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instance, invokes a ‘relatively new interest in comprehensive, multi-dimensional 
and multi-track approaches’. She makes the important observation that this 
interest did not emerge randomly or in isolation from broader developments; 
rather it derived from the ‘limited success of traditional diplomacy and military 
intervention[s]’, which clearly evidenced a limited capacity to ‘to control 
protracted conflicts, let alone achieve peace’ (2006, 440).  
This provides us with an important insight into the emergence and 
development of the comprehensive approach. It emerged from a collaborative 
exercise of institutional learning, which was clearly directed towards the 
inadequacies and limitations of established techniques of conflict engagement. 
Peacebuilding initially emerged as part of this agenda because it was 
understood to provide a more ‘comprehensive’ framework of conflict 
engagement. This explains why Gawerc (2006) and Ahmed et al (2007) present 
it as a progression from its immediate predecessor (peacekeeping).  
This process of institutional learning did not occur in isolation, but was 
instead framed against the broader context of the so-called ‘new’ wars. These 
conflicts necessitated new techniques and practices precisely because they 
were irrational (initiated or sustained by ethnic/religious identities), diverged 
from conventional expectations and impacted upon regional and international 
security (Helman and Ratner 1992) (Rice 2003) (Rubin 2005). To put it slightly 
differently, the comprehensive approach arose as a responsive adaptation to a 
‘new breed’ of warfare, state breakdown and complex political emergencies 
(European Commission 1997, 25).  
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Theory and Practice 
The term ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ describes interventions in the 
aftermath of violent conflict which are addressed to the underlying causes of 
violent conflict. In An Agenda for Peace (1992), which is often cited as the point 
at which the concept began to assume a broader significance, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, the then UN-Secretary General, defined post-conflict peacebuilding as 
‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict’. The OECD defines 
peacebuilding as ‘activities designed to prevent conflict through addressing 
structural and proximate causes of violence, promoting sustainable peace, 
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delegitimising violence as a dispute resolution strategy’. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), meanwhile, defines peacebuilding as ‘a 
range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into 
conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and 
development’ (Alliance for Peacebuilding 2013).  
It is important to recognise that the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding 
(which developed in the post-Cold War era) was substantially proceeded by 
both peace theory and the associated field of peace studies. The word 
‘peacebuilding’ can itself be traced back to Johan Galtung’s Three Approaches 
to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, which was initially 
published in 1975.  
In contrast, it was only with the end of the Cold War that post-conflict 
peacebuilding began to become a significant practice within the international 
system. Up until this point, the political exigencies of the Cold War had 
restricted its use and implementation; there were very few instances, prior to 
1989, in which the UN had operated under a peacebuilding mandate. Largely 
due to the political divides of the Cold War, peacekeeping provided the main 
means of international engagement with conflict theatres. However, this was to 
change with the publication of An Agenda for Peace in 1992; this document 
made it clear that post-conflict peacebuilding would come to play a considerably 
larger and more prominent role in the post-Cold War era.  
As the Literature Review establishes in more depth and detail, this was 
as much a response to rapidly changing circumstances: the post-Cold War era 
had been inaugurated by a series of brutal and intense intra-state conflicts, 
which presented a clear challenge to international order. As the 1990s 
progressed, the UN oversaw (whether as the lead or delegating agency) a 
broad number of post-conflict interventions within a diverse range of settings. 
The practice of post-conflict peacebuilding rapidly became established as a 
core and integral feature of the post-Cold War political environment. While the 
UN played a pre-eminent role in the development of this practice, a range of 
other agencies and actors contributed to the evolving and developing practice 
of post-conflict peacebuilding. 
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However, it is important to recognise that these practical innovations 
were substantially proceeded, and to some extent anticipated by, an 
established body of peace theory (Gawerc 2006, 438). Hugely influential 
contributions from John Burton, who proposed that conflict arose in the denial of 
fundamental human needs; Johan Galtung, who advanced a structural analysis 
of violent conflict, and John Paul Lederach provided the basis for a theoretical 
framework which addressed the underlying causes, as opposed to proximate 
effects, of violent conflict (see Fetherston 2007, 202-203). Each of these 
authors argued in favour of an approach that was premised upon the principles 
of ‘positive peace’, which is distinguished from its negative counterpart upon the 
basis that it is not solely concerned with the mitigation or absenting of violent 
conflict (see Berdal 2009; Barnett et al 2007, 44; UN 2001; Keating and Knight 
2004, xxxiv). Positive peace can further be distinguished from ‘negative peace’ 
upon the basis that the former equates ‘peace’ with the realisation of 
fundamental human needs; in contrast, the latter defines ‘peace’ as the 
absence of violence (Haugerudbraaten 1998). 
Peace theory does not constrict democracy to specific processes, 
structures of institutions, but instead posits an open-ended process that is 
undermined and which is defined in the process of its implementation. Bertram 
therefore asserts that peace is ‘an indigenous product, the outcome of hard-
fought battles among local groups’ (1995, 405). Gawerc provides further insight 
when she observes that ‘solutions must be adopted by local actors and [cannot] 
be forced from above or imposed from the outside’ (2006, 441). Accordingly, 
‘each country must develop the approach that suits its particular circumstances’ 
(World Bank 1990, 14). Each of these contributions clearly establishes an 
account of democracy that is open-ended, that is sensitive to context and which 
is defined by local actors.  
This imposes clear limitations upon external actors, whose role is not to 
promote specific practices or attributes but is instead to initiate a process that 
will enable local actors to take the lead in the democratisation process. Kenneth 
Bush reiterates that the essential concern of peacebuilding is: ‘To encourage 
the creation of the political, economic, and social space, within which 
indigenous actors can identify, develop and employ the resources necessary to 
build a peaceful, prosperous and just society’ (Keating and Knight 2004, xxxvi). 
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Peacebuilding theory therefore closely resembles participatory development 
(DfID 1997, 37), with local actors being empowered to utilise the tools and 
techniques that will enable them to challenge established distributions of power.  
In emphasising the need to alter prevailing social conditions, peace 
theory is transformative in character and intent. MacGinty and Richmond 
reiterate that ‘[c]onflict transformation is not content with elite-level peace 
agreements, and instead drills down to address the identities, attitudes and 
education systems that underpin conflict’ (2013, 771). In contrast to 
peacekeeping, which is preoccupied with the management of violence, peace 
theory is therefore concerned with engaging and altering established structures 
of violence (see Azar 1986, 38; Keating and Knight 2004, xxxiv; Jabri 2013, 9). 
Peacebuilding can thus be theorised as a progression beyond peacekeeping: it 
does not seek to control or mitigate violent conflict but instead penetrates to its 
foundations and transforms prevailing social conditions.  
Peace theory is therefore premised upon the understanding that violence 
is essentially a symptom which derives from underlying pathologies (see UNDP 
2001, 13; Azar 1986, 28). Peace theory is distinguished from reconstruction 
upon the basis that it does not seek to restore the status quo ante. In further 
reiterating this point, Richmond and MacGinty clearly distinguish between 
conflict management, resolution and transformation (2013, 771), differentiating 
transformation upon the grounds that it ‘stresses a clear normative commitment 
to the transformation of social conditions and ‘the empowerment of the 
unorganised, the poor [and] the marginalised’ (UN, 1992). Peace theory 
envisages an ‘emancipatory project’, which is situated within a broader body of 
‘emancipatory peace research’ (Patomӓki 2001, 724, 727) and which seeks to 
‘emancipate humanity from unnecessary violence’ (Patomäki 2001, 731). 
While peacebuilding theory ultimately flowered into the interdisciplinary 
field of Peace Studies, peacebuilding practice remained comparatively 
underdeveloped and emaciated until the post-Cold War era, when a range of 
institutional actors began to develop post-conflict intervention capabilities. The 
World Bank’s development of a post-conflict unit and the heightened 
importance of the Economic and Social Council within the UN institutional 
apparatus were both important developments in this respect. Over the course of 
the 1990s, the relative balance between theory and practice would again shift. 
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Far from being guided by a body of theory, practical peacebuilding interventions 
during the early-mid 1990s instead appeared to more closely resemble a series 
of ad hoc improvisations, which were insufficiently adjusted to the challenges 
encountered within post-conflict theatres (see Benner and Rotmann 2008, 44).  
 
Research Focus: The British Government 
For the purposes of the current analysis of the comprehensive approach 
to peacebuilding, it would be productive to engage with a state actor that played 
a leading role in integrating development approaches into its conflict-
engagement frameworks and which played a foremost role in the development 
of non-traditional (e.g. non-military) approaches to security challenges. In 
addition, this actor’s contribution to both of these fields of innovation should be 
internationally recognised and acknowledged.  
The British government meets each of these requirements. In the years 
since it was founded in 1997, the Department for International Development 
(DfID) has proactively illustrated how development practices and techniques 
can be applied to the challenges of conflict engagement. Its contributions in this 
respect have been particularly important because it has helped to break with 
the belief that development begins at the point where violent conflict ends. In 
illustrating how development can make an active contribution to peacebuilding, 
the DfID has contributed to the emergence of a new orthodoxy.  
To the same extent, the British government, and again the DfID’s 
contribution should be recognised in this respect, is a particularly instructive 
point of engagement because its contribution to the development of innovative, 
flexible and adaptive approaches to conflict intervention has been 
internationally recognised. Its contribution to international forums and 
discussions further reiterates the British government’s role in helping to elevate 
and sustain the agenda of the comprehensive approach.  
The election of the New Labour government brought to power a 
government with a clear international agenda. In the following years, the DfID 
emerged as a standard-bearer for sophisticated, integrated and broad-ranging 
responses to the challenges of underdevelopment and violent conflict. In 
contributing to broader debates and adopting a leading international role, the 
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British government played a leading role in helping to challenge and alter 
established security and development agendas.  
However, it should be noted that both the comprehensive approach and 
post-conflict peacebuilding initially developed within a different context, namely 
the United Nations (UN). As the leading international authority for questions 
pertaining to international security, the UN initially established the basis for the 
development of both the comprehensive approach and post-conflict 
peacebuilding. The two concepts originated within the UN framework, and this 
provided the basis upon which national and regional actors could then integrate 
both reference points into their conflict engagement strategies and practices. 
The UN also played the leading role in the development and application of the 
practice of post-conflict peacebuilding – its pre-eminence in this respect is 
further underlined by the number of academic studies that focus upon its role.  
The early-mid 1990s coincided with several key and important shifts 
within the international system. The bipolar system had given way to the 
uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. This presented both new challenges and 
new opportunities. In the latter sense, questions of peace and security became 
subject to a fundamental reconceptualization – it was during this period that 
concepts such as ‘human security’ and ‘positive peace’ began to become 
popularised and integrated into policy frameworks and structures (OECD, 
1995). Similarly, a series of UN conferences held during the early-mid 1990s 
also established a radical and emancipatory agenda centred upon human 
rights, gender equality and the environment. The Millennium Development 
Goals emerged from this process and established the basis for a new 
development agenda.  
The emerging consensus on development fed into a broader consensus, 
which held that the problems of security, development and governance were 
essentially interconnected and interrelated. Development could, by implication, 
not be engaged as a sectoral or technical concern. Insecurity was not therefore 
a problem that could be resolved by technical specialists or expertise; rather it 
instead necessitated a broader analysis, which would be able to simultaneously 
engage the economic, political and social drivers of instability.  
In engaging with the textual output of the British government, I will 
attempt to identify how this broad-ranging agenda and set of preoccupations 
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was engaged and incorporated by a specific national-level actor. This is 
particularly important because national-level studies of post-conflict remain, in 
contrast to studies focused upon the UN and EU, relatively underdeveloped. In 
making an additional contribution to the academic study of peacebuilding, I 
therefore seek to demonstrate that the national level can be an equally 
instructive and fruitful point of engagement.  
Research Question 
How and to What Extent Does the British Government’s Comprehensive 
Approach to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Reconcile the Discursive Tensions and 
Contradictions of Liberal Peacebuilding? 
The first sub-section of this chapter has already engaged with the central 
research question in some detail, and therefore established the basis for a 
research thesis which engages with two separate questions. The ‘how’ of the 
above research question is essentially the identification of the discursive 
techniques, strategies and manoeuvres that enable the comprehensive 
approach to overcome or reconcile the tensions of liberal peacebuilding. The 
essential premise at this point is that the comprehensive approach does 
reconcile tensions and that the central concern is to identify precisely how it 
achieves this.  
The second part of the question is very different – it instead requires a 
closer engagement with the question of extent – the degree to which the 
comprehensive approach overcomes tensions and contradictions. This instead 
suggests a different order of analysis – that is, with tensions that reoccur or 
which are reiterated at the level of the text. In contrast to the first part of the 
question, ‘extent’ requires analysis.  
Both parts of the question relate to reconciliation – that is, to its 
possibilities, limitations and constraints. This question is open-ended, and 
although I approach it from within a critical perspective, I do not seek to 
predetermine the form of reconciliation or make any definitive judgements as to 
its conditions of possibility. I accept that, even in the absence of an observed 
discursive reconciliation, it could conceivably be achieved under different 
circumstances and in different instances. I do not therefore begin with the 
proposition that tensions or contradictions cannot be reconciled or overcome. 
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Ultimately, I proceed upon the basis of the understanding that both dimensions 
of the question can only be resolved with reference to the text. 
The third chapter sets out how I intend to apply the comprehensive 
approach framework. It breaks this framework down into three components 
(deepening, contextuality and complementarity) and then uses each of these 
components to identify relevant texts. It develops Lene Hansen’s approach to 
discourse analysis and demonstrates how her contribution can establish the 
basis for a critical analysis of each text. The tables within this chapter set out 
the progression of each stage of my analysis and also identify the core texts 
that will be engaged by the following three empirical chapters.  
Research Contribution 
My thesis is an important contribution to the research literature because 
it is concerned with the discursive structuring of peacebuilding. A considerable 
part of the literature – both problem-solving and critical – is concerned with the 
question of how contradictions and tensions are evidenced in material practice. 
It is therefore relatively straightforward to find case studies of specific 
interventions or studies that seek to apply general lessons to the practice of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Chandler explicitly reiterates this point when he 
refers to the proliferation of ‘empirical case studies [focused upon] fairly generic 
and idealistic sets of policy recommendations’ (2006, 189). By implication, 
empirical practice has tended to predominate the discussion of peacebuilding. 
In large part, this is a reflection of the fact that peacebuilding has been 
predominantly conceived and approached as a practical project, that is with a 
view to identifying and applying practical solutions.  
In comparison, it is noticeable that far fewer contributions focus upon the 
role of peacebuilding discourse. This is a particularly important oversight 
because, as my own research reiterates, discourse essentially structures 
practice, and sets out its limits and possibilities. In engaging with discourse, I 
propose to take a ‘step back’ from practice and to engage at an essentially prior 
level of analysis. In consciously breaking with the fetishisation of practice, I seek 
to demonstrate that tensions and contradictions are evidenced at a prior level of 
analysis and that the essential question is not simply to achieve a fuller 
reconciliation in practice. I therefore suggest that it is necessary to critically 
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interrogate the basis of this comprehensive approach rather than to ask how it 
can be materially manifested in practice.  
In focusing upon the material practice, observers invariably abstract from 
the ideal and seek to establish the extent to which the practice approximates to 
this prior template. A considerable part of the critical literature is therefore 
concerned with demonstrating the extent to which the ‘actual’ does not 
correspond to the ideal. This, I would argue, misses an essential and important 
question – namely the discursive processes which generate concepts such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘context’. In engaging at this point, I propose to identify the 
form in which both concepts are reproduced within key texts. In many instances, 
I argue, it is the case that the tensions and contradictions of this discourse are 
reproduced in subsequent effect.  
The break with practice is also significant because it enables me to 
diverge from an associated assumption – namely that analysis should begin, 
almost as a prior condition, with the actor that has played a central role in the 
development of the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding. In applying this 
assumption, a number of research engagements therefore orientate, as if under 
the influence of a gravitational pull, towards the UN. In comparison, far less 
research has focused upon national-level actors and their engagement with the 
peacebuilding agenda. This is an important oversight because it fails to 
acknowledge the contribution that national-level actors have made to debates 
pertaining to both post-conflict peacebuilding and the comprehensive approach.  
This thesis is also an important contribution to the critical literature 
because it questions or challenges normatively loaded concepts such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘context’. In reiterating the ways in which both concepts can 
become incorporated into wider power structures, this thesis insists, in a 
characteristically Foucauldian way, upon an analysis grounded within the 
ubiquity of power relations. It achieves this by highlighting the ways in which the 
transformative and emancipatory components of the liberal peace are 
reformulated and aligned with wider neo-liberal imperatives. In suggesting that 
concepts such as ‘democratisation’ and ‘context’ are intelligible in their relation 
to this wider context, it directly challenges the premise – which is naively 
reproduced within parts of the critical literature – that they can be conceived in 
opposition to power.  
 30 
Although this thesis is distinguished by its emphasis upon its emphasis 
upon discourse, I understand it to be a contribution to a broader critical project. 
This project seeks to highlight, question and challenges the biases and 
distortions that have become deeply interwoven into liberal peacebuilding. It 
begins, in common with this wider project, with an abrupt rejection of the 
premise that ‘problems must be solved rather than solutions problematised’ 
(Heathershaw and Lambach 2008, 275; also see Pugh 2004, 39). It is similarly 
predisposed to reject the proposition that peacebuilding should be synonymous 
with the ‘spread of technocracy, the professionalisation of staff, the promotion of 
“best practice” and the spread of common conflict analysis frameworks’ 
(Richmond and MacGinty 2013, 777). Quite the contrary – it instead views 
standardisation, bureaucratisation (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009) and 
professionalization (Sabaratnam 2011, 17) as sources of concern and 
trepidation.  
In deliberately and consciously breaking with the policy imperative – that 
is, an unthinking repetition of the norms and conventions of the policy sphere, 
my contribution – in common with the wider critical project of which it is part – 
originates within a concern that the peacebuilding field has become far too 
closely intertwined, to the point where it almost appears to be indistinguishable 
from, the concerns and preoccupations of policy-makers. When perceived from 
this vantage-point, lesson learning, project evaluation and best practice 
frameworks do not appear as the harbingers and embodiment of a more fully 
realised policy wisdom but rather as mechanisms which threaten to ‘deepen 
and extend the power of Liberal governance’ (Duffield 2001, 260).  
In critically engaging with the root underpinning assumptions of liberal 
peacebuilding, this research seeks to provide the basis for further research that 
destabilises received policy wisdoms and truths. In ideal circumstances, this 
research would challenge or disrupt the grounding epistemology of liberal 
peacebuilding, opening up space for research that seeks to implicate this 
individual and specific practice within wider power complexes and networks. In 
common with Roland Paris (2000), this research would begin with the 
proposition that the focus upon practical implementation ultimately represents a 
narrowing or delimitation of the terms of reference. It would extend and 
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operationalise the proposition that it is imperative to ‘broaden’ the study of 
peace operations (see Hameiri 2010, 11; Duffield 2001, 28).  
In my own account, this ‘broadening’ extends analysis to the 
assumptions that underpin liberal peacebuilding. It focuses in upon the fact that 
liberal peacebuilders have unquestioningly internalised the proposition of an 
incremental progression towards a comprehensive approach. This has 
assumed the status of a policy axiom. In questioning and probing this article of 
truth, I propose to further develop  develop Bellamy’s proposition that it is 
necessary to question ‘significant normative assumptions that are left 
unexplored’ (Bellamy 2004, 19).  
My thesis therefore originates within the understanding that there is a 
clear need to ‘expose and problematise the ideas and practices that underpin 
dominant approaches to peace operations’ (Bellamy 2004, 31). It seeks to 
unsettle deeply rooted or ‘sedimented’ assumptions (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1982, 196; Paris 1997, 55; Haugerudbraaten 1998) by applying a critical 
analysis to unspoken, implicit or essentially prior assumptions (see Richmond 
2011, 58).  
In enabling the framework of the comprehensive approach to be applied 
as a critical tool of enquiry, rather than as a policy imperative to be further 
unravelled, this thesis provides a basis upon which future research can engage 
with the conceptual limitations and constraints of liberal peacebuilding. The 
three dimensions of the comprehensive approach can therefore be transferred 
to other contexts, potentially being applied to other manifestations of 
peacebuilding policy at the national, regional or international level.  
My research provides an analysis fixated upon text and its various 
potentialities and limitations. My analysis further helps to orientate the 
discussion away from the material practice of peacebuilding and instead directs 
attention towards the question of how discourse is structured and arranged. 
This is a particularly important contribution because it reiterates that the 
essential concern is not to focus upon the material reproduction of an idealised 
form (e.g. of democracy or context) but rather to identify precisely how this form 
is reproduced and, to borrow an expression of Foucault’s, made to function. 
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Research Summary 
This thesis provides a critical analysis of the discursive structuring of 
core policy documents. It engages with the underpinning assumptions of the 
comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and seeks to provide a reading that 
problematises deeply ingrained normative assumptions. It directly opposes 
liberal assumptions by adopting a Foucauldian framework of analysis, which 
teases out tensions, contradictions and divergences.  The Literature Review 
establishes the basis for a general critical analysis by demonstrating how critical 
perspectives have emerged in response to the limitations and constraints of 
liberal peacebuilding. This chapter identifies core contradictions and tensions 
while demonstrating the essential contribution of critical perspectives. The third 
and fourth chapters of this thesis establish the theoretical and empirical basis 
for a critical engagement with core policy documents. The third chapter 
develops core theoretical concepts and themes whereas the fourth chapter 
demonstrates how the comprehensive approach can be developed and applied.  
In asking how I could challenge and contest the grounding assumptions 
of liberal peacebuilding, I found Foucauldian perspectives to be of particular 
utility: they enabled me to question and challenge grounding assumption by 
inverting core binary oppositions (freedom in opposition, knowledge in 
opposition to power) and also helped me to develop a more sophisticated 
analysis of power and freedom. In refusing to situate the two reference points in 
opposition to each other, Foucault established the basis for a critical 
interrogation of liberal technologies of government, which are operationalised 
through and within different conditions and attributes of freedom. A closer 
engagement with liberal technologies of government accustoms us to the 
insight that, far from functioning as the point at which power is refused, freedom 
more frequently operates as the means through it is manifested and concretely 
put into effect.   
My approach to discourse is also grounded within a Foucauldian 
framework. Although I would not define my analysis as a discourse analysis 
(this implies a more precise, exact and systematic framework than the one I 
actually apply) it does, in the process of developing a critical reading, draw 
upon a number of the underlying principles of discourse analysis. It adapts the 
work of Lene Hansen, an International Relations theorist whose work can be 
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broadly categorised as Foucauldian or post-structuralist. I then adapt this 
framework of reference and seek to integrate it into my analysis of policy 
documents. In addition to providing underpinning principles, Hansen also offers 
some important insights which have implications for textual selection, the period 
of engagement and the objects of analysis. 
The comprehensive approach is broken down into three separate 
components: deepening, contextuality and complementarity. Policy actors 
would not explicitly recognise or use these terms, but would register their 
meaning at an unconscious level of analysis. In explicitly articulating their 
underlying meaning, I establish an analytical framework that can be applied to 
policy texts, thereby establishing the basis for a critical analysis of the 
discursive structuring of policy documents. The fourth chapter, in engaging with 
each dimension in more depth and detail, demonstrates how the framework of 
the comprehensive approach can be empirically applied and developed.  
I will then identify specific policy documents, asking how they reproduce 
deepening, contextuality and complementarity. I then propose to explore 
precisely how reconciliation is achieved within each of the given texts. I 
approach the texts from a critical perspective, directing my critical analysis to 
points of enclosure that are contingent, unstable or mutually contradictory. In 
concluding, I summarise my main observations, link the discussion back to the 
theory chapter and the literature review and suggest points that could be 
fruitfully engaged by future research.  
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Chapter One  
Literature Review: Bringing in Critical Perspectives 
Introduction 
As this chapter seeks to illustrate, far from embodying the point at which 
a more complete reconciliation is attained, realised and put into effect, liberal 
peacebuilding should instead be conceived and approached as a deeply 
conflicted object of reference which is both internally conflicted and afflicted by 
perpetual tensions between its theory and practice.  
The essential contribution of this chapter is therefore to demonstrate the 
scope, significance and implications of these tensions. Important work has 
already been done in this respect: Bickerton (2007) has, for example, previously 
highlighted how statebuilding practices frequently both invoke and undermine 
the principle of sovereignty; Chandler (2006), in highlighting the tension 
between the stated objectives and actual outcomes of post-conflict intervention, 
examines instances in which external actors have reproduced the very 
weaknesses that they have ostensibly sought to address; and Cramer (2006), in 
demonstrating the forms of violence that are inherent to liberalism, highlights a 
clear tension between the ideological and empirical components of the ‘Liberal 
Peace’.  
In highlighting contradictions and tensions that are deeply rooted within 
the liberal peace, each of these contributions establishes a clear agenda for this 
chapter. In this chapter I work towards the understanding that tension is not an 
unfortunate or contingent consequence of peacebuilding but instead suggest 
that, far from overcoming tensions, liberal peacebuilding just as frequently 
reproduces them in subsequent effect (Bickerton 2007).  
In engaging with these contradictions, I structure this chapter around 
Bellamy’s distinction between problem-solving and critical approaches (2004). 
Whereas the former seeks to reproduce liberal assumptions, the latter seeks to 
interpolate the liberal peace within wider power relations. David Mosse has 
drawn a very similar distinction between problem-solving approaches, which are 
premised upon ‘rational problem solving’, and critical approaches, which instead 
challenge ‘rationalising technical discourse [that conceal] hidden purposes of 
bureaucratic power or dominance’ (2004, 2). This chapter is arranged around 
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this distinction. I initially engage the context in which post-conflict peacebuilding 
emerged; I then discuss its constitutive components, and finally I highlight some 
of the central themes and concerns of liberal peacebuilding. I will then proceed 
to engage with perspectives that challenge the grounding premises of the liberal 
peace. 
Although I repeatedly distinguish between the two branches of the 
literature, I do so with an acknowledgement that it is equally important to remain 
aware of their interaction and interrelation. From my perspective as a 
researcher, one of the most interesting questions is how liberal peacebuilding 
has progressed and developed – this is a preoccupation that is clearly 
prefigured by, and embodied within, the initial research question.  
In addition to the problem-solving/critical divide and a clear sense of 
progression and evolution, the breadth of the peacebuilding literature can also 
be said to be another of its defining attributes. Development economists, 
anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists have all influenced the field, 
making important and invaluable contributions in the process. While the sheer 
breadth of the literature is clearly to be welcomed it has been, for purposes of  
parsimony and thematic coherence, to omit or overlook a number of points of 
potential engagement. This chapter does not therefore engage with the peace 
studies literature or with the conflict resolution literature; to the same extent, it 
does not concern itself with case studies of specific interventions.  
In this chapter I will begin by discussing the broader contextual 
background, the ‘framing’ of peacebuilding discourse and practice. This part of 
the discussion will focus upon the UN and the so-called ‘new wars’. The UN is a 
particularly important point of reference because, as observed in the 
introductory chapter, it played a pre-eminent role in the development of post-
conflict peacebuilding. The so-called ‘new wars’ were particularly important in 
this respect because they provided the initial impetus for the development of an 
architecture of external engagement, intervention and mediation.  
Precisely the same could be said of the comprehensive approach. As the 
introductory chapter has already identified, the comprehensive approach to 
post-conflict peacebuilding emerged as a responsive adaptation to structural 
shifts within the international system. The emergence of a distinctively ‘new’ 
form of war necessitated new practices and techniques of conflict intervention. 
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Both the comprehensive approach and post-conflict peacebuilding therefore 
emerged within a context of a broader debate which sought to engage problems 
of external intervention; specifically, the point at which external intervention 
should be undertaken, the means through which it should be practiced and the 
structures and processes that should be put into place in its aftermath. In my 
discussion of both innovations, I will primarily engage with the academic 
literature, although reference will also be made to relevant policy documents.  
A discussion of the UN and the new wars helps us to understand how 
and why a comprehensive approach emerged. The Components of Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding: Governance, Development and Security identifies the 
key referent objects. It sets out each individual component of a ‘Holy Trinity’ 
(democracy promotion, development and security) and explains how they have 
become, through the influence of the comprehensive approach, subject to a 
deepening and broadening. In engaging at each point, I register and 
acknowledge the progression from a ‘narrow’ to a ‘broad’ framework of 
reference. Democracy, democracy and security are not therefore engaged as 
static forms, as the distilled embodiment of an essence, but are instead 
conceived and engaged in their progression.  
After initially establishing the key features of post-conflict peacebuilding, I 
then seek to unpack liberal peacebuilding, with specific attention to its 
ideological and technocratic components. The second part of the review then 
engages with critical perspectives. In the first part of the review my attention is 
focused upon the components and attributes of the ‘liberal peace’. For 
unreflective practitioners, the essential question is not what peacebuilding is 
(this is implicitly assumed) or how it functions within a broader context (this is 
unrelated to the immediate terms of reference), but rather how this framework 
can be more effectively implemented or realised. In fixating upon 
implementation, these actors blind themselves to a whole range of fascinating 
and thought-provoking questions and fail to acknowledge the clear need to 
broaden the study of peace operations (Paris 2000).  
Aside from being engaged with very different questions, problem-solving 
and critical approaches also orientate towards very different points of 
engagement. Problem-solving approaches proceed from a specific set of 
assumptions to ask how they can be more fully embodied or reproduced. 
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Critical approaches, in contrast, seek to return to prior assumptions and to 
uncover deeply internalised assumptions and predispositions that may lie at the 
root of the problem. In failing to do this, liberal peacebuilding leaves itself open 
to the accusation that it reproduces its own tensions and contradictions in 
subsequent effect.  
In contrast to liberal problem-solving perspectives, which view tension 
and contradiction as a challenge to be overcome and as the incitement of 
ameliorative correctives, critical perspectives instead seek to unravel tension to 
its full implication and significance. This echoes Marxism’s anticipation of a 
future society within the tensions, contradictions and dissonances of capitalism. 
The topic ‘Critical Perspectives’ heralds the second part of the review. It breaks 
down into three sub-sections. First of all, Critical Perspectives: Disciplinary 
Liberalism directly inverts one of the central articles of liberal faith by 
highlighting the ways in which economic integration can exacerbate and 
intensify conflict dynamics.  Critical Perspectives: Critical Engagements with 
Statebuilding then demonstrates how the formalised state-building frameworks 
become, when transferred to post-conflict contexts, subject to various forms of 
subversion, reconfiguration and even inversion. Critical Perspectives: Engaging 
with Complexity similarly examines how the tensions and contradictions of the 
post-conflict context distort the smooth linearities and regularities of liberal 
peacebuilding beyond recognition. By engaging at each of these points, I 
demonstrate that analysis should not begin with abstract templates but should 
instead begin from a prior anticipation of contingency, subversion and volatility. 
The conclusion then brings the overall discussion together and leads into the 
following Foucauldian chapter. 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Liberal Peacebuilding 
1. The Broader Context: UN Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and 
the New Wars 
During the Cold War, the UN’s ability to uphold its international mandate 
was severely limited by political exigencies. This meant that its interventions 
were largely confined to limited forms of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is 
essentially a form of conflict management; it does not attempt to resolve 
underlying causes or drivers, but instead attempts to mitigate the worst 
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consequences. The prospect of a more ambitious approach began to gather 
momentum in the early 1990s, when the inauguration of a ‘new world order’ 
raised hopes that the UN might be poised to realise the hopes and expectations 
which had been invested in it more than 50 year earlier. These hopes were 
further raised when, in the early 1990s, the organisation oversaw practical 
interventions within a diverse range of post-conflict settings, including 
Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia.  
Practical intervention proceeded far in advance of conceptual and 
theoretical consolidation. In reflecting upon this development, Ahmed et al 
observed that, in the early 1990s, quantitative growth in activity far outstripped 
qualitative reflection (2007, 12). From its inception, post-conflict peacebuilding 
appeared to be an inherently practical or ‘pragmatic’ concern which remained 
under-theorised. Questions such as the significance of the practice, its relation 
to preponderant interests within the international system and its broader 
implications remained, at least during these initial years, under-explored.  
Many of these initial interventions were therefore essentially ad hoc in 
character, and the development of doctrinal and theoretical bases were 
subsequent to the emergence of a practice of peacebuilding. This slowly began 
to change when a Political Affairs Department, Peacebuilding Commission and 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) established the basis for improved 
responsive capabilities (Diehl et al 1996; Ahmed et al 2007). These institutional 
reforms provided the centre for a range of impressive practical innovations 
(Chopra 2000; Dobbins et al 2004). Ammitzbøll and Torjesen (2007; also see 
UN 2006) documented the democratisation of the organisation’s peacebuilding 
practices and frameworks of engagement. At the same time, the organisation 
developed its ability to undertake multifunctional peace operations (Chesterman 
2004). However, these developments, while important and significant, were not 
straightforward or uncomplicated, and a number of observers (Richmond 2004; 
Zanotti 2006; Berdal and Economides 2007) have sought to draw attention to 
associated contradictions, constraints and limitations.  
In addition to improving a basis upon which practical peacebuilding 
interventions could be undertaken, the UN also played an invaluable role in 
defining the terms of the post-Cold War agenda. A series of reports that the 
organisation published over the course of the 1990s made a crucial contribution 
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in this respect. These reports traversed a number of levels (subnational, 
national and transnational), highlighted different dimensions of conflict 
(economic, political and social) and engaged different phases of the conflict 
intervention cycle (extending from preventative to post-conflict phases).  
An Agenda for Peace (1992) captured the dynamism and flux of the 
rapidly shifting security environment. It introduced the concept of post-conflict 
peacebuilding and thereby established the basis for a more sustained 
engagement with the structural or ‘root’ causes of political violence (UN 1995). 
The report stressed that institutional reform was a necessary response to a 
‘new breed’ of conflict and reiterated that post-conflict peacebuilding was 
essentially a response to objective changes within the nature of war. Ammitzbøll 
and Torjesen echoed this point when they suggested that the new wars 
necessitated workable, comprehensive and integrated strategies of conflict 
intervention.  
Associated fears and prejudices found expression within contributions 
from Samuel Huntingdon (The Clash of Civilisations), Robert Kaplan (The 
Coming Anarchy) and Michael Ignatieff (Blood and Belonging). Each writer 
successfully tapped into the zeitgeist by furthering the impression that the 
global hinterlands were regressing to a state characterised by irrational and 
primordial hatreds. These concerns were lent an added air of intensity by the 
perception that the international community was poorly placed to contain the 
consequences of violent conflict. Peacekeeping, which previously functioned as 
the predominant mode of international engagement with conflict theatres, was 
dwarfed by the scale of the challenges which now confronted the international 
system.  
State breakdown, regional destabilisation and mass population 
movements all posed a clear and immediate threat to the stability of the 
international system. In reflecting upon these challenges, Kofi Annan, the 
former UN Secretary-General, observed that the multi-faceted character of 
‘complex political emergencies’ necessitated ‘co-operation across a range of 
different agencies and departments’ (UN 2000). Post-conflict peacebuilding 
could therefore be said to be part of a more general problematic of intervention 
– the circumstances under when it was appropriate to intervene; the means 
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through which intervention should be undertaken; the measures that should be 
put in place once intervention had occurred.  
The Brahimi Report (UN 2000) explored how peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding could be more effectively integrated into a general strategy. In 
contrast to preceding reports (UN 1992; UN 1995) that had been more 
concerned with clarifying key concepts and themes, it evidenced a closer 
preoccupation with logistical co-ordination. It also touched upon the co-
ordination between different agencies and post-conflict actors, the UN 
Secretariat’s post-conflict capacities and the development of peace 
enforcement capabilities. In the Prevention of Armed Conflict (UN 2001) the 
serving UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed the centrality and 
significance of conflict prevention. Annan suggested that prevention would be 
considerably improved by an improved understanding of the roots of violent 
conflict, a subject that An Agenda for Peace had previously engaged in great 
depth and detail. Annan placed a similar faith in ‘good governance’ and 
‘sustainable development’ frameworks, presenting both as a means through 
which preventative and post-conflict interventions could be more effectively 
integrated.  
In reading these documents alongside each other, the reader is struck by 
the sense of a linear progression, which runs through and conjoins each 
document. The reader is left with a clear impression – and this is to some extent 
reproduced within the broader peacebuilding literature – that post-conflict 
peacebuilding is a progression beyond prior limitations and that it is, by 
implication, far better adjusted to the challenges and complexities of a post-
Cold War environment that presented novel challenges.  
This point was clearly appreciated by Mary Kaldor, who argued that it 
was entirely inappropriate to view the wars of the late twentieth century as a 
recidivist reversion to a barbarism that modernism had long surpassed. This, 
she suggested, would be to mistake the form for the content. In Kaldor’s view 
these ‘new’ wars were inextricably linked into modernity and its hyper-
acceleration in the form of globalisation. The new wars therefore originated 
within a dichotomy: while their ostensible form suggested a reversion, their 
underlying dynamics could be traced back to global integration. Kaldor clearly 
reiterated this dichotomy when she defined globalisation as: ‘[A] contradictory 
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process involving [integration] and fragmentation, homogenisation and 
diversification, globalisation and localisation (1999, 3).’  
In Kaldor’s analysis, globalisation placed new stresses and strains upon 
the domestic state. States dependent upon external benefactors were 
increasingly vulnerable and insecure, with the consequence that state 
weakness and state collapse were increasingly pronounced features of the  
international order (Zartman, 1995). Statebuilding therefore implied an analysis 
of state weakness and a practical commitment to the establishment of  
functional, accountable and representative states. Yannis (also see Robinson 
1998 and Krasner 2004) linked these two agendas (globalisation and 
statebuilding) when he referenced a ‘post-Cold War international environment in 
which globalisation and the decline of state authority have become the 
quintessential questions of our time’ (2003, 65). 
In common with Huntingdon’s Clash of Civilisations, Kaldor sought to 
shatter the Panglossian naiveté that had accompanied the end of the Cold War. 
Far from ushering in an ‘end of history’, this period instead gave rise to a series 
of brutal, complex and internecine conflicts. In divulging itself of liberal illusions 
and self-deceits, the international community now addressed itself to:  
[a] new breed of intra-state conflicts [that] have certain characteristics 
that present United Nations peacekeepers with challenges not presented 
since the early 1960s. They are usually fought not only by regular armies 
but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-
defined chains of command. They are often guerrilla wars without clear 
front lines. (UN 1995) 
 
These developments anticipated the emergence of a comprehensive 
approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. State breakdown, the heightened pre-
eminence of irregular military forces and the collapse of the distinction between 
civilian and combatant all presented clear and immediate challenges which 
could not be tackled within established terms of engagement. Ongoing 
developments virtually demanded an adaptive, multi-dimensional and 
comprehensive approach to conflict intervention.  
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2. The Component Parts of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:  
Governance, Development and Security 
Post-conflict peacebuilding began to consolidate as a significant practice 
within the international system at the beginning of the 1990s. The term 
describes interventions in the aftermath of protracted violent conflicts, which are 
directed towards underlying causes and structures of violence. Whereas 
peacebuilding engages prior to the outbreak of violence, peacekeeping is 
instead, to the extent that it is concerned with the mediation of violence after it 
breaks out, essentially subsequent. A further point of distinction can be found 
within the fact that post-conflict peacebuilding anticipates wholesale 
transformation. In the words of Duffield, it anticipates ‘a level of intrusion and 
social engineering hitherto frowned upon by the international community’ 
(Duffield 2003, 291). 
In its ideal form, post-conflict peacebuilding is multi-dimensional in 
character, simultaneously working across economic, political and social points 
to provide integrated responses to the outbreak of violence. Beate Jahn has 
previously spoken of a Holy Trinity, which consists of governance, development 
and security. In this chapter (and in my analysis of complementarity), I develop 
this tri-partite framework in more detail. I intend to specifically focus upon the 
question of how each of these elements becomes subject to a discursive 
‘broadening’ or ‘widening’, within the wider context of a comprehensive 
approach.  
Approaches which engage with democracy promotion, development and 
security through a ‘broadened’ framework of reference make operational the 
grounding premise of a comprehensive approach – namely that individual 
imperatives can only be realised through a ‘comprehensive’ approach that 
incorporates each element into an overarching framework of engagement. In 
this chapter I will discuss how the three components of the Holy Trinity become, 
under the aegis of a comprehensive approach, subject to a discursive 
broadening.  
I will begin by discussing the promotion of democracy. Within the 
literature, a number of different terms denote this single imperative, with 
governance, democracy promotion and democratisation being used 
interchangeably. In each instance, the efforts of peacebuilding practitioners are 
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directed towards the establishment of a political process that is open, 
accountable and responsive to public needs and expectations. For the 
purposes of the current discussion, it is necessary to differentiate ‘narrow’ 
fixations upon a particular practice (e.g. electoral reform) from ‘broader’, 
‘holistic’ or ‘comprehensive’ engagements.  
Nancy Bermeo has previously referred to ‘minimalist’ frameworks of 
democracy promotion, which are concerned with establishing and upholding the 
principle of elite accountability (2003, 153-154). Melissa Labonte has described  
 ‘circumscribed’ frameworks of democratic reference, which fixate upon the 
rationality, inclusivity and functionality of political institutions (2003, 262). And 
Thomas Carothers, similarly presenting a restricted or confined political focus, 
writes about a ‘democracy template’, which is comprised of elections, state 
institutions and civil society engagement (1999, 86), being transferred and 
applied across different contexts. 
In each of these contributions, ‘democracy’ is defined in very precise 
terms, being delineated in an equally exact form. This sense of delimitation is 
similarly invoked within Carothers’s allusion to a ‘democracy template’. As he 
observes: ‘Each project in the typical US portfolio aims to shape a particular 
sector or institution along the lines of its counterpart in Western democracies’ 
(1999, 90; also see Paris 1997, 63).  
Carothers correctly identifies that this template rests upon a very precise 
definition of a pre-determined democratic form that can be transferred across 
different contexts. This can be clearly contrasted with Lederach’s ‘process 
structure’, which is instead defined by the absence of predetermination or a 
prescribed outcome (1997, 84). Lederach’s emphasis upon process reiterates 
that the concept is formed through its articulation – it does not stand outside of 
or beyond process. The form, to put it slightly differently, does not anticipate the 
content. To the same extent, the form does not exist independently of the 
context in which it is articulated and the ideal is not counterpoised to the actual.  
Lederach touches upon an important tension within the democratisation 
literature. Bermeo, Labonte and Carothers had, in focusing their attention upon 
a precise set of institutional amendments, essentially defined democracy in very 
precise, exact and formal terms. In contrast, Lederach’s account asserts an 
understanding of democracy that is open, undefined and essentially informal in 
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character. To a certain extent, Lederach’s analysis of democracy can be directly 
counterpoised and contrasted with the initial understanding.  
Bermeo and Labonte had, when using pejorative terms such as 
‘minimalist’ and ‘circumscribed’ to describe their perception of democratisation, 
anticipated a more substantive framework of democracy promotion. In contrast, 
other contributors have taken a ‘minimalist’ or ‘circumscribed’ model of 
democracy as their basis of engagement. Reilly (2001), Belloni (2004) and 
Reynolds (2005), for example, have specifically focused upon the question of 
how different electoral systems either increase or reduce the risk of violent 
conflict. Sisk (1996) and Barnett et al (2006) also focus upon the question of 
how specific institutional arrangements can further the ends and objectives of 
peacebuilding (also see World Bank 1999). Each of these contributors can be 
said to be ‘minimalised’ or ‘circumscribed’ in their analytical perspective 
because they essentially reduce the broad question of democracy to a set of 
highly formalised institutional adjustments and amendments.  
Bermeo’s and Labonte’s allusion to ‘minimalist’ or ‘circumscribed’ models 
of democracy reiterate that it is possible to conceive democracy within a very 
different framework of reference. Call and Cook provide a potential starting 
point in this respect when they point out the deeply rooted assumption that each 
of the component parts of liberal democracy are mutually reinforcing (2003, 
237). This contribution establishes the direction for an analysis that seeks to 
adjust or negotiate the terms of liberal reference, and this is precisely what 
Barkawi and Laffey (1999) attempt to do when they unravel and explore the a 
priori tension between the liberal and the democratic. Heathershaw and 
Lambach similarly focus on this point when they consider the internal tensions 
and contradictions of liberal governance (2008).  
In seeking to democratise existing frameworks of engagement, a number 
of observers have stressed the need for a heightened engagement from local 
actors and agencies. Newman, for example, calls for an engagement which 
‘balanc[es] top-down and bottom-up approaches, recognis[es] the realities of 
power and aspir[es] to cosmopolitan aspirations and a positive peace’ (2009, 
38). In questioning the existing ordering and alignment of liberal frameworks, 
Newman advocates a framework of reference which actively incorporates ‘local 
voices, desires and forms of politics’ (2010, 319; also see Richmond 2005).  
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In direct opposition to the idea of ‘circumscribed’ or ‘minimised’ 
frameworks of engagement, Newman does not conceive of democracy as an 
optimised or more efficient form of decision-making; rather, he presents it as a 
means through which forms of social and economic exclusion can be directly 
addressed and remedied (also see Lederach 1997; Chopra and Hohe 2004, 
289; Richmond 2011, 13). In contrast to its more formal counterparts, this 
represents a ‘deepened’ or more substantive framework of democratic 
reference. Lederach (1997), Chopra and Hohe (2004, 289) and Richmond 
(2011, 13) offer similarly expansive and far-reaching accounts of democratic 
engagement. In each of these contributions, attention is focused upon the form 
and character of the domestic political settlement. However, it is equally 
important to recognise that the question of democracy promotion can also be 
conceived with reference to internal-external relations, as Labonte affirms when 
she observes that, ‘[S]hifting the strategic enterprise of [peacebuilding] activities 
from a deductive, structural perspective to an inductive, process-driven one 
brings local priorities to the fore, rather than subjecting them to donor priorities’ 
(2003; 271).  
Here Labonte helpfully identifies a number of key features that are 
associated with a ‘deepened’ or more substantive framework of democratic 
engagement. Her initial allusion to an inductive process affirms that we are 
concerned with an open-ended process that is not in any sense predetermined; 
secondly, she emphasis local priorities; finally, she disavows external influence. 
Each of these three stresses counterpoises a ‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ 
account of democracy promotion.  
In drawing out the conceptual and practical implications of a 
comprehensive approach, liberal peacebuilding actors have gravitated towards 
a more substantive model of democratic engagement; this is the development 
that the deepening chapter will engage in more depth and detail. A similar shift 
is also evidenced within those sections of the peacebuilding literature that 
engage with the challenges and complexities of development. A number of 
contributions to this literature explicitly disavow technocratic frameworks of 
reference, and instead stress the centrality of political engagement (see OECD 
1991; World Bank 1990, 60). This politicisation has corresponded with a 
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heightened emphasis upon themes such as civil society engagement, 
empowerment and state decentralisation. The prodigious rise of the  
 ‘good governance’ paradigm should similarly be understood in this context.  
In registering the significance of this development, Hameiri observes 
that, from the ‘late 1990s, neoliberal development orthodoxy has shifted its 
attention from focusing purely on economic policy towards emphasising the 
functioning of the domestic governing institutions of recipient states’ (2010; 73). 
Hameiri’s reference to ‘functioning’ reiterates the emerging agenda of state 
capacity, which supplanted a prior emphasis upon the accentuation or removal 
of state influence. By virtue of this adjustment, development was no longer a 
narrow economic concern, but was instead conceived with reference to a wider 
range of political questions and themes. In acknowledging this, the OECD 
spoke of ‘the dramatic widening of the scope and ambition of the development 
co-operation agenda’ (1997b, 18).  
While this adjustment was in many senses necessitated by the limitations 
of neo-liberal governance, it should be recognised that it does not represent a 
decisive break with neo-liberalism itself; quite the contrary, it instead implies a 
reorientation towards neo-liberal statebuilding. Capacity-building within this 
framework is ultimately orientated towards enhancing the ability to participate 
within neo-liberal governance. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary-
General, summarised this essential point in the following terms: 
 
The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by 
conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong 
domestic institutions of participation are essential. Promoting such 
institutions means promoting the empowerment of the unorganised, the 
poor, the marginalised. (UN 1992)  
 
Over the course of the 1990s, institutions came to be widely conceived 
as the central determinant of successful development. Development agencies 
increasingly came to recognise that strong institutions enabled the stresses and 
strains of the development process to be successfully managed (ICISS 2001; 
UN Millennium Project 2005; Paris and Sisk 2009, 10). The World Bank 
therefore explicitly asserted that ‘[c]ountries need markets to grow but they 
need capable state institutions to grow markets’ (1997, 38). The emerging 
orthodoxy no longer placed state and market in diametric opposition, but 
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instead originated the insight that ‘markets rest upon a foundation of institutions’ 
(ibid, 41). It was not merely that institutions were an important consideration 
within the development process. Neo-liberal institutionalism went further to 
insist that ‘institutions are the critical variable in development’ (2004, 29; UNDP 
2001, 24).  
At the same time, development orthodoxy was increasingly accentuating 
the active engagement and empowerment of local actors (Fraser 2005, 317). As 
empowerment, local ownership and participation became increasingly 
pronounced parts of the development agenda, its managerial and technocratic 
tenets were increasingly attenuated. In contrast to modernisation, which had 
sought to make individual societies approximate to a singular vision, 
development increasingly appeared as an open-ended framework that was 
receptive to cultural and social specificity. Whereas modernisation theory has a 
very precise and exact trajectory, development theory is instead characterised 
by the absence of an ‘advance blueprint’ (OECD 1997b). This recalls our earlier 
engagement with Lederach’s ‘process-orientated’ approach to democracy 
promotion, in which the contents of democracy are not prescribed but only 
emerge in the process of their articulation.  
This articulation is endogenous to individual societies: it cannot be 
imposed from above or from without. This proposition has been questioned by 
some observers, who have continued to insist upon the disciplinary or 
regulatory character of development. Mark Duffield, for example, suggests that 
the ‘broadening’ of the development agenda (OECD 1997b, 18) represents an 
adaptation or refinement of disciplinary instruments. He explicitly refers to  
the ‘radicalisation of development and its reinvention as a strategic tool of 
conflict resolution and social reconstruction’ (2003, 1049). The use of ‘strategic’ 
is particularly significant in this context, suggesting that development is tied up 
with the realisation of external priorities. Fraser’s (2005) critical encounter with 
‘local’ development similarly highlights its regulatory implications.  
 In common with the development field, security studies also underwent a 
number of important innovations in the post-Cold War era. For security 
specialists, it had been an almost intuitive assumption that security was co-
terminus with the state, with the state representing both the object and method 
of security. This began to change when critical security theorists began to probe 
 48 
and challenge the very meaning of ‘security’. The emerging paradigm of ‘human 
security’ thereby questioned the pre-eminence afforded to the state, and 
actively sought to elevate human welfare as the preponderant concern. Roland 
Paris (2001, 99) has described how, during this period, ‘the basic concept of 
security [became] redefined, [to place] much more weight on the needs and 
concerns of human beings and the quality of their environment’ (OECD 1995). 
This implied that security was no longer to be understood as an objective 
condition, that could be analysed and understood independently of context and 
subjective priorities. ‘Security’ was increasingly theorised and understood with 
reference to the denial of fundamental rights, the weakness or absence of 
social and political participation, and the absence of social and economic 
development. Incidentally, the reverse also applied: underdevelopment became 
securitised and conceived as a threat to international security (Zartman 1995; 
Rice 2003; Yannis 2003).  
By the end of the 1990s, as the statebuilding agenda became an 
increasingly pressing priority for international actors, the state reasserted itself 
as an indispensable point of reference. In acknowledging this development, 
Ghani and Lockhart spoke of a ‘renewed recognition of the state’s 
contemporary centrality’ (1998, 26). Almost a decade later, OECD guidelines 
would reiterate that external intervention should ‘focus upon statebuilding as the 
central objective’ (2007). Statebuilding represented an integrated approach that 
traversed economic, political and social processes. It faithfully reproduced one 
of the central axioms of the comprehensive approach: namely, that democracy 
promotion, development and security should be understood in their interrelation. 
A fully functional state would enhance legitimacy and this in turn would produce 
a heightened level of security. Ghani and Lockhart explicitly reiterated this point 
when they asserted that the ‘solutions to our current problems of insecurity, 
poverty and lack of growth all converge on the need for a statebuilding project’ 
(2009, 4). 
Ghani and Lockhart’s contribution presents us with a state that is deeply 
integrated into economic and social processes. Self-evidently, this is not the 
autonomous state that has historically featured so prominently within the theory 
and practice of the state, and which Cunliffe invokes when he refers to ‘an 
institution that is over and above society’ (2007, 49; Barnett 2006, 91). Quite the 
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contrary, this is instead a state that is integrated into a complex array of state-
societal relations, whose very legitimacy is contingent upon its ability to satisfy 
social expectations, needs and requirements. In encapsulating this 
development, Duffield would speak of the emergence and consolidation of the 
‘governance state’.  
This ‘governance’ state rests upon the pillars of ‘good governance’ and 
‘state capacity’. It is not reducible to specific attributes and features, but is 
instead intelligible in terms of the specific functions that it performs and the 
quality of its relationships. In many respects, the governance state is not 
intelligible as a form but rather as a set of interlinking relationships and 
interactions. This model subtly alters and reconfigures the component parts of 
the Holy Trinity. No longer conceived in isolation, each component part 
becomes mutually reinforcing and intelligible in its interrelation.  
The literature on good governance and state–societal relations (Paris 
2002, 654, 655; Paris and Sisk 2009, 1-2), for instance, furthers the impression 
that ‘security’ is reducible to a set of relationships and interactions. This finds a 
further echo within the World Bank’s previous assertion that state strength is 
grounded within legitimacy (1995, viii). In this understanding, state security is 
not ensured through coercion or force, but is instead enabled by the 
enhancement of ‘multi-stakeholder relationships’ and the ‘[management of] 
complexity and interrelationships’ (Ghani and Lockhart 1998, 52). 
This emphasis upon ‘political’ relations and interactions can, at first 
glance, be directly counterpoised to ‘technical’ frameworks that are more 
predisposed to originate generalizable categories and concepts that apply 
across contexts and which can be measured against a standardised scale.  
Helman and Ratner’s (1992-1993) hugely influential contribution, for 
example, traced state failure back to a general post-colonial condition. The 
failure of post-colonial states, they suggested, was reducible to a failure to 
approximate to a ‘Weberian state, [based on] legal-rational authority, technical 
standards and enforcement capacity’ (Woodward 2006, 26; Schlichte and 
Migdal 2005, 5; Ottaway 2002, 1003). 
In similarly taking an abstracted understanding of state capacity as their 
core point of reference, contributions from Jackson and Rosberg (1982), 
Crocker (2003) and Rubin (2005) discuss the question of how state security can 
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be further enhanced. For each of these writers, the concept of the autonomous 
or Weberian state provides a number of functions. Firstly, it provides a 
framework of analysis in which successes and failures are relative to the level of 
autonomy that the state has been able to achieve; secondly, it provides a 
practical focus and measure of success – statebuilding interventions are to be 
assessed with reference to the level of autonomy that they help to achieve; 
finally, it provides an end objective – statebuilding interventions should 
endeavour to achieve the autonomous state (also see Rice 2003, and 
Fukuyama 2004). In reiterating the grounding assumption of this framework, 
Katarina Ammitzbøll and Stina Torjesen observe that 
The aim [is] to create a state that exercises legitimate and 
effective authority throughout the national territory and upholds the rule 
of law. [Statebuilding] seeks to ensure that the state has a monopoly 
over the use of armed force, the ability to raise necessary revenues and 
that the state institutions are capable of carrying out their administrative 
tasks effectively. (2007, 16) 
 
In the post-Cold War era, this model of statebuilding was increasingly 
challenged and contested. The Social Structuralism literature, for instance, 
sought to demonstrate that this attempt to detach the state from society was 
doomed to failure, along with the perpetual repetition of its own contradictions 
(Milliken and Krause 2003; Chandler 2006, 48; Bickerton 2007). A number of 
observers (see Yannis 2003; Engelbert and Tull 2008) have observed, for 
instance, that the notion of ‘state failure’ is, for the reason that it forecloses the 
‘solution’, an essential tautology. One of the main contributions of the literature 
on Social Structuralism has been to demonstrate that state ‘strength’ and 
‘capacity’ are not general attributes that can be abstracted from the individual 
context; quite the contrary – such terms only attain meaning within a social 
context. 
Although its grounding assumptions were increasingly open to challenge 
and contestation, the Weberian state continued to exercise a strong hold upon 
statebuilding practitioners. Its continued salience is attested to by genealogies 
of state failure (Pureza, 2006), which contrast early 1990s accounts of state 
failure (e.g. Helman and Ratner 1992-1993) with their post-2001 counterparts 
(see Crocker 2003, and Krasner and Pascual 2005). These contributions 
demonstrate that, although the terms of reference have incrementally 
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expanded, the Weberian state appears as a continuous thread, which runs 
through the different parts of the statebuilding literature (Lemay-Hebert 2009, 
23; Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 2). The general thread persists, even as a 
number of its core tenets (such as bureaucratic domination – specifically the 
belief that states should be ‘more effective agents of control over their territory 
and population’ (see Rubin 2005, 97; World Bank 1997, 20)) are openly 
contested.  
In this sub-section I have engaged with each of the constitutive elements of 
post-conflict peacebuilding – governance, development and security. In 
engaging at each point, I have highlighted key shifts, progressions and 
evolutions. For the most part, my attention has focused upon the question of 
how ‘narrow’ frameworks of reference have been superseded and replaced by 
‘broader’, ‘deeper’ or more comprehensive counterparts.  
3. Liberal Peacebuilding: Core Features 
Liberal peacebuilding is premised upon the belief that the transfer of 
liberal tenets, processes and structures to post-conflict contexts will establish 
the basis for a lasting peace. Barnett et al define liberal peacebuilding as a set 
of operations that seek to create a state ‘defined by the rule of law, markets and 
democracy’ (2006 88). Richmond, meanwhile, observes that the main 
components of the liberal peace include democratisation, the rule of law, human 
rights, free and globalised markets and neo-liberal development (2006, 292).  
Liberal peacebuilding operates within the framework of reference that 
has been established by the ‘liberal peace’. Oliver Richmond defines the latter 
as ‘the biases of a specific set of actors, a knowledge system and epistemic 
community, allied to a narrow set of interests, norms, institutions and 
techniques’ (Richmond 2011, 3). Writers working within the framework of the 
‘liberal peace’ include Michael Barnett, Simon Chesterman, Thomas Carothers, 
Jaret Chopra and Michael Doyle. Roland Paris also falls within this category, 
although it is perhaps important to clarify that his work essentially represents an 
attempt to salvage or ‘save’ liberal peacebuilding from its internal contradictions. 
These writers generally converge upon a common project that holds that the 
spread of liberal values and practices will contribute to a more harmonious and 
peaceful world order.  
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Although it originates within a clear set of ideological commitments, 
liberal peace is not static nor is it confined to a specific set of objects. Instead, 
by working within a comprehensive approach, peacebuilding actors have 
originated a series of ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ effects. In seeking to re-
orientate liberal peacebuilding towards local needs and priorities, Call and Cook 
have, for example, called for a heightened engagement with context. They 
assert that: ‘More attention [should] be paid to specific and local context and to 
[the] integration of appropriate external governance models with local, 
legitimate, practices in war-torn societies’ (2003, 234). The understanding that 
external intervention should be aligned with local context has increasingly 
assumed the status of a policy axiom. Call and Cousens therefore give voice to 
a widely shared consensus when they assert that ‘External actors need to 
understand the history, politics and cultures in which they are attempting to 
build peace’ (2008, 14; see also Reynolds 2005, 27; UNDP 2001, 13). 
Barnett et al (2006) invoke a ‘deepened’ form of democratic engagement 
to critique ‘elitist’ or ‘top-down’ approaches to liberal peacebuilding. While still 
operating within a liberal framework of reference, they make use of republican 
concepts to stress the need for a heightened emphasis upon deliberation and 
participation within peace operations (see also Chopra and Hohe 2004). Donais 
(2009), meanwhile, draws attention to the ways in which improved levels of 
local ownership can improve operational outcomes (2009). In each of these 
three contributions we encounter a clear confidence that ‘top-down’ and 
‘externalised’ distortions can be resolved through the heightened participation of 
local actors.  
However, this proposition of a ‘deepened’ democratisation is 
problematically reconciled with the technocratic dimensions of liberal 
peacebuilding. It encounters an equally obstinate obstacle in the form of 
externalisation – that is, the premise that peacebuilding is an essentially 
external exercise, which is guided and orientated by external actors (Charles-
Philippe 1999, 3). Both instances raise the question of precisely how liberal 
peacebuilding manages to overcome or ‘reconcile’ these dissonances.  
The puzzle is further compounded by the fact that Liberal peacebuilding 
is characterised by a pronounced lack of reflexivity. The introductory chapter 
made this point when it reiterated the need for liberal peacebuilding to 
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(re)engage with its underpinning assumptions (see Paris 2002, 656; Bellamy 
2004, 31; Richmond 2011, 58). There is a persistent assumption, which all too 
frequently escapes critical scrutiny, that ‘problems must be solved rather than 
solutions problematised’ (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008, 275).  
By virtue of the unchallenged pre-eminence of liberal ideology there is a 
clear sense that the essential components are already present and that the 
central question is how they can be arranged or implemented. This 
predisposition was even more clearly evidenced during the initial period of 
application when, as Sabaratnam observes (see also Paris 1997; OECD 2005, 
34), the terms of discussion were ‘highly focused on the technical questions of 
sequencing and speed’ (2011, 17). By virtue of this conceptual and practical 
inheritance, it is perhaps unsurprising that ‘most works on the subject have 
sought to provide practical recommendations [which] aim at improving the ability 
of peacebuilders to control local conflict’ (Paris 2002, 656; see also Bellamy 
2004).  
While Paris shows a clear willingness to transgress beyond the 
limitations that this framework imposes, he ultimately collapses back into it – his 
indictment of previous ‘missteps’ is telling precisely because it is preceded by 
the clear impression that, under different circumstances, a separate set of steps  
could and should have been undertaken. In this respect, Paris brings to mind  
Lund’s appeal for a more ‘appropriate’ balancing of hard and soft approaches 
(2003, 40). While Paris is aware of the limitations of this framework, he is 
ultimately predisposed to collapse back into it. Bickerton, in striding towards the 
conclusion that Paris can only tentatively venture towards, appropriately 
reminds us that ‘[b]ecause problems arise from the political nature of the 
statebuilding project, they [cannot be] amenable to mere technocratic solution’ 
(2007, 93). From this question, the essential question is whether liberal 
peacebuilding can fully divest itself of its technocratic dimensions and assume 
an unconflicted appearance.  
A similar puzzle originates in relation to the question of externalisation. 
Here too there is a sense that liberal peacebuilding can transgress beyond the 
limitations that derive from external distortions. The purported ‘local turn’ is an 
essential development in this respect, equipping peacebuilders with the 
mentality and operational techniques that will enable them to engage with local 
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actors and agendas. In invoking this orthodoxy, Malloch-Brown is emboldened 
to claim that ‘primary responsibility for conflict resolution lies not with the 
international community, but with the governments and civil societies in affected 
countries’ (2003, 145). Peacebuilding is thereby presented to us as a blank 
canvass upon which local actors can inscribe their vision of a just and 
meaningful peace. The tension between generality and case specificity (Call 
and Cousens, 2008; 15) is thereby comprehensively bypassed, a relic of a less 
enlightened era. In offering a similarly optimistic appraisal, Doornbos invites us 
to concur that liberal peacebuilding actors have learned to ‘de-generalise’.  
However, this is far from a universally accepted consensus and there are 
a number of contributions which call this assertion into question (see Sending 
2011; Call and Cook 2003, 238; Call and Cousens 2008, 15; Woodward 2006, 
63-64). For some observers, exteriority is not an unfortunate by-product; rather, 
it is anticipated within the conceptual and theoretical foundations of liberal 
peacebuilding (see Engelbert and Tull 2008, 134; Heathershaw and Lambach 
2008, 273; Richmond 2004; Marshall 2008, 4; Lemay Herbert 2009, 22). In 
further reiterating this point, Paris reminds us that liberal peacebuilding involves 
‘the promulgation not just of liberal values and institutions, but [the] idea of the 
state itself’ (2002; 655).  
It could be suggested that the liberal peace’s critique of externalisation is 
articulated within clear limitations: the critique of external distortions can 
proceed up to a point but can go no further. In apparent denial of the structural 
attributes of externalisation, improved implementation and application 
persistently assert themselves as correctives (Paris 2002; Lund 2003). This 
does little or nothing to offset the suspicion that the tension between the internal 
and external is rooted within the practices that invoke and reproduce the ‘local’.  
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Critical Perspectives 
1.The Contribution of Critical Perspectives 
The first part of this review has largely concerned itself with setting out the 
distinctive features and attributes of liberal peacebuilding. Critical contributions 
were intermittently referenced for illustrative effect, but the time has now come 
for a more sustained engagement with critical perspectives. In engaging at 
these points, I seek to question, subvert and challenge the grounding 
assumptions of liberal peacebuilding.  
My introductory chapter has already established the outlines of a critical 
engagement. It has made an important contribution by affirming that a critical 
reading should be addressed to the a priori components of the liberal peace. In 
opposition to the sense of progression that is imbued within liberal 
peacebuilding, it is therefore imperative to regress to taken-for-granted 
assumptions. As Roland Paris observes, this is particularly important because 
‘[s]cholars have dedicated relatively little attention to analysing the concept of 
peacebuilding itself, including its underlying assumptions’ (1997, 55; see also 
Haugerudbraaten 1998).  
Critical observers have sought to explore this possibility in more depth by 
questioning the nature or character underpinning liberal peace. For these 
observers, the focusing concern is to identify how liberal peacebuilding is 
situated within broader power relations. Mark Duffield observes that ‘the liberal 
peace [is] not ultimately emancipatory or transformative in ambition or effect: 
rather it [is] a regulatory network of governance’ (2007; see also Sabaratnam 
2011, 22). In direct opposition to the liberal peace, which conceives of a fuller 
flowering of an inherent potentiality, Duffield posits a series of constrictions and 
enclosures. This resonates in the assertion that the liberal peace is co-terminus 
with ‘fixed definitions and categories’ (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 412) and 
echoes within Richmond’s stated concern with the limitations that adhere within 
‘peace-as-governance’ (2009, 57; 2011, 12). 
Each of these contributions offers a clear counterpoint to a ‘pragmatic 
peacebuilding’ (Heathershaw, 1998; 2) that is less concerned with what it is, 
and more with the question of how it can be put into effect. This ‘pragmatism’ is 
characterised by a practical predisposition and a pronounced disinterest in 
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abstract speculation. This perhaps explains why, in engaging with the 
peacebuilding literature, we repeatedly discover key concepts that are under-
theorised and underdeveloped (see Lemay-Hebert 2009, 22; Gruffydd Jones 
2008, 186; Heathershaw 2010, 598).  
An adherence to ‘pragmatic peacebuilding’ therefore implies a certain 
delimitation of vision, a blindness to wider considerations. This practical 
commitment enhances the likelihood that tensions and contradictions will be 
reproduced in subsequent effect (Bickerton 2007, 100-107). This anticipates the 
central paradox of liberal peacebuilding: repeated failure does not bring about a 
questioning of underpinning assumptions but rather a renewed application. This 
perverse repetition (Chandler 2009, 4) is the very antithesis of the sense of 
momentum that is deeply imbued within liberal peacebuilding discourse. Closer 
reflection reveals that certain ‘lessons’ cannot be acknowledged, much less 
‘learned’. As Barnett et al observe: ‘[Peacebuilding] strategies, more often than 
not, reflect unexamined assumptions and deeply rooted organisational 
mandates rather than “best practices” born from empirical analysis’ (Barnett et 
al, 2007, 53; see also Engelbert and Tull 2008, 109). 
This sense of oscillation and repetition will later be engaged in the 
contextuality chapter. The initial reference point has already been engaged in 
Newman’s invocation of an approach which ‘balanc[es] top-down and bottom-
up approaches, recognis[es] the realities of power and aspir[es] to cosmopolitan 
aspirations and a positive peace’ (2009, 38). The subsequent oscillation is 
anticipated in the accounts of externalisation that we have already engaged. In 
this respect, it is the external dimensions of liberal peacebuilding that appear to 
be, to borrow from a previous indictment of liberal peacebuilding, ‘under-
theorised and under-developed’. 
Newman’s contribution, in common with a sizable part of the literature on 
democratisation, is vulnerable to the criticism that it offers an ideological and 
empirically naïve account of democratisation. In Chapter Two I will look to 
further develop this critique by illustrating how freedom functions as an essential 
intermediary within the circulation and exertion of government. Bickerton 
anticipates this analysis when he suggests that the ultimate aspiration of  
peacebuilding is to establish ‘nodes integrated into the international system of 
governance’ (2007, 107). Charles-Philippe offers a very similar conclusion when 
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he defines peacebuilding as ‘an external (foreign) intervention (national, 
multilateral or UN) [that] help[s] to create conditions conducive to peace’ (1999, 
3). Their candour offers a welcome counterpoint to many of the deceits and 
obfuscations which accompany elite invocations of local-level ‘participation’, 
‘empowerment’ and ‘ownership’.  
In this chapter I seek to demonstrate how a critical analysis can 
disassemble and untangle the component parts of the liberal peace. Rather 
than reproducing the liberal peace in subsequent effect, I instead seek to 
establish the grounds for an analysis that engages with power relations and 
openly problematises deeply ingrained regularities and linearities. I seek to 
expose the limitations that adhere within liberal peacebuilding and to explore 
the paths and routes that lie beyond. In working towards a critical framework of 
analysis, I engage across three separate points: firstly, I discuss critical political 
economy perspectives; secondly, I discuss critical contributions to the 
statebuilding literature; finally, I demonstrate how the general theme of 
complexity can be expanded into an expansive and encompassing critique of 
liberal peacebuilding 
2.Critical Perspectives: Disciplinary Liberalism 
For liberal observers, violence is diametrically opposed to a benign and 
sanctified liberal peace. Liberal institutions, processes and structures provide a 
means through which violence can be resolved; by implication, they are not 
involved in its outbreak or perpetuation. The liberal peace is predicated upon 
the belief that the spread of liberal norms, principles and values will inculcate a 
more stable and harmonious world order. The concept of ‘intra-state’ warfare 
furthers this abrupt juxtaposition of a volatile, conflict-ridden internal sphere and 
a benign, tranquil external order.  
In seeking to overcome the limitations imposed by this dichotomy, a 
number of observers have sought to achieve an essential inversion – they have 
therefore sought to highlight the various ways in which external influences are 
implicated within ‘internal’ or ‘civil’ wars. Duffield (2001), Bendaña (2003) and 
Berdal (2004) have sought to demonstrate how external ‘drivers’ feed into 
internal conflict dynamics. Paris previously demonstrated how external actors, 
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in seeking to introduce neo-liberal reforms at the domestic level, have 
destabilised and undermined broader peacebuilding objectives (1997, 59). 
As the earlier contribution from Barnett et al (2007, 53) suggests, this 
affirms that policy interventions are not always guided by lessons that have 
been learned; rather, as Chandler (2009) and De Guevara (2009) observe, this 
entrenched bias towards neo-liberal reform instead suggests an engagement 
which can be traced back to ideological foundations. Liberal ideology, rather 
than an empirically grounded analysis or the needs of local actors, provides the 
basis upon which liberal peacebuilding proceeds and develops.  
Writers within the post-Marxist tradition, such as Michael Pugh, have 
sought to highlight the various tensions, contradictions and imbalances that are 
built into the economic dimensions of liberal peace. In these accounts, which 
take the distortions of neo-liberal governance as their key point of reference, the 
liberal peace is presented as an external imposition that is only sustained 
through various degrees of force and coercion. Chandler, in offering a 
characteristically structural analysis, draws attention to instances in which local 
actors have been ‘reduced to the administrative bodies of external power’ 
(2002, 192). Far from ‘empowering’ or ‘enabling’ local actors, external influence 
instead subjects them to various forms of mediation and oversight. This again 
brings us back to the proposition that liberal peace is, as Duffield has proposed, 
a ‘regulatory network of governance’. It inculcates ‘appropriate’ political conduct 
and sets out the ends and objectives that should orientate policy interventions.  
Critical observers have developed this feature to argue that violence is 
not external to, but is instead intermeshed with, the frameworks and practices 
that are implemented within post-conflict contexts. The liberal order is, upon the 
basis of this understanding, not sustained by an immanent reason, but rather by 
various forms of domination and control (it is however important to 
acknowledge, in common with Andreas (2004) and Gruffydd Jones (2008), 
various points of subaltern resistance). Cramer (2006, 299) explicitly makes this 
point when he observes that ‘violence is not just an aberration or virus that 
afflicts societies; it is part of potential development’ (see Moore 2000). In direct 
contrast to liberal perspectives, violence is no longer understood to be ‘rare, 
exceptional [or] aberrant’ (Cooper, 607), but is instead deeply ingrained within 
various aspects and attributes of ‘normality’ (see also Wennmann 2005). 
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The established development holds that it is imperative for post-conflict 
states to integrate into the wider global economic system. This integration, it is 
established, will establish the basis for foreign investment, enable the individual 
state to develop comparative advantage and benefit from international trade. 
Critical voices raise the clear objection that integration under existing terms will 
raise just as many problems as solutions: integration into a global economic 
system that is inherently volatile, unstable and predatory will invariably produce 
a range of destabilising effects. Richards (2004) therefore depicts a purgatory-
like state, in which there is ‘no peace and no war’. Pugh has similarly pointed 
out instances in which neo-liberal reforms have extended the life cycle of 
conflicts beyond their natural point of termination.  
While liberal peacebuilding agencies have evidenced an ability to 
engage with these contributions, it is clear that this engagement has occurred 
within clear limitations and constraints. While these agencies have now deigned 
to admit the consequences of ‘premature’ integration, this recognition has failed 
to penetrate to the ideological foundations of the liberal worldview, that is to the 
fact that the contemporary capitalist world order is only sustained through 
various forms of violence (Paris 1997, 59). 
The value of each of these contributions derives from their open 
problematisation of the smooth regularities and continuities which characterise 
the liberal peace. In place of its emancipatory pretensions they instead insert 
various forms of discipline and regulation. Disciplinary liberalism is not 
sustained through an immanent reason, but is instead perpetuated by various 
forms of force and coercion, being synonymous with a sense of denial, 
restriction or limitation.  
3.Critical Perspectives: The Limitations and Possibilities of 
Statebuilding 
In the first part of this review I referenced approaches that sought to work 
within the framework of the Weberian state. I observed that this framework had 
given rise to the misperception that statebuilding was an essentially 
technocratic concern and that the state could be theorised and analysed in 
independence from the context in which it operates, giving rise to the premise 
that capacity and institutional strength could be understood in isolation from 
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societal determinants. Chandler (2006), Bickerton (2007) and Lemay-Hebert 
(2009, 27), in reiterating that statebuilding is inherently political, further 
underline that technocratic approaches recreate the conditions of their own 
failure. Lemay-Hebert (2009) makes the same point by reiterating that the state 
is frequently an alien entity that is essentially imposed upon individual contexts 
– this is why statebuilding interventions so frequently give rise to the 
phenomenon of ‘phantom’ states (Yannis 2003; Chandler 2006). Far from being 
accidental or coincidental, this is in fact the logical conclusion of the belief that 
sovereignty can be ‘be mechanistically isolated from society’ (Bickerton 2007, 
99). 
The social structuralism branch of the peacebuilding literature therefore 
emerged in response to the limitations and shortcomings of statebuilding 
interventions. In reiterating the centrality of social processes and structures in 
the statebuilding process, it provided a welcome response to accounts which 
privileged – in both analytical and practical terms - the autonomous state. In 
relating the core components of this branch of the literature, Lemay-Hebert 
refers to a ‘sociologically or anthropologically orientated approach’ [that] 
emphasise[s] the particularities of each state and its societal context’ (2009, 28; 
also see Zartman 1995). This approach does not understand the state in 
isolation, but instead attempts to understand it within a social context and with 
reference to relations that link the state into society (Zartman 1995; Migdal 
2001; Barnett et al 2007, 50). In many respects, this approach inverts the 
Weberian state (Woodward 2006, 26). The state does not exert authority over 
society but is instead legitimised within and through social processes.  
Universalisation and generalisation are therefore cancelled out by the 
contextual, local and specific. There is an implied refusal to present ‘historically 
situated techniques of government as universally effective’ (Zanotti 2006, 162). 
The state-in-society approach therefore establishes a clear point of limitation for 
technocratic frameworks (Robinson (1998), Migdal (2001), Milliken and Krause 
(2002) and Lemay-Herbert (2009)) and establishes the basis for a sociological 
analysis of the state.  
As, this branch of the literature – in making the state’s authority 
conditional upon societal legitimisation – inverts established norms of 
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sovereignty (in which the state’s ability to exert control over society is a defining 
attribute of state sovereignty).  
As an analytical device, the state-in-society approach has the added 
benefit that it does not fetishise the state – it does not perceive all social 
phenomena (most notably violent conflict) to this single reference point, and 
thereby offers an alternative way of analysing, conceiving and understanding 
state formation and disintegration. In practical terms, state-in-society 
approaches reject the premise that statebuilding interventions should be 
directed towards the establishment of ‘capable, autonomous and legitimate 
governmental institutions’ (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1-2). This is because terms 
such as ‘capacity’ are not understood as generalizable categories but rather as 
terms that only obtain meaning within the given context – hence why Bickerton 
asserts that ‘sovereignty is always of society’ (2007, 99). This is also why 
Hameiri observes that it is necessary to begin from the premise that the 
‘strength of a society’s institutions is a societal question, not merely an 
institutional one’ (2010, 28).  
The state-in-society approach is more concerned with the substantive 
contents of statebuilding than with the form. Pouligny clearly reiterates this 
point: ‘Politics and statehood must be understood in their ‘substantial’ aspects, 
their diverse conceptions and properties, and not only in their formal 
appearances’ (2005, 505; see also Herbst 1996, Berger 2006, Lemay-Hebert 
2009 and de Guevara 2010). 
Social structural accounts also collapse the binary distinctions that are so 
integral to liberal peacebuilding: internal in opposition to external, formal in 
opposition to informal, state in opposition to society. Duffield’s allusion to the 
‘sovereign frontier’, is significant because it captures both the blurring of 
previously sacrosanct forms and the relational attributes (with the frontier being 
defined as a ‘fluid and relational zone’ (2006)) of the state form. Hameiri 
similarly draws attention to this latter reference point when he relates the state 
as a ‘dynamic set of power relations’ (2010, 38).  
Social structural accounts also inculcate a stronger sense of 
contingency. There is no premise that statebuilding interventions should be 
directed towards approximation or alignment. Quite the contrary, there is a clear 
grasp of the fact that statebuilding actors have all too frequently equated 
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‘variation’ with ‘deviation’. In privileging variation and heterogeneity, social 
structural approaches instead provide the basis for an analysis that does not 
‘reduce’ the empirical products of statebuilding to idealised templates. In 
developing an analysis grounded within the local context, statebuilding actors 
will come to understand each instance in its specificity. Migdal and Schlichte 
observe that: ‘The challenge is to illuminate the variation in forms of the state 
expressed in this pluralism, rather than reducing all cases to more or less 
straying from the ideal-type’ (2005 13). 
This insight also has important implications for the way that formal 
institutions are conceived and understood. Rather than being conceived 
autonomously, these institutions are understood in relation to their operational 
context, and in this respect, they can be said to be socially ‘nested’ (Lemay-
Hebert 2009; Richmond 2009). Context imposes itself upon the terms of 
reference and demands acknowledgement. Doornbos and Chandler duly oblige 
when they call for ‘context and trajectory-specific approaches’ (Doornbos 2002, 
810-811) and abruptly reject linear models of peacebuilding (Chandler 2013, 
23). 
In the contextuality chapter I demonstrate how the practitioners of liberal 
peace have come to internalise this framework of reference. For these actors, it 
has become a deeply ingrained article of truth that statebuilding interventions 
should not seek to reproduce a particular model of the state, but should instead 
provide a framework within which local actors can adjust the statebuilding 
process to local conditions.  
Englebert and Tull use this understanding to explain the crisis of the 
African state. They thereby highlight how, in many instances, it is an artificial 
and even alien form, which has failed to penetrate the surrounding society. In 
addressing this point, they observe that the ‘essence of African statebuilding is 
the [fostering of] interaction and bargaining processes between state and 
society’ (2008, 138) (see also Doornbos 2002). 
This insistence upon the importance of societal reference points 
originates within a prior understanding that the phenomenon of state collapse 
cannot be understood in general terms; rather, it can only be understood in 
relation to the specific instances in which it occurs. Because state-societal 
relations differ across each and every context, the precise circumstances of 
 63 
state collapse must similarly diverge. Thus, Torres and Anderson assert that 
‘there is no single model for how we should work better in fragile states’ (2004, 
14). A contextually sensitive approach to statebuilding is therefore synonymous 
with a heightened level of heterogeneity and an abrupt rejection of one-size-fits-
all approaches. 
For other observers, context is not merely an analytical tool through 
which we can attain an improved understanding of the processes of state 
formation and disintegration; rather, it is the basis for an emancipatory agenda. 
MacGinty (2008), for example, has suggested that the heightened engagement 
and incorporation of indigenous practices by peacebuilding actors will help to 
resist the rationalising or universalising distortions of liberal peace. Norris 
(2008) also suggests that the distortions of the liberal peace can be overcome 
by the engagement of local actors at all stages of the peacebuilding process. 
Norris points out that, far from being passive or inert objects, local actors are 
possessed of their own agency. The post-conflict context is not a blank canvass 
awaiting the artistic flourishes of international technocrats, but is already 
possessed of a clear life and vitality. Upon the basis of both contributions, we 
are led to believe that there are strong practical and normative justifications for 
rooting peacebuilding interventions within local contexts.  
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4.Critical Perspectives: Complexity and the Limitations of 
Liberal Peace 
One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of liberalism is that it essentially 
imposes itself upon a complex reality. It does not seek to understand the world 
as it is, but instead views and perceives the world as it would like it to be, a 
criticism which clearly recalls the Realist branch of international relations theory. 
Thomas Carothers, in directing his attention to detached and generic US 
democracy promotion initiatives, has similarly critiqued a  ‘transition paradigm’, 
which reproduces a ‘technocratic, gradualistic conception of democratisation’ 
(1999, 91). 
In engaging liberal peacebuilding from within a social structural 
framework of analysis, we can expound a very similar critique. The core 
objection is that the practitioners of liberal peace do not sufficiently 
acknowledge or engage context, but instead reduce context to the prior 
templates and preferences of liberal peace. The specifics of the local, social or 
contextual become lost, entrapped within binary distinctions and linear 
progressions. The imposition of external benchmarks and standards 
reconfigures the local context and reproduces it as an approximation to a 
general template, standard or requirement.  Even in instances where deviation 
is evidenced, it is ultimately defined in relation to this initial framework of 
reference, with the consequence that statebuilding actors are perceived to be 
progressing to, or regressing from, a specific point. At this point we are 
reminded of Thomas Carothers’s critique of the ‘transition paradigm’. This 
paradigm, he observes, derives from ‘a dangerous habit of trying to impose a 
simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order on an empirical tableau of 
considerable complexity’ (2002, 15). 
For social structural perspectives, binary distinctions and linear 
progressions are a sharp, abrupt and even brutal curtailment of the limitless 
potentials of contextual engagement. As David Chandler observes, social 
structuralism is guided and orientated by the principle of ‘non-linearity’ (2013), 
with the general being negotiated and adapted to local context. This suggests 
that the application of generic templates and frameworks to post-conflict 
contexts does not anticipate their reproduction but rather their reconfiguration, 
contestation and even vulgarisation. 
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 ‘Deviation’ is not an unfortunate or unwanted consequence; quite the 
contrary, it should instead be engaged and understood as a creative 
negotiation. Schlichte and Migdal therefore call for statebuilding practices to 
engage the local and contextual upon its own terms (2005, 3; see also Moore 
2000 and Pugh 2005) while Richmond argues that ‘backsliding’ should be 
(re)conceived as a negotiation (2009).  
This requires a fundamental change of mentality upon the part of 
statebuilding actors, whose interventions must become adjusted to 
heterogeneity and variation. David Chandler similarly reiterates that 
‘infrapolitics’ (a form of informal politics grounded in the social sphere) should 
no longer be engaged as a product of weakness and repression but rather 
should instead be conceived ‘as an ontological starting point for explaining the 
limits of peacebuilding’ (2013, 29). Berger’s (2006) discussion of the state’s 
historicity and Milliken and Krause’s engagement with the sociological and 
cultural dimensions of state formation similarly establish the basis for an 
analysis which surmounts the limitations of liberal peace.  
Both contributions emphasise the politics of statebuilding. This is why 
Migdal and Schlichte explicitly call for an acknowledgement of the ‘political 
nature of statebuilding relations’ (2005, 35; also see Hameiri 2010, 37, 96) – by 
implication, any depoliticised or technocratic engagement is flawed from the 
outset and therefore doomed to the perpetual repetition of its own internal 
contradictions. A ‘political’ analysis implies an approach that is able to engage 
with the complexities and variations of the post-conflict context, and which is not 
reducible to templates and formulas. A ‘political’ engagement is also 
predisposed to engage at the level of relations rather than form. By virtue of the 
fact that these relations are singular to each context, they cannot be, in contrast 
to forms, extrapolated across different contexts.  
 
 In addition to being co-terminus with social reference points and 
heterogeneity, social structural approaches are also synonymous with 
contingency. As De Guevara observes, ‘unintended effects of purposeful action 
are at the centre of state dynamics under conditions of statebuilding’ (2010, 
116). In opposition to the linear progressions and static binaries that 
characterise technocratic approaches to statebuilding, social structural accounts 
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privilege deviation, variation and alterity. By inserting complexity as a 
foregrounded principle, statebuilding actors establish the basis for a heightened 
heterogeneity and variation. The ‘cultural’, ‘informal’ or ‘social’ appear as 
complicating factors that limit, or at the very least complicate, the predisposition 
to generalise across different contexts. 
Social structural approaches therefore bring into question the very basis 
of statebuilding interventions. Statebuilding actors should not be concerned with 
making the reality approximate to an ideal; rather, they should instead begin 
from a refusal of the predetermined or foreclosed. De Guevara therefore 
conceives a ‘process-orientated’ approach that originates within the insight that  
 ‘statebuilding’s effects [unfold] in contingent, contradictory and often 
unintentional and unconscious ways’ (2010, 116). De Guevara’s contribution 
finds an echo in Migdal’s and Schlichte’s call for a ‘process-orientated, dynamic 
conception of the state’ (2005, 16). 
This ‘process-orientated’ conception serves as a belated 
acknowledgement of the fact that external actors do not engineer change within 
post-conflict contexts; on the contrary, in many instances they are cast in a 
responsive role, adjusting to unforeseen developments. External actors do not 
engineer change, aligning the individual context with their own preferences and 
designs. Zürcher (2011) goes as far as to suggest that it is optimal to begin from 
an analysis of how external frameworks are subverted and negotiated in the 
course of post-conflict intervention (also see Englebert and Tull 2008, 110). The 
significance of intervention is fundamentally altered in the process, changing 
from the exertion of influence from without to the negotiation of this influence 
from within. The hybridity branch of the peacebuilding literature (see Richmond 
and Mitchell 2012; Belloni 2012; MacGinty 2010) is an instructive reference 
point in this respect, highlighting the fact that negotiation and deviation is an 
attribute, rather than unfortunate or unintended consequence. 
In the contextuality chapter I will discuss how liberal actors have come to 
terms with this insight, rejecting generic models of statebuilding in the process. 
By virtue of this adjustment, context has emerged as a central problematic of 
statebuilding practice – the question of how it can engaged, incorporated and 
developed has become one of the most pressing challenges for statebuilding 
actors within a range of contexts. As I will seek demonstrate in more detail, this 
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process has not been straightforward and has been accompanied by 
considerable tension or contradiction. Richmond has similarly detailed a 
fundamental ambiguity, in which international actors have attempted to 
homogenise, essentialise or instrumentalise the local (2011 46). The 
contextuality chapter explores this theme in more detail, bringing out the 
problematic encounter between liberal peacebuilding and local context in more 
depth and detail.  
Conclusion 
In the initial stages of this review, I situated contemporary peacebuilding 
within its broader political, historical and institutional context. I then described 
the internal components of peacebuilding, while simultaneously its general 
attributes (specifically its liberal character and technocratic predisposition). The 
initial stages of the chapter provided an important accompaniment to the 
introductory chapter, bringing out important attributes and features in clearer 
detail.  
In acknowledging these general attributes, I suggested that Liberalism 
was the most important, being so closely associated with contemporary 
peacebuilding as to be essentially co-terminus with it. Three separate layers 
were duly established, with peacebuilding mapping onto liberal peacebuilding 
which in turn mapped onto the liberal peace. The first three sub-sections 
outlined the context in which post-conflict peacebuilding emerged, traced some 
of its core progressions and also detailed some of the core features and 
attributes of liberal peacebuilding. 
Having defined the central object of critical engagement, I then sought to 
bring out core contradictions and tensions in more detail. Critical perspectives 
were essential in this respect, providing a tool that could be applied to the 
immediate task-in-hand. These critical contributions helped me to bring out 
themes that will be engaged and discussed in more depth in the empirical 
chapters: the instrumental adaptation of local agency and contextual specificity 
will, to take two examples, be discussed extensively in later stages of this 
thesis.  
In many respects, my essential concern is to engage with the question of 
how liberal peacebuilding has engaged with critical insights, with a view to 
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tracing and bringing out resultant tensions and contradictions in clearer 
perspective. 
The second part of the review accordingly sought to highlight a number 
of the tensions deeply embedded within liberal peacebuilding. Disciplinary 
liberalism directly challenged one of the grounding assumptions of liberal 
peacebuilding – namely that it is concerned with the absenting or restriction of 
external influence and interference. My discussion of the disciplinary or 
regulatory implications of liberal peacebuilding offered precisely the opposite 
conclusion: that the integration of domestic actors into these broader 
frameworks actually reinforces and recalibrates various forms of discipline 
which operate across the internal-external divide.  
The following two sub-sections (Critically Engaging with Statebuilding 
and Critically Engaging with Complexity) then discussed further tensions within 
liberal peacebuilding. By situating themselves in direct opposition to liberal 
peacebuilding’s predisposition to depoliticise, externalise and technocratise, 
these contributions anticipated an analysis of the contextual, political and social. 
Each of these points of engagement, I suggested, needed to be complemented 
by an analysis of power, an analysis so transparently lacking within liberal 
representations, justifications and rationalisations. This is the core contribution 
of the following chapter.  
Any analysis of the forms of power that adhere within liberal 
peacebuilding must begin with the question of freedom. Liberal peacebuilding 
does not attempt to directly control; rather it operates indirectly, subtly guiding 
and orientating local actors. Crucially it represents a refinement, rather than 
absenting (as in classical liberalism) of government. As Foucault recognised, 
liberal technologies of government represent a refinement and advancement of 
government, inaugurating more efficient and productive exertions of external 
power. The ‘free’ agency of domestic actors does not therefore represent the 
point at which power is limited; quite the contrary, it instead provides the means 
through which it is enabled and put into effect.  
This concern with forms of power that operate through and within the 
condition of freedom suggests that a Foucauldian framework of analysis is 
appropriate. Foucault enables an inversion of the binary oppositions that 
underpin liberal peacebuilding - freedom in opposition to power, power in 
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opposition to knowledge. His work provides a sophisticated analysis of liberal 
power, enabling us to unpick its various dimensions and exertions. By 
perceiving liberal peacebuilding through a Foucauldian lens, we come to 
understand how freedom, power and knowledge function as the respective 
components of a liberal governmentality. The next chapter will further develop 
Foucauldian insights and perspectives, with a view to establishing the basis for  
a critical analysis of liberal peacebuilding.  
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Chapter Two  
A Foucauldian Critique of Liberal Peacebuilding 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I introduced and developed critical insights, 
demonstrating how they establish the basis for an analysis that is directed 
towards the contradictions of liberal peacebuilding. This chapter adds a 
Foucauldian ‘accent’, demonstrating how this author’s analysis perfectly maps 
onto liberal governmentalities and technologies of government (of which liberal 
peacebuilding is but one instance).  
Foucauldian analysis of a particular style of liberal government and the 
condition of subjectivity enable us to bring together freedom, power and 
knowledge. Under different circumstances, in which the observer is beholden to 
liberal tenets, each of these elements would be conceived and understood in 
their mutual opposition: freedom in opposition to power: power in opposition to 
knowledge. The peculiar significance of Foucault’s contribution therefore 
originates within his inversion of these binary distinctions, an act which 
establishes the basis for a novel and sophisticated analysis of power and its 
associated exertion.  
The so-called ‘local turn’ (Richmond and MacGinty 2013) has been one 
of the most significant developments within peacebuilding theory and practice. 
This ‘turn’ has contributed to a fundamental re-evaluation of the core-tenets of 
peacebuilding theory and practice, resulting in the elevating and privileging of 
local priorities and the attenuation of external influence. However, as I seek to 
demonstrate, this limitation does not correspond to an absenting of power; quite 
the contrary – it instead represents a rationalisation.  
Foucault’s contribution is particularly important because it enables us to 
break with the problem-solving, managerial and technocratic biases that are 
deeply rooted within liberal peacebuilding. As Jonathan Joseph correctly 
observes, a more sustained engagement with Foucault’s body of work enables 
‘[liberation] from complicity with managerial and depoliticising programmatic 
epistemes’ (Joseph 2010, 202). The ‘local turn’ therefore demands an analysis 
of how concepts such as ‘empowerment’, ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ are 
often tied up, in ways that are sometimes unclear or undefined, with external 
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forms of mediation, a development embodied within Simons’s observation that 
‘every empowerment of individual subjects [has been] matched by the growth of 
subjectifying capacities of government’ (1995, 47, 50).   
This suggests that the ‘local turn’ represents a refinement in the practices 
of government, embodying the more effective exertion of government through 
various conditions of freedom (empowerment, participation, ownership etc). 
This raises the danger that the ‘local turn’ has become incorporated into wider 
managerial and strategic designs, a danger which Oliver Richmond anticipated 
when he distinguished between the local and the ‘local-local’. In continuing to 
hold out the prospect of a more authentic engagement with local actors, 
Richmond reiterates that the liberal peace’s engagements with the ‘local’ have 
produced inherently disappointing results: in all too many instances, he 
suggests, the ‘local’ has corresponded to little more than a ‘liberally projected 
artifice of elites and civil society’ (2011, 14). Richmond further explains that  
peacebuilding actors ‘construct the local in a positive sense as supporting the 
liberal peace framework, but in actual fact they distance the local from 
international peacebuilding for governmental purposes relating to security, 
rights and institutions, with needs, justices, culture and identity often ignored’ 
(2011, 59). 
Even as it extends an open hand of invitation to local agency, the liberal 
peace remains possessed of the desire to guide and orientate; its envisaged 
‘freedom’ serves as a perpetuation of power through other means. This clearly 
recalls Foucault’s depiction of liberal governance, which he presented as the 
‘considerable extension of procedures of control, constraint, and coercion which 
are something like the counterpart and counterweight of different freedoms’ 
(2010, 67). Foucault therefore clearly rejected a deeply rooted liberal tradition 
which had opposed freedom to power. In proceeding along the same path, 
Barbra Cruikshank, the democratic theorist, had previously demonstrated the 
essential dualism at the heart of empowerment. Relations of empowerment, she 
suggests, are simultaneously defined by: a) local or external expertise; b) the 
democratically unaccountable exercise of power (embodied in the relationship 
between the empowering and the empowered); c) knowledge of the 
empowered; d) relations that are both coercive and voluntary (1999, 72). 
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In this chapter I develop this interrelation of freedom and power to argue 
that empowerment, participation and ownership are governmental technologies 
that interpolate the subject within wider power relations. I initially begin with a 
general theoretical analysis, which seeks to unravel the interrelation of  
freedom, knowledge, power and government. I then attempt to demonstrate 
how this general theoretical discussion can be related to the specific attributes 
of liberal peacebuilding. Ultimately, my intention is to establish an analysis of a 
liberal form of power that operates through and within various conditions of 
freedom. My intention is not to engage this apparatus at an ideological level of 
analysis; rather, I instead propose to bring out its disciplinary and regulatory 
implications in fuller detail. These themes will be brought out in fuller detail in 
subsequent empirical chapters. The deepening chapter will illustrate the 
persistence of managerial and technocratic overtones; the contextuality chapter 
will demonstrate the ‘lag’ of externalised and generic reference points; while the 
complementarity chapter will highlight the securitisation of democratisation and 
development.  
Before engaging in a sustained discussion of Foucault’s work, I should 
first clarify that it is not my intention to provide a prolonged exegesis of 
Foucault’s work or engage in a systematic analysis of his different textual 
products. This chapter instead applies Foucault instrumentally – its core 
concern is to demonstrate how Foucauldian concepts and themes can be 
applied to a specific attribute of international relations, specifically post-conflict 
peacebuilding.  
Aside from being justified by the immediate task at hand, this application 
of Foucault’s work could also be justified as distinctively ‘Foucauldian’. Shani 
has previously advanced the argument that attempts to impose an artificial 
coherence upon Foucault, or to reduce his work to a set of authoritative 
interpretations which are grounded within an ‘appropriate’ reading of core texts, 
are inherently flawed. He has suggested that ‘Foucault must be defended 
against attempts to colonise his work and render it intelligible, systematic and 
coherent’ (2010, 210). 
I interpret this to mean that any attempt to salvage a ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ 
Foucault (in much the same sense as critics and historians present an 
‘authentic’ Marx) is a wholly redundant enterprise which is, by virtue of its own 
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inherent contradictions, doomed to failure. This has clear implications for the 
approach that I will adopt in this chapter, which is to selectively identify those 
aspects of his work that can be used to examine attributes or dimensions of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. In developing and applying Foucauldian insights, I 
will therefore focus primarily upon Discipline and Punish, some of Foucault’s 
College de France Lectures and edited collections and anthologies of 
Foucault’s work. When I reference the peacebuilding literature, I very clearly 
distinguish between authors who offer an explicitly Foucauldian analysis (such 
as Laura Zanotti) and authors who instead count Foucault as one among a 
range of influences (such as David Chandler and Mark Duffield). My discussion 
of Foucault’s work will intermittently draw upon broader frameworks of 
reference, referring to contributions from critical theory, critical development 
theory (Kothari 2001; Mosse 2001, 2004; Abrahamsen 2004) and democratic 
theory (Cruikshank 1999).  
This chapter progresses and develops in five stages. First of all, it 
identifies two objects of critical engagement: the technocratic and liberal 
attributes or dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding. It then engages, at a 
theoretical level of analysis, with themes of power, knowledge and freedom; in 
engaging each of these points, I bring out the respective components of a 
distinctive liberal governmentality. After establishing the theoretical basis, I then 
demonstrate how Foucauldian perspectives can sustain a critical analysis of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. The fourth part of the review demonstrates how the 
contribution of Lene Hansen, an IR theorist whose work broadly operates within 
a Foucauldian/post-structuralist framework of reference, can provide the basis 
for a critical analysis of core policy texts. A conclusion then briefly summarises 
the key issues and themes engaged over the course of this chapter.  
Two Objects of Critical Engagement: The ‘Local Turn’ and 
Technocracy 
In the literature review chapter, I argued that liberal peacebuilding could 
be traced back to three key influences: liberalism, peacebuilding theory and 
technocracy. The influence of peacebuilding theory has been evidenced within 
the proposition of a ‘deepened’ or substantive democratisation. The OECD, as 
one of the foremost international institutions with responsibility for helping to 
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embed ‘good’ peacebuilding practice (OECD 1995, 1995b, 1996), has helped to 
promote and consolidate democratic values. Previous OECD guidelines clearly 
establish that:  
Development interventions in support of dialogue and negotiation must 
avoid seeking to impose externally generated solutions. They must 
continually discipline themselves to help create the space within which 
parties to a conflict may themselves explore solutions, and work together 
to build peace and good governance. (1997, Point 183) 
This quote (also see Fraser, 2005) explicitly voices the proposition that external 
actors have come to understand the limitations of external power and influence. 
The essential inference of ‘discipline’ is that this limitation has become 
internalised, to the point where external actors no longer seek to prescribe or 
implement solutions. In contrast to the proposition that post-conflict 
peacebuilding remains defined by an essential exteriority (see Engelbert and 
Tull 2008, 134; Heathershaw and Lambach 2008, 273); Richmond 2004; 
Marshall 2008, 4; Lemay Herbert 2009, 22), these contributions instead suggest 
that it is endogenous, taking root within the conflict-afflicted society. This 
reinvents peacebuilding as an almost organic process, that is both defined and 
enabled by the absenting of external determinants. The agency of local actors 
is accordingly enhanced, to the point where ‘minimalist’ frameworks of 
democratic engagement (see Bermeo 2003, 153-154) are now scornfully 
disavowed and swept aside. Popular engagement is no longer constrained to 
specific institutional innovations, but instead addresses itself to the broad 
project of societal reform. As the Literature Review has already explained, the 
emergence of this site of democratic engagement is far from unimportant or 
irrelevant; rather, it envisages a whole new level of democratic engagement.  
Whereas the democratic commitments of the liberal peace are openly 
acknowledged and indeed celebrated (not least by its own adherents), its 
technocratic components appear as a perhaps less celebrated, if no less 
pronounced, concern. Perhaps in acknowledgement of Richmond’s ‘local turn’, 
MacGinty speaks of a ‘technocratic turn’ that originated within a prior 
‘bureaucratic imperative’ (2012, 87). This ‘turn’ is embodied within a substantial  
technocratic apparatus that aspires to ‘transparency, efficiency and 
accountability’ (MacGinty 2012, 290). In referencing its epistemic component, 
Fetherston relates a ‘progressive linearity of knowledge’ (2007, 199) while 
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Mosse, with reference to development practice, invokes a ‘managerialist 
language of linear progressions, inputs and outcomes’ (2004, 146). Couzens 
Hoy, meanwhile, relates ‘[a] scientific-realist view [in which] the replacement of 
[an] earlier, false theory by a later, true one, [culminates] in a cumulative 
progression toward a clearer view of things as they are’ (Couzens Hoy 1986, 6). 
Knowledge, it is anticipated, is the condition that will enable a fuller 
reconciliation of theory and practice, ironing out irregularities and establishing 
the basis for optimal peacebuilding outcomes (DfID 1997, 48; Smith 2004, 56; 
Kartas 2007, 15), providing the basis for models and frameworks which can be  
generalised across different contexts (Paris 2002, 654, 655; Paris and Sisk 
2009; 1-2; Ammitbøll and Torjesen 2007, 11; Woodward 2009, 47). In short, 
technocracy underpins the ‘perceptible trend towards the standardisation of 
approaches to conflict analysis’ (MacGinty 2012, 300) and the aspiration 
towards a transferable knowledge (Berger 2007, 21). 
However, other observers have viewed the advance of the technical 
horizon with varying degrees of trepidation. Donais critiques a technocratic 
mentality in which ‘local perspectives are more often viewed as hurdles to be 
overcome or obstacles to be avoided than as potential sources of sustainable 
solutions’ (2009, 8; see also Heathershaw and Lambach 2008, 272). Hameiri, 
meanwhile, relates the essential exteriority of technocracy (2010, 22). Both 
critical theorists and Foucault converged upon a shared concern that 
technocracy had disciplinary implications. Centero defines technocracy as the 
‘[imposition] of a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of 
instrumentally rational techniques’ (1993, 314) while Mosse observes that, in 
the last analysis, it ultimately aspires ‘order, [the] systematic, [the] rule [and the] 
rule or principle’ (2004, 134).  
In each contribution, there is a clear sense of delimitation and the denial 
of human and social potentiality. There is a clear echo of Marcuse’s One-
Dimensional Man, which had similarly warned of the consequences, both 
human and social, that would be brought about by the advance of technical 
reason. An echo of this seminal work is found within MacGinty’s allusion to a 
‘closed logic of the technocratic system that simultaneously rationalises, 
conditions and coerces’ (2012, 289). This ‘closed’ logic’ ultimately leads in the 
direction of ‘an authoritarian political framework’ (Centero 1993, 308) and ‘an 
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advanced society that makes scientific and technical progress into an 
instrument of domination’ (Marcuse 1964, 16).  
A Foucauldian Analysis of Power, Knowledge and Freedom 
A Foucauldian analysis demands the effective inversion of an 
established tradition of Enlightenment thought, in which power is placed in 
opposition to freedom. Freedom, for this tradition, is a means through which  
power is resisted and denied. This core tenet of Enlightenment thought remains 
as influential as when it was first expounded; upon engaging with the  
peacebuilding literature, for example, we have previously encountered the 
proposition that local actors can be empowered in a way that addresses and 
overcomes deeply embedded inequalities of power. Edward Newman, for 
example, suggests that empowerment will shift ‘the strategic enterprise [of 
peacebuilding] activities from a deductive, structural perspective to an inductive, 
process-driven one. In his view, this will ‘bring local priorities to the fore, rather 
than subjecting them to donor priorities’ (2003, 271). 
Rita Abrahamsen has also noted the persistence of this tradition within 
the development literature. She notes that in ‘defining power primarily as 
domination, and as the antithesis of freedom, the existing literature [on 
participatory development] tends to perceive partnerships either as a way of 
abolishing, reducing or “taming” power by subjecting it to contract’ (2004, 1463). 
 Here Abrahamsen draws attention to an oppositional agency, in which it 
is situated in opposition to established concentrations of power. This agency is 
conceived in constitutive or relational terms. It is also clearly emancipatory or 
transformative in character. The ‘freedom’ which is invoked by peacebuilding 
actors is therefore essentially ideological in form. Foucault, in emphasising the 
fact that freedom was produced, rather than concretely realised, insisted that 
this freedom was an attribute and manifestation of power; as such, it could not 
be conceived or situated in opposition to it. David Chandler similarly insists 
upon this constitutive dimension when he relates interventions that ‘appear to 
be consensual rather than coercive, through which the technologies and 
practices simultaneously produce or constitute the subjects being dominated 
through the discursive practices and frameworks of knowledge, meaning, norms 
and values’ (2006, 15). 
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In consciously inverting the established liberal tradition, Foucault insisted 
that ‘liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the 
establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying 
on threats’ (2010, 63, 64). Burchell further clarifies that Foucault’s analysis of 
liberalism was ‘pitched at the level of its practice as a critical reflection on 
governmental reason. It is not an analysis of liberalism as a theoretical doctrine, 
a utopian dream, an ideology or a collection of particular governmental policies’ 
(1991, 143). 
Foucault was therefore concerned with the question of how power is 
exerted through and within the condition of freedom. This implies a particular 
style of government, which does not seek to constrain or delimit, but which 
rather induces and works through the agency of individual subjects. Freedom, 
in the Foucauldian understanding, is the condition and effect of power (Couzens 
Hoy 1986, 139) and a correlate of government (Duffield 2007, 4). Power is not 
visible, concentrated or exerted at a specific point (as in the legal-juridical 
tradition); rather, it is exerted in subtle and insidious ways; power is not external 
to the subject, but the subject is instead constituted within power, ‘various 
discursive practices and systems of knowledge’ (Joseph 2012, 67).  
It is essential to appreciate that, with liberal governmentalities, power is 
not a denial or restriction; in this form, it operates through and within the ‘free’ 
agency of individual subjects; government can, to this extent, be defined as  
a ‘relationship of power that [does] not act directly and immediately upon others’ 
(Faubion 1994, 340, 341; Cruikshank 1999, 41, 102). If we are to fully grasp the 
significance of liberal technologies of government, it is essential to attain an 
understanding of the ways in which ‘power [operates] through the modality of 
freedom’ (2010, 59). The converse also applies: ‘this freedom, both ideology 
and technique of government, should in fact be understood within the mutation 
and transformation of technologies of power’ (Foucault 2010b, 48). 
In drawing upon the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Foucault insisted that 
frameworks that sought to deny or limit power were essentially means through 
which power was further reinforced or circulated. This insight can be applied to 
both liberalism, which presents a range of techniques through which power can 
be mitigated or qualified, and technocracy, which presents itself as a neutral or 
apolitical embodiment of an objective and universal ‘truth’. 
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In addition to these reference points, Foucault’s critical project was also 
directed towards a legal-juridical tradition which held that power could – through 
the application of various devices and mechanisms – be subject to limitation or 
constraint. For Foucault, this tradition, which had a profound and lasting impact 
upon liberalism, was profoundly flawed because it occluded a whole range of 
power relations. As he observed: ‘Disciplinary power [is] exercised through its 
invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of 
compulsory visibility’ (Foucault 1979, 187) 
Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population (2009) explored the progressive 
development of power, distinguishing it, with close attention to overlaps and 
continuities, into its pastoral, state (raison d’etat) and naturalised forms. At each 
of these points, Foucault stressed the existence of forms of power that could not 
be collapsed into legal-juridical mechanisms and forms, thereby reiterating the 
co-existence and exertion of a whole host of ancillary powers which remained 
unacknowledged in their true implication and significance (see also Zanotti 
2005, 463). Power, Foucault therefore reiterated, should be understood to be  
 ‘distributed, dynamic and nodal’ (Paras 2006, 64). In stressing the creative 
character of this power, Foucault consciously rejected a legal-juridical tradition 
which equated power with the ability to constrain, restrict or punish. Mark Bevir 
clarifies that: ‘Foucault wanted to modify our negative concept of power, as 
something that represses, by stressing how it also can act positively to produce 
and to define’ (1999, 349). 
This theme of ‘positive power’ is perhaps most clearly brought out by 
Foucault’s discussion of subjectivity, receiving its clearest articulation with the 
influences that produce and cultivate the self. The self, Foucault reiterated, did 
not exist outside of, or beyond, discourse, but was instead constituted through 
and within it. Dillon goes as far as to suggest that the very appearance of a 
preformed subject is itself an effect of power (2004, 78). Barbara Cruikshank, in 
adopting a noticeably Foucauldian vernacular, speaks of ‘voluntarily applied 
technologies of selfhood’ (1999, 102). Here it is important to acknowledge that 
the self is not cancelled or annulled by power; rather, autonomy is the 
precondition for the exertion of these powers, a feature which brings to mind 
Richmond’s allusion to ‘agencies of both emancipatory and repressive 
character’ (2010, 200)). The ‘autonomous self’ therefore presents an object that 
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is divided into two parts: a ‘subject who is both subject to someone else by 
control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge’ (Foucault 1982, 212).  
A casual encounter with the peacebuilding literature more often gives 
rise to a very different interpretation of autonomy. Paris and Sisk, for instance, 
suggest that peacebuilding interventions are ultimately directed towards the 
establishment of ‘autonomous institutions’ (2009, 1-2); Paris, meanwhile, relates 
interventions under the peacebuilding rubric which seek to ‘bolste[r] the 
effective sovereignty of peacebuilding host states’ (2002, 654). In both of these 
contributions, ‘autonomy’ is a prior status that is concretely realised in the 
process of peacebuilding interventions. In both its production and final 
articulation, it is conceived in opposition to external reference points.  
Critical contributions to the development literature, in contrast, evidence 
a much clearer appreciation of the fact that ‘autonomy’ and ‘independence’ are 
constituted within and through external relations and interactions. Abrahamsen, 
for instance, presents partnership as ‘an advanced liberal power that works 
through promises of incorporation and inclusion’ (2004, 1453). This brings to 
mind Richmond’s denunciation of instances in which ownership is ‘determined 
by international ideals and capacity, not by local consensus, but rather by local 
compliance’ (2012, 358). Donais (2009, 6) draws a similarly sharp distinction 
between ‘cosmopolitan’ (in which ‘local actors [take] ownership over a largely 
predetermined vision of peacebuilding’ and ‘communitarian’ (which implies a ‘far 
more substantive vision of local ownership’) forms of ownership.  
Within this liberal governmentality, freedom, knowledge and power are 
not mutually opposed, but instead appear as the respective components of an  
ensemble. Foucault successfully captured this dimension when he described 
governmentality as an attempt to ‘arouse, to facilitate, and to lasseiz faire, in 
other words to manage and to no longer control through rules and regulations’ 
(2010b, 353). The concept of governmentality therefore enables us to escape 
the tight embrace of the legal-juridical tradition, ultimately progressing analysis 
towards an understanding of how ‘[e]conomic freedom, liberalism [and] 
disciplinary techniques are completely bound up with each other’ (2010, 67). 
Jonathan Joseph, whose work has sought to apply the concept of 
governmentality to international relations, has similarly spoken of a 
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governmentality that ‘takes political economy as its method of intervention’ 
(2012, 52-53). 
In direct opposition to ideological renderings of neo-liberalism, which 
instead posit an absenting of government, Joseph instead conceives of 
economic processes and relations as political technologies that subtly 
interpolate the subjectivity of domestic actors. Even within neo-liberal systems 
of governance, which are ostensibly predicated upon the mitigation or removal 
of government, it is therefore the case that governmental intervention is ‘no less 
dense, frequent, active and continuous than [in any] other’ (Foucault 2010, 
145). 
Foucault was not strictly concerned with freedom or the liberal subject; 
rather, he was more preoccupied with the question of how both were 
constituted. Foucault was clearly aware of the fact that the liberal self was not 
an essentially prior form concretely manifested in practice; quite the contrary, it 
was instead the product and attribute of a positive power.  
Foucault’s attention was not therefore directed towards the unitary, 
ahistorical or reified subject that was the basis and derivative of the liberal 
tradition. It would perhaps be more accurate to suggest that his interest only 
extended as far as taking it apart. Bevir acknowledges this imperative when he 
observes that the subject does not present itself but is instead the product of 
‘social structures, epistemes, discourses or something else of the sort’ (1999, 
347). The constitutive process – that is, the ways in which the subject is 
‘shaped, guided and moulded into [an actor] capable of responsibly exercising 
[freedom]’ (1999; 157) – is the primary preoccupation for a Foucauldian 
analysis.  
The central concern for liberal governance is therefore to establish the 
conditions under which the agency of the ‘free’ agency can be most effectively 
managed. This is a key preoccupation for Jonathan Joseph, as embodied by his 
close attention to technologies that ‘operate from a distance’ (2012, 12). Joseph 
observes that the concept of governmentality ‘fits perfectly with ideas like 
competitiveness (especially emphasising its artificial, constructed nature), the 
emphasis on individualised, privatised social relations and the stress on 
flexibilisation, reflexivity and networked forms of governance’ (2012, 48). To put 
it slightly differently, the concept of governmentality provides an important 
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insight into a ‘new form of politics’ orientated towards ‘registers of meaning, 
evaluation and justification that can guide, induce and enable actors to act in 
certain ways’ (Sending 2010, 3). 
Liberal governance does not establish a situation in which the subject 
exists in opposition to power; on the contrary, it is apparent that when ‘power is 
exercised and political technologies are deployed, individuals are made into 
subjects’ (Foucault 1982, 212). Far from being a ‘limiting point’ of resistance or 
denial, the liberal self presents itself as a ‘tool of power [and] a product of 
domination’ (Merquior 1985, 108). Closer inspection therefore reveals that the 
self does not approximate to a ‘fixed identity, the realisation of which constitutes 
freedom’ (Bevir 1999, 349).  
Whereas liberal ideology presents the subject as its foundation-stone, 
Foucault instead suggests that it is the end product or consequence. This point 
was explicitly made when he observed that the subject does not exist as a 
‘natural, essential entity whose freedom consists in its unlimited expression or 
teleological realisation [but rather as] a transitory and contingent result of power 
relations that constitute it’ (Foucault 1979, 29). In further extending this point, 
Richmond insists upon an analysis that does not take the ‘self’ as a pre-given 
form, an insight which suggests a closer engagement with the question of how 
liberal peacebuilders ‘produce political subjects or citizens best suited to fulfil 
their policies, agendas, interests and ideologies’ (2011, 12).  
Just as with his interrelation of freedom and power, Foucault’s analysis of 
the relationship between power and knowledge sought to invert an established 
Enlightenment tradition. Foucault explicitly demanded the unequivocal rejection 
of a ‘tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the 
power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its 
injunctions, its demands, and its interests’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, 
knowledge was clearly implicated within the exertion of power. He made his 
intentions in this respect clear when he stated,  
Insofar as what is involved in this analysis of mechanisms of power is the 
politics of truth, [I] see its role as that of showing the knowledge effects 
produced by our struggles, confrontations and battles that take place in 
our society, and by the tactics of power that are the elements of this 
struggle (2009).  
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Foucault’s analysis, which was very much indebted to Friedrich Nietzsche, was 
therefore directed towards the point at which ‘Western rationality declar[ed] its 
autonomy and sovereignty’ (Simons 1995, 16). He insisted that the ‘will to 
knowledge’ derived directly from a ‘will to power’ (an insight derived directly 
from Nietzsche). For Foucault, the fact that knowledge was a ‘thing of this world’ 
(Bevir 1999, 349) directly implicated it within the operations and exertions of 
power (Cruikshank 1999, 2). Foucault anticipated a closer engagement with ‘the 
machinery by which power relations give rise to a possible corpus of 
knowledge, and [the way/s that] knowledge extends and reinforces the effects 
of this power’ (Foucault 1979, 29). Zanotti, in adopting a noticeably similar 
vernacular, invokes ‘a multifaceted and universally valid technique of rule, a 
knowledge/power complex that opens multiple spaces of visibility at the national 
and international level’ (2005, 480).  
Paras suggests that Foucault sought to achieve a ‘frank subordination of 
knowledge to a power understood in wholly socio-political terms’ (Paras 2006, 
57). Given that this was his preoccupation, it was perhaps unsurprising that 
Foucault should seek to fixate upon the human sciences. In contrast to their 
natural counterparts, the human sciences provided a more fertile point of 
engagement precisely because they were still immersed in their social origins. 
Foucault observed:  
If one takes a form of knowledge (savoir) like psychiatry, won’t the 
question be much easier to resolve, since the epistemological profile of 
psychiatry is a low one and psychiatry is linked with a whole range of 
institutions, economic requirements and political issues of social 
regulation. (Gordon 1980, 109). 
From the outset, Foucault therefore clearly distinguished between forms 
of knowledge which had been able to liberate themselves from their social 
origins (the natural sciences) and those which had not (the human sciences). It 
should be recognised, however, that this was not intended to enable the 
distinction of ‘genuine’ and ‘false’ knowledge. Foucault put this question to one 
side, justifying this course of action upon the basis that he was not concerned 
with epistemology. For him, such questions were to be clearly distinguished 
from the issue of how knowledge is made to function. Hansen summarises the 
essential distinction when she observes that Foucault was less concerned with 
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the question of what knowledge is than with the question of how it functioned 
(Hansen 2006, 36).  
Kothari, whose analysis of development practices makes extensive use 
of Foucault, observes that Foucault understood knowledge to be ‘an 
accumulation of social norms, rituals and practices that, far from being 
constructed in isolation from power, is embedded in them (or against them)’ 
(2001, 141).  This reiterates that Foucault did not seek to engage with 
knowledge at the level of its objective truth; rather, his analysis was instead 
directed towards the question of how knowledge functions as a social practice. 
The conditions under which knowledge is produced, the ways in which 
knowledge is deployed in social struggles, the power relations which emerge 
around knowledge – each of these questions preoccupied Foucault. This 
interest, and here it is important to note that Foucault explicitly acknowledged 
the influence of the Frankfurt School, also found an echo within Theodor 
Adorno’s assertion that ‘critique of society is critique of knowledge, and vice-
versa’ (Cook 2004, 71).  
Previously the Enlightenment tradition had stood outside of social 
relations, being preserved in austere and serene isolation. The critical theorists 
and Foucault now sought to bring it down to a temporal level, to soil its esoteric 
appearance. In common with critical theorists, Foucault expressed a concern 
that the rationalisation of society and social thought had assumed disciplinary 
implications. In direct opposition to the Panglossian naivete of liberal thought, 
Foucault grimly invoked ‘discourses which, claiming to be under the banner of 
legitimate science, have in fact remained intimately involved with the 
micropractices of power’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 176; Foucault 1979, 191).  
Far from establishing the basis upon which the promise of Enlightenment 
thought and its associated concepts of ‘reason’, ‘rationality’ and ‘progress’ could 
be fulfilled, modern forms of knowledge had instead assumed disciplinary 
implications. Merquior observes that: ‘Underneath its noble ideals of human 
emancipation, the Enlightenment defined new “moral technologies” conducive 
to a degree of social control far greater than was the case in traditional 
societies’ (1985, 90). 
In further expanding this theme, Foucault’s Discipline and Punish traced 
the emergence and consolidation of ‘a corpus of knowledge [and] techniques [in 
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which] ‘scientific’ discourses [are] formed and becom[e] entangled with the 
practice of the power to punish’ (1979, 23). Hailey further reiterates that: ‘the 
knowledge embodied in a discourse should not be seen as being representative 
of a universal truth but rather should be seen as an exercise of power’ (2001, 
98). Far from establishing the basis for the advancement of the human 
condition, the Enlightenment, along with its associated notions of ‘progress’, 
‘rationality’ and ‘reason’, instead imposed a range of subtle regulations and 
disciplines. Duffield, making much the same point in a very different context, 
has reiterated how freedom and knowledge could become active components in 
the reproduction of more effective forms of ‘metropolitan monitoring, 
intervention and regulation’ (2002). 
Discipline and Punish provides a clear and lucid development of this 
argument. In place of a progressive humanisation of the French penitentiary 
system, Foucault instead posited a gradual and incremental refinement of 
disciplinary techniques; this refinement was guided, in all crucial aspects and 
dimensions, by the associated development of a practical knowledge.  
It should be stressed that Foucault did not view this development as the 
corruption or betrayal of a sanctified tradition; still less did he view it as an 
unfortunate outcome which could be mitigated through minor adjustments or 
amendments. Instead, Foucault spoke of a nexus at which the two elements 
intertwined. He explicitly observed: ‘Power and knowledge directly imply one 
another…there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field 
of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at 
the same time power relations’ (Foucault 1979, 27).  
This is by no means a novel observation; it reoccurs within seminal 
works of critical theory, such as Dialectic of Enlightenment, Critique of 
Instrumental Reason and One-Dimensional Man. Fetherston alludes to ‘an 
apparatus which produces docile social bodies and seeks to establish the 
disciplinary power of the regime of truth’ (2007, 200). And Marcuse expresses a 
concern that ‘technical and scientific rationalities had formed a new means of 
social control [and] delegated the individual subject to the status of functional 
object’ (Centero 1993, 308; Foucault 2010b, 357).  
In contrast, other observers continue to hold out hope of an 
emancipation through knowledge. Habermas, for instance, distinguishes an 
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‘emancipatory knowledge interest’ from the ‘technical interest in manipulation 
and control that characterises the empirico-analytical sciences’ (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999, 29). Bellamy, meanwhile, insists upon a clear distinction of 
‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ knowledge (2004, 30, 31). 
Applying Foucault to Liberal Peacebuilding 
The preceding discussion has engaged with Foucauldian concepts and 
themes at a general level of analysis. In expounding the concept of a liberal 
governmentality, it has interrelated democracy, freedom and knowledge. In this 
sub-section I will now descend to the level of liberal peacebuilding. I first 
develop the interrelation of knowledge and power; I then engage with the 
conjoining of freedom of government; finally, I seek to demonstrate how 
Foucauldian concepts can be applied to the tensions and contradictions of 
liberal peacebuilding.  
In initially engaging at a theoretical level of analysis, I developed the 
proposition of a power/knowledge nexus – in Foucauldian terms, ‘discourses of 
truth’ which ‘induc[e] regular effects of power’ (1980, 131). This interrelation can 
be clearly contrasted with technocratic accounts that are instead premised upon 
linear progressions. In contrast, a Foucauldian perspective would be more 
predisposed towards a genealogical analysis, engaging at this point in the 
expectation that this would bring to light hidden struggles, suppressed 
alternatives and points of resistance. From this vantage-point, the policy 
document would not appear a particular point within an incremental progression 
towards a more completely realised policy wisdom; rather, it would instead 
appear as a relay, aspect or dimension of power. Hence why he called upon 
observers to make ‘the technology of power the very principle both of the 
humanisation of the penal system and the knowledge of man’ (1979, 23). 
Upon this reading, the steady consolidation of the body of knowledge 
would contribute to the refinement of subtle disciplinary techniques. Joseph, in 
referencing innovations within neo-liberal governance, has referenced the 
emergence and consolidation of more ‘subtle methods of power exercised 
through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques which  
act to regulate social conduct’ (2010b, 224).  
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This is why Foucault presented knowledge as ‘a functional mechanism 
that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more 
effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come’ (1979, 209). The 
words ‘subtle’ and ‘lighter’ clearly convey the extent to which freedom functions 
as a key component within liberal technologies, precipitating the more effective 
exertion of power. In this context, ‘progression’ takes on a quite different 
meaning, corresponding to the refinement of disciplinary technologies of the 
self.  
This provides us with a basis upon which we can sceptically engage with 
the ‘local turn’ within peacebuilding theory and practice. The premise that the 
limitations of top-down frameworks and mechanisms have been acknowledged, 
and that peacebuilding actors have ‘learned’ the merits of bottom-up 
engagement, should invoke a considerable degree of disquiet upon our part. In 
engaging with previous epistemic progressions, Simons observes that they are  
associated with a whole range of power effects (1995, 43). This is true of both 
the ‘local turn’ and peacebuilding more generally – both have given rise to new 
techniques of surveillance and subtle coercion.  
 In the established narrative of the comprehensive approach, external 
actors have ‘learned’ the limitations of top-down management, coming to 
appreciate and acknowledge their limited ability to bring about lasting change 
within post-conflict contexts, ultimately contributing to a heightened emphasis 
upon local capacities and contributions. In evidencing this ability to reflect upon 
its own internal contradictions and limitations, liberal peacebuilding has found 
renewed impetus, being reinvented as an open-ended, dynamic and reflexive 
enterprise.  
Foucauldian contributions would enable us to question and challenge 
this general assertion, along with its associated corollaries. Far from 
establishing the basis for the fuller embodiment of an ideological ‘self’, the ‘local 
turn’ would instead initiate and sustain various forms of regulation and oversight 
(see Mosse 2001, 22, 29), as Hindess acknowledges when he refers to the 
‘greatly expanded use of markets, empowerment and self-government as 
regulatory devices’ (2004, 36); Kartas similarly expounds upon this theme when 
he relates instances in which ‘[donor] assistance [structures] participation and 
input’ (2007, 14; see also Campbell 2011). 
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For Foucault, the percolation of the legal-juridical myth – the ‘myth’ being 
that power was contained or constrained by formal mechanisms – enabled and 
sustained various disciplinary technologies and rationalities. The shift from ‘top-
down’ management to ‘bottom-up’ empowerment and participation therefore 
enabled a refinement or rationalisation of power, therefore inaugurating and 
putting in process novel forms of discipline and regulation  
David Chandler (2002, 64; 2006, 26) has previously described how 
domestic ‘capacity-building’ interventions broadly correspond to this 
representation; Henkel and Stirrat (2001, 179) argue that participation is a form 
of governance; meanwhile, Harrison suggests that ‘[t]he governance lexicon of 
‘participation’, ‘partnerships’, ‘governments in the driver’s seat’ [is] an expanding 
remit of intervention which attempts to shape sovereign frontiers in deeper and 
more pervasive ways’ (2009, 204); Fraser, meanwhile, relates instances in 
which ‘participation disciplines the national political economy’ (2005, 318). While 
there is a clear temptation to ascribe transformation or emancipation to 
participation, it is just as likely that it will reproduce the status quo (Mosse 2004, 
80, 96). In further underlining this point, Mosse suggests that there is a clear 
potential for participation to be subverted from below - that is, by the very actors 
that are supposed to be the subjects of participation (2001, 97).  
Campbell’s (2011) critical engagement with ‘second generation’ 
peacebuilding is particularly instructive in this respect. He argues that it is 
profoundly mistaken to speak as though bottom-up innovations mitigate or 
remove power; instead, he suggests, it is more sustainable to view these 
innovations as a reconfiguration of power. Participation under these 
circumstances is not open-ended being instead, to the extent that it is delimited 
in relation to clear end objectives, functional or instrumental in character. 
Cleaver, in reflecting upon the ways in which emancipation has become a close 
correlate of development, observes that: ‘As empowerment has become a 
buzzword in development, an essential objective of projects, its radical, 
challenging and transformatory edge has been lost’ (2001, 37). 
Empowerment under conditions of neo-liberal governance is inextricably 
entangled with a range of managerial and technocratic imperatives. In engaging 
within this frameworks, participants are subtly orientated back towards a range 
of functional imperatives. Far from envisaging the fundamental transformation of 
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social conditions, empowerment under these circumstances is directed towards 
ensuring the ‘commitment of those to be controlled’ while permitting a ‘degree of 
‘responsible autonomy’ within limits’ (Taylor 2001, 137; see also Francis 2001, 
80). Richmond, upon encountering this emaciated and lacklustre 
‘empowerment’, was ultimately disenchanted to the point of seeking refuge 
within the ‘everyday’ (Richmond 2004, 89; 2012; Richmond and MacGinty 2013, 
772).  
This brings to mind Kothari’s observation that: ‘even when individuals 
think that they are most free, they are in fact in the grip of more insidious forms 
of power, which operate not solely through direct forms of repression but often 
through less visible strategies of normalisation’ (2001, 144). It similarly recalls, 
with comparable intensity, Henkel and Stirrat’s observation that ‘the attempt to 
empower people through the projects envisaged and implemented by the 
practitioners of the [participatory] orthodoxy is always an attempt, however 
benevolent, to reshape the personhood of the participants’ (2001, 182). In 
making the same point, Zanotti relates ‘international disciplinary mechanisms’ 
that ‘prescrib[e] standardised mechanisms for normalising politically diverse 
[local] situations’ (2006, 163). In each of these instances, the meaning and 
significance of ‘freedom’ is constituted within the interaction between the local 
and international.  
Cruikshank, in registering the fact that the essential concern is not the 
reproduction of an idealised ‘freedom’, observes that her principal concern is to 
establish ‘how [democracy] is done, how it is thought and practiced’ (1999, 18).  
Simon Chesterman, after engaging with the concept of ‘ownership’, clearly 
establishes the need for a similar undertaking when he notes that the concept 
can conceivably be defined in six different ways, which range from heightened 
responsiveness to direct control (2007, 9-10). The essential task, which is 
clearly foregrounded within the initial research question, is to establish precisely 
how concepts such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ are reproduced within 
policy documents.  
Critical analysis should pick at the bridges or joining points to bring out 
the logical contradictions and tensions that are contained therein. As Pouligny 
observes, ‘[m]ost programmes of [civil society] assistance are based on [a] 
fundamental ambiguity: they pretend to rebuild a “society” or even a “civil 
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society” while continually reducing this process to highly technical dimensions, 
depriving it of all political substance’ (2005, 505). Chandler further reiterates the 
need for such an engagement when he relates a policy of ‘evasion’ in which the 
immediate point of engagement is empowerment while the broader conceptual 
framework is technocratic (2006, 20-21, 64). In each of these instances, there is 
deeply embedded ambiguity, tension or contradiction which virtually demands 
critical engagement.  
The documentary reproduction of local knowledge provides an equally 
instructive example in this respect. Within the policy literature it is relatively 
straightforward to find instances in which local knowledge is conceived as a 
‘corrective’ to external distortions. Bellamy’s distinction between ‘objectivist’ and 
‘subjectivist’ knowledge appears to rest upon this understanding, while 
Habermas’s ‘emancipatory knowledge interest’ (2004, 30, 31) also appears to 
hint tantalisingly at it. It is not difficult to find other instances in which the 
concept is stamped with the sanctified seal of localism.  
It is noticeable that this local knowledge is presented within a unitary 
form. The conditions of its emergence and perpetuation, in contrast, escape 
sustained attention. A Foucauldian analysis, in contrast, would be more 
predisposed to disassemble this form, probing at its emancipatory and 
transformative pretensions. Kothari, for example, observes that it is inherently  
 mistaken to speak as if local knowledge is exclusively possessed by local 
actors (2001, 141). He observes that ‘what counts as local knowledge is very 
often the effect of specific kinds of techniques, of power, of regulation, and of 
normalisation’ (2001, 152). Sounding an equally pertinent note of warning, Jabri 
addresses a sceptical appraisal in the direction of ‘so-called’ local knowledge 
(2013, 11). 
These contributions suggest that a critical approach should fracture or 
disassemble unitary forms. From a Foucauldian perspective, concepts such as 
empowerment, participation and local knowledge should not be conceived in 
opposition to power. Shahar Hameiri (2010), in demonstrating how such an 
analysis can be progressed and developed, draws upon Foucauldian ideas to  
decompose the domestic context: in place of a unitary structure, he offers the 
domestic context as the intersecting point for a whole host of power relations. A 
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Foucauldian approach begins, by necessity, with an abrupt rejection of discrete 
or unitary forms; in their place, it instead inserts a set of relations. 
Mohan reiterates that it is necessary to begin with a rejection of ‘bounded 
subjectivities and [discrete] realms of knowledge’ (2001, 164). Knowledge and 
discourse are not simply instruments that empower the subject. Rather, as 
Abrahamsen observes, ‘[power] works through systems of knowledge and 
discursive practices to provide the meanings, norms, values and identities that 
not only constrain actors, but also constitute them’ (2004, 1459).  
A rejection of ‘bounded’ concepts is particularly important because 
Liberal peacebuilding is predicated upon a range of binary oppositions, in which 
freedom is situated in opposition to power and power is situated in opposition to 
knowledge. The divide between the internal and external is an equally important 
distinction, establishing the basis for a whole architecture of intervention 
predicated upon capacity-building, empowerment and participation. Substantial 
effort has already been committed to the cause of vulgarisation – in the 
Literature Review chapter sustained reference was made to both the hybridity 
and social structural branches of the peacebuilding literature. Duffield’s 
invocation of the ‘governance state’ similarly signals a shift away from 
hierarchies and ordered distributions, as does Bickerton’s allusion to a blurring 
of conventional lines of authority and accountability, a development which can 
be traced back to the ‘decentralised power of multiple external agents’ (2007, 
108). 
Alterations within neo-liberal governance impact upon the relationship 
between internal and external levels of governance. Hameiri, continuing on from 
where Bickerton leaves off, observes that the integration of the post-conflict 
context into wider governance structures corresponds to a situation in which 
transnational actors ‘become part of [the domestic state’s] internal governance’ 
(2010, 96; see also De Guevara 2010, 114).  This is but reiteration of the fact 
that, in the absence of ‘appropriate’ forms of external mediation, ‘local solutions 
are likely to be problematic’ (Chandler 2006, 50). In one earlier contribution, 
Chandler suggests that unmediated political agency is not a key object of 
statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions; on the contrary, it is more likely 
to be viewed as a problem in and of itself (2002, 53). This conclusion finds a 
further echo in Fraser’s observation that ‘the [World] Bank and many of the 
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‘constructive critics’ find autonomous, democratic development politically 
unattractive’ (2005, 328) and a World Bank report which expresses concerns 
about the dangers associated with ‘arbitrary’ state interventions (1997, 99). 
A Foucauldian Textual Analysis 
This chapter has demonstrated how Foucault can be applied to some of 
the core attributes of liberal peacebuilding. Although it has put in place the basis 
for a critical analysis, it has not established a framework that can be applied to  
policy texts. By virtue of the fact that we are concerned with a Foucauldian 
framework of analysis, it would not be appropriate to speak of a methodology 
(this word presupposing an analysis more beholden to the sacred conventions 
of social science). In place of a methodological template, it would instead be 
more appropriate to speak of a set of guiding principles which can sustain a 
critical analysis of peacebuilding policy texts.  
Although my analysis takes discourse as its object of reference, it does 
not correspond exactly to the framework of discourse analysis. It would perhaps 
be more appropriate to state that it is a critical reading rooted within the 
principles of a specific approach to discourse analysis. Discourse analysis 
broadly operates within a post-structural framework of reference and, as such, 
is well-suited to an analysis which is grounded within Foucauldian principles (it 
should, however, be noted that Foucault disputed the application of this term to 
his own work). 
In searching for an appropriate framework of discourse analysis, I was 
guided by the insight that it would, in all probability, be necessary to find a 
framework that would resemble my own needs and requirements. I sought a 
framework that was not too restrictive or prescriptive, and which was sufficiently 
open-ended. This framework needed also to enable me to engage with fault-
lines in the text and to bring out understated or occluded tensions. My attention 
ultimately converged upon the work of Lene Hansen, an IR theorist whose work 
has engaged extensively with both the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of discourse analysis. Her work was also familiar to me by virtue 
of the fact that she had previously engaged with themes of conflict intervention, 
although it should be recognised that Security as Practice (2006) was 
concerned with the challenges and complexities of humanitarian intervention.  
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Discourse is a conceptual reference point that frequently reoccurs within 
Lene Hansen’s work. She has previously engaged with discursive 
methodologies (Discourse Analysis, Post-Structuralism and Foreign Policy and 
Ontologies, Epistemologies, Methodologies), with the process through which 
‘security’ has been redefined (The Concepts and Methods of Non-Traditional 
Security Studies: Suggestions for a Discursive Agenda) and with the theoretical 
and methodological aspects of post-structural analysis (Poststructuralism).  
In Security as Practice (2006), perhaps her most significant publication, 
Hansen attempts to establish an interrelation between the identity and material 
practices of international relations. In engaging with this question, she begins 
with the assertion that identity, which is constructed through and within 
discourse and knowledge, has a clear relation to, and implication for, the 
practice of politics. In further examining this point, Hansen draws a clear 
distinction between the ‘intra-discursive’ and ‘extra-discursive’ – the latter, she 
observes, places clear ‘external limits upon discourse’. This distinction makes a 
clear parallel with Foucault’s methodological shift, in which he moved from 
considering the internal dimensions of discourse (The Archaeology of 
Knowledge) to understanding discourse in its relation to the social field and an 
associated array of relations, tactics and strategies (Discipline and Punish).  
Hansen explicitly rejects objectivist assumptions: ‘language is not a 
transparent tool functioning as a medium for the registration of data as 
(implicitly) assumed by positivist, empiricist science’ (2006, 16). And she 
engages the constitutive interactions through which subjectivity is produced, 
continually stressing the crucial interrelation of knowledge and power. In 
Security as Practice Hansen applies each of these understandings to three 
separate topics. These are: 1) the intertextual relations that adhere between 
each given text (while each text is engaged independently, it is accordingly 
conceived and understood within a broader field of reference); 2) the 
interrelations between each basic discourse (in addition to structuring the 
broader discursive field, each basic discourse is also related to its 
counterparts); and 3) the discursive construction of the condition of subjectivity. 
As I will now proceed to explain, the last has the closest resemblance to my 
own engagement.  
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In tracing these interactions and interrelations Hansen suggests that a 
genealogical approach, which would enable us to establish a ‘history of the 
present’, is appropriate. A genealogy does not encounter or engage a teleology, 
and to this extent, it does not conceive of its object of engagement as a stage 
within a more general movement. A genealogical reading is instead more 
predisposed to engage with relations and interactions that are guided by force 
and various impositions. In departing from this point, it is predisposed to 
reiterate contingency and deviation.  
By insisting upon the centrality of contingency, Hansen ultimately 
orientates towards a heightened appreciation of complexity (the Beyond the 
Liberal Peace: Engaging with Complexity sub-section of the Literature Review is 
also a relevant point of reference in this respect). She rejects positivist 
approaches on the basis that they are more predisposed to simplify reality; in 
her view, it is a clear distortion to reduce reality to simplistic causes and effects. 
Consequently, she advocates an interpretative approach that is more 
predisposed to understand how (and here the divergence away from 
explanation is significant) different discursive threads feed into the general 
framework of foreign policy. 
However, Hansen does not merely engage these discursive threads at 
an abstract level of analysis: she instead attempts to understand how ‘extra-
discursive’ practices feed into, and help to sustain, these discursive 
representations. In this respect, her analysis recalls Foucault’s determination 
not to engage concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘participation’ at the level of 
their ideological reproduction. Similarily, Foucault had no interest in the 
question of whether the idealised form was realised in practice; rather, he was 
more concerned with the question of how idealised forms were made to function 
– a quite different order of analysis. The constitutive process through which the 
object was composed, as opposed to the object itself, was therefore his 
predominant focus.  
Hansen’s approach to discourse is predisposed to engage at points of 
fracture and breakage, and she explicitly relates the need to engage discourse 
at its various ‘discursive fault-lines’ (2006, 48). A critical reading (Hansen uses 
the term ‘methodology of reading’) should engage at these points, with the overt 
intention of destabilising and fracturing privileged interpretations. Hansen 
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conceives of a critical engagement which addresses the question of how 
‘discourses seek to construct stability, where they become unstable, how they 
can be deconstructed and the processes through which they change’.  
Hansen’s analysis proceeds in accordance with this understanding. She 
does not therefore direct her attention to unitary objects of analysis; rather, she 
instead adapts a social constructivist approach to ask how discourse and 
knowledge construct unified identities. This preoccupation with the cultivation 
and production of the self clearly recalls and brings to mind Foucault’s 
engagement with various ‘technologies of the self’. Although Hansen engages 
with a range of constitutive influences – social, cultural, historical – she is 
particularly interested in knowledge and the ways in which it feeds into the 
production of subjectivity. Her concern with the question of how subjectivity is 
produced is clearly indebted to Foucault’s conception of a ‘positive power’ 
which produces and cultivates. In engaging with the construction of identity, she 
seeks to highlight the essential contingency and the extent to which it is guided 
and orientated by relations of force. In tracing these interactions, Hansen does 
not aspire to a fuller realisation or embodiment, rather her constitutive 
methodology instead directs her attention to points of incipient breakage or 
rupture.  
I will now clarify how Hansen’s framework of analysis can be adapted to 
my own engagement with policy documents. In engaging at this point, it is 
important to clarify both points of convergence, e.g. where the two research 
agendas come together, and points of divergence, e.g. where it is necessary for 
me to alter or amend Hansen’s initial framework of engagement. In engaging 
with both aspects, it is important to remember that Hansen’s research approach 
is not to be conceived as a precise methodology, or as a step-by-step guide.  
Although I will broadly operate within Hansen’s research framework, it 
should first be acknowledged that I follow a number of divergences in this 
respect. The first point of divergence derives from Hansen’s engagement with 
the ‘extra-discursive’, or material. My own analysis is purely fixated upon policy 
texts and so it cannot engage with this broader context within which policy is 
produced. While it does not engage directly with peacebuilding practices, it 
would perhaps be more accurate to state that it is more concerned with the 
question of how peacebuilding practices are discursively mediated and 
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reproduced. As my concluding chapter stresses, this question of the relationship 
between peacebuilding discourse and practice is a question that would reward 
further research. 
My policy analysis does not engage with the question of intertextuality to 
any extent. In discussing the emergence and consolidation of a peacebuilding 
field, my Literature Review chapter had touched upon this theme to a much 
greater extent. My analysis of policy documents is instead much more 
concerned with the tensions and contradictions that adhere within individual 
texts. The question of how texts produce a shared web of inter-subjective 
meanings and reference points, in comparison, is a question that could only be 
engaged and developed through further research (again, this is a proposition 
that I further expand in the concluding chapter). 
The two research frameworks do nonetheless converge upon the 
question of how knowledge constitutes individual subjectivity. In engaging with 
policy documents, I am concerned with a very specific form of knowledge which 
is embodied and reproduced within policy documents. The distinctive outlines of 
the peacebuilding subject are produced within and through this knowledge. 
Whereas Hansen focuses upon the question of how specific identities are 
reproduced, I am instead more concerned with the question of how different 
aspects and attributes of subjectivity are reproduced and rendered. This 
emphasis is particularly clear in the chapters on deepening and contextuality. 
Hansen’s rejection of positivist models of social enquiry reiterates that 
she is not concerned with the question of ‘why’. She is not concerned with 
questions that relate to causation and effect; rather, her emphasis upon 
understanding suggests an analysis which is more predisposed to ask ‘how’. 
‘How’ implies an analysis that engages with its referent objects in their own 
terms, and which does not seek to reduce them to prior templates or formulas; 
to this extent, it could be suggested that the purpose of a critical analysis is to 
complicate or ‘vulgarise’. As one illustration of this point, my discussion of 
contextuality deliberately seeks to challenge the binary distinction that the 
liberal peace has established between the internal and external.   
Hansen’s engagement with social constructivism also implies an analysis 
that actively and deliberately disassembles its objects of reference. Critical 
analysis, in direct contrast to its problem-solving counterpart, does not seek to 
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reproduce concepts such as ownership, empowerment and participation; rather 
it instead seeks to establish how these concepts are produced and put into 
effect. Cruikshank similarly declared her intention to identify ‘how [democracy] is 
done, how it is thought and practiced’ (1999, 18), and in the same manner, 
Simon Chesterman has also previously reiterated the need to establish which 
version of ‘ownership’ is being invoked (2007, 9-10). Both Cruikshank and 
Chesterman signal the need for an analysis that critically probes and questions 
the surface invocation of concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘ownership’. There 
is, by implication, a similar need to unsettle rooted assumptions, and to highlight 
the exclusion or denial of possible alternatives.  
With this end in mind, Hansen stresses the need to push and probe at 
points of instability. Discourse seeks to stabilise and to secure; in direct 
contrast, Hansen calls for us to engage at the points where ‘discourses seek to 
construct stability, where they become unstable’. This depiction of an incipient 
rupture or breakage perhaps lies at the heart of Hansen’s rejection of 
teleological readings – she consistently refuses to conceive of ultimate closure. 
This closely resembles my own preoccupation with unresolved tensions and my 
rejection of the linear representations of liberal theory and technocracy.  
Aside from providing a framework that can be applied to policy texts, 
Hansen also provides guidance as to how my own analysis can be structured. 
Taking Hansen’s discussion of different models of study as my point of 
reference, I would be predisposed to suggest that my own study most closely 
resembles a model one study, e.g. a study which is focused upon policy 
discourse (Hansen 2006, 53). In adapting this model, I will engage policy texts, 
with a particular emphasis upon formal policy documents.  
In the first three chapters of this study I have looked at critical 
perspectives that have been engaged by policy actors. In exploring how these 
perspectives have been engaged and incorporated, I have outlined a policy 
agenda which converges upon a heightened democratisation (deepening), 
contextual engagement (contextuality) and engagement with internal 
contradictions and tensions (complementarity). In each of these instances I 
engaged with the question of how policy discourse incorporates and responds 
to its critical counterpart. To borrow Hansen’s terms of reference, I have 
engaged with the question of how ‘official discourse encounters criticism’ 
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(Hansen 2006, 54). This concern, which will be elaborated in each of the three 
empirical chapters, defines my project as a model one study. Hansen provides 
a further point of clarification when she reiterates the need for researchers to 
resolve: 1) the number of selves that will be engaged; 2) the intertextual model 
that will be adopted; 3) the temporal perspective that will be adopted; 4) the 
number of events that will be engaged. The current study will be a single-self 
study (which focuses upon the UK’s government policy output); it will engage at 
a formal level of analysis; it will cover an 18-year period (1997-2015) and it will 
analyse key policy documents.  
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter, I identified the generation of freedom 
(associated with concepts of empowerment, ownership, partnership and 
participation) and technocratic components of liberal peacebuilding as my key 
objects of critical engagement. Two key propositions grounded my critical 
engagement with liberal peacebuilding: 1) that various external imperatives are 
not only compatible with, but are co-terminus with various conditions and 
attributes of freedom; 2) that peacebuilding techniques and practices have 
become closely interwoven with technocratic practices and interventions 
In the Introduction, I asserted that a critical analysis must ultimately be 
directed towards the underpinning, a priori components of liberal peacebuilding. 
Both of the aforementioned attributes, by virtue of the fact that they are so 
deeply ingrained within the liberal peace, therefore present themselves as 
appropriate points of critical engagement. The second section then attempted to 
provide a theoretical basis upon which this analysis could consolidate and 
develop: it offered an inversion of the binary distinctions that have historically 
sustained both liberal peacebuilding and liberalism more generally (freedom in 
opposition to power; knowledge in opposition to power). In achieving this 
inversion, it demonstrated that each of the three core theoretical reference 
points corresponds to a liberal governmentality – a distinctive style of 
government that is exerted through and within various conditions of freedom. 
This provides me with the basis upon which I can develop a critique of 
liberal peacebuilding. The essential purpose or contribution of this critique 
would be to engage with liberal peacebuilding and to demonstrate the ways in 
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which it is linked into broader power complexes and relations. In further 
developing this insight, I then applied Foucauldian concepts and themes to 
liberal peacebuilding. In engaging at this level I sought to demonstrate how a 
Foucauldian analysis can be applied to both the technocratic 
(power/knowledge) and liberal (governing through freedom) dimensions of 
liberal peacebuilding.  
After establishing the general basis for a critical engagement with liberal 
peacebuilding, I then sought to demonstrate, with reference to the work of Lene 
Hansen, how Foucauldian concepts and themes can be applied to a critical 
reading of core policy documents. This established the basis for an approach to 
textual analysis which will be unravelled in the three empirical chapters, 
deepening, contextuality and complementarity. This chapter has set out some 
of the general features of my approach to policy documents; the next chapter 
will now proceed to clarify how the framework of the comprehensive approach 
will ground a critical engagement with core policy documents.  
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Chapter Three  
Engaging the Comprehensive Approach 
Introduction 
The first three chapters have established the central research question, 
engaged the relevant body of literature, highlighted relevant tensions and 
contradictions and put in place the theoretical basis for a critical analysis. They 
have situated my analysis by placing it within a broader field of conceptual and 
theoretical reference. It still remains for me to explain how I intend to 
incorporate the comprehensive approach into an empirical analysis of core 
policy documents. The previous chapter has made some progress in this 
direction by adapting and applying Lene Hansen’s approach to discourse 
analysis; however, it now remains for me to illustrate how I intend to establish a 
critical reading of the given policy documents.  
The purpose of this brief chapter is to clarify some of the most important 
features of the following textual analysis. I will begin by clarifying the meaning of 
deepening, contextuality and complementarity. The introductory chapter has 
already engaged them to a limited extent, but it is now necessary to engage 
them in further depth and detail. As I will subsequently make clear, each term 
corresponds to an essential innovation within the terms of the liberal peace. The 
proposition in this instance – and here the contrast with critical perspectives 
should be noted – is that the liberal peace is sufficiently flexible to engage and 
fully assimilate critical contributions.  
As the consequence of a deeply ingrained ‘lesson learning’ process, the 
attention of practitioners has increasingly converged upon: a) the limitations of 
technocratic or managerial approaches, b) the need for a more sustained 
contextual engagement, c) the need for a more ‘integrated’ approach to conflict 
engagement and intervention. Peacebuilding actors have worked towards this 
framework of reference since the early 1990s, with the consequence that each 
insight has become interwoven into policy documents, serving as the individual 
embodiment of a more general policy wisdom.  
Deepening, contextuality and complementarity are three of the general 
attributes of the comprehensive approach. The proposition of a comprehensive 
approach therefore elicits the expectation that each element will be invoked 
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within core policy documents. This explains why I do not seek to question the 
existence or non-existence of a comprehensive approach; rather, I instead to 
the question of how each one of the three dimensions is discursively 
reproduced within core policy documents. I am specifically interested in the 
question of how a specific policy actor has engaged and incorporated critical 
insights. This in turn enables and sustains an analysis of whether this 
incorporation overcomes deeply embedded obstacles. The preceding chapter 
reveals Barbara Cruikshank’s intention to discover how democracy is ‘thought, 
done and practiced’ (1999, 18). To all intents and purposes, this description 
also translates to my current engagement; I am concerned with the question of 
how ‘democracy’, ‘context’ and ‘integration are ‘done’ within peacebuilding 
policy documents.  
The concluding phases of the preceding chapter established the 
foundation for a critical reading. It is now necessary for me, in this brief chapter, 
to clarify some of the more specific attributes of this approach. Firstly, I will 
develop the three different dimensions of the comprehensive approach: 
deepening, contextuality and complementarity. The first two dimensions are 
fairly self-evident – deepening relates to the discursive structuring of democracy 
and contextuality pertains to the textual reproduction of context. However, 
complementarity needs to be clarified in more detail. First of all, I seek to do this 
by breaking post-conflict peacebuilding down into its component parts of 
‘democracy’, ‘development’ and ‘security’. I then establish precisely what a 
‘broadened’ discursive framing of democracy, development and security looks 
like. The penultimate and final sub-sections break with complementarity and 
attempt to justify my emphasis upon a specific actor, the British government, 
and the relevant period, 1997-2015.  
Three Dimensions of the Comprehensive Approach: 
Deepening, Contextuality and Complementarity 
It will be noted that there is a degree of overlap between each of these 
three dimensions. This is perhaps most immediately obvious with regard to the 
dimensions of deepening and contextuality. In my discussion of contextuality I 
will most frequently focus upon the theme of cultural and social heterogeneity; 
however, this theme can also be enlarged with reference to the relative 
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centrality of internal and external actors within peacebuilding interventions. The 
recurrence of a functional or instrumental discourse is also a common concern 
that unites the deepening, contextuality and complementarity chapters. Each of 
these three dimensions will now be examined in more depth and detail.  
Deepening was initially engaged within the Literature Review, when I 
touched upon the question of how the peacebuilding literature has engaged 
with the challenges of democracy promotion. It will be recalled that I 
distinguished between procedural and substantive accounts of democratisation, 
and suggested that the progression between the two points could be attributed 
to ‘lesson learning’ and the incremental assimilation of peacebuilding theory. 
Deepening, then, is linked to the proposition that the ‘root causes’ of conflict can 
only be addressed through an approach that engages with inequalities and 
distortions that are deeply rooted within a society.  
Contextuality is concerned with the question of how the local or specific 
becomes incorporated into peacebuilding frameworks. The central premise is 
that external actors have registered the limitations of attempts to engineer 
change from without; accordingly, they have become, as part of a general 
renunciation of generic frameworks and models, more sensitive to the centrality 
of cultural and social reference points. Heterogeneity therefore become an 
aspiration and established attribute of peacebuilding interventions.  
Complementarity is synonymous with the proposition that each 
constitutive element of the comprehensive approach is, under ideal 
circumstances, mutually reinforcing and reproducing. This insight leads into the 
proposition that it is wholly insufficient to speak of security without reference to 
democracy, of development without reference to democracy, and so on. This 
explains the iterative character of previous peacebuilding interventions which, 
more often than not, reproduced their own internal tensions in subsequent 
effect (DfID, 1997; 12) (Smith, 2004; 55) (OECD, 2005; 12) (DfID, 2010; 6). 
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First Dimension: Deepening 
In engaging with the democratisation literature, we repeatedly encounter the 
proposition that a heightened engagement with local actors and agencies can 
qualify or mitigate ‘top-down’ distortions (Reilly, 2001; Belloni, 2004; Sisk, 1996; 
Gawerc, 2006; Ahmed, 2007).  This contrasts with other instances, in which 
democracy may be promoted and justified within a technical or functional 
vernacular (World Bank, 1990; OECD, 1991; DfID, 2009) – that is, as a means 
through which improved levels of economic and political performance may be 
sought and achieved.  
Democratic deepening is clearly differentiated from this agenda for the 
reason that it is explicitly justified as a progression beyond technocratic or 
narrow models of democracy promotion. A substantive democratisation instead 
implies a closer attention to power inequalities and the concomitant concern of   
social transformation (DfID, 1997; Bush, 1996; Gawerc, 2006). This is not 
democratic reform (a term which suggests the close imitation of standards and 
templates) but rather a deep and pervasive democratisation of social conditions 
(OECD 2006; Paris and Sisk 2009; Paris 2002).  
My discussion of deepening will repeatedly return to three points – firstly, 
to discursive openness – that is, to the absenting of predetermination; secondly, 
to the proposition of a progression beyond technical reform agendas and 
formalised points of engagement; finally, an expectation that both of the 
preceding features will be intelligible in relation to a wider process of lesson-
learning.  
Second Dimension: Contextuality 
The second condition of the comprehensive approach is concerned with 
the interface between local specificity and universally applicable models and 
templates. This encounter suggests a closer engagement with questions 
pertaining to culture, tradition and knowledge. Upon engaging with 
peacebuilding documents, we repeatedly encounter the proposition that each of 
these elements, which are invariably aggregated under the single rubric of 
‘context’ are essential components, and even conditions, of successful 
engagement.  
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Whereas deepening appears as an innovation that has been made in 
response to ‘technocratic’ or ‘top-down’ distortions, contextuality instead 
appears as a response to the criticism that liberal peacebuilding essentially 
represents an ‘alien’ imposition upon the society in which it is implemented.  
Barkawi and Laffey, for instance, relate a ‘hegemonic Liberalism [which] 
define[s] out other historically valid democratic claims’ (1999, 408-409). Lund 
argues that liberal ideology is deeply intolerant. Meanwhile, other writers 
(Yannis 2003; Englebert and Tull 2008) draw attention to a lack of reflexivity 
upon the part of the liberal peace’s protagonists. In assimilating these insights, 
both the hybridity and social structural branches of the peacebuilding literature 
have incorporated cultural and anthropological materials into a sustained and 
coherent critique of the liberal peace (Barnett et al 2007; Milliken and Krause 
2002; Lemay-Hebert 2009; Schlichte and Migdal 2005). 
The relations between internal and external actors can also be 
considered with reference to the range of ‘disciplines’ that neo-liberal 
frameworks impose upon local autonomy. Richmond, for example, has 
previously referenced a neo-liberal framework of ownership that ‘is 
predetermined externally, not by local context, history, society, culture, politics 
or hierarchy’ (2012, 259).  
In responding to these criticisms, policy makers have sought to 
acknowledge the centrality of context, establishing it as the basis for their 
interventions. The logic and objects of external intervention have been 
transformed in the process, becoming reconstituted as the cultivation of 
domestic capacities and capabilities. This shift is evidenced, for example, when 
development practitioners decisively break with modernisation theory, instead 
instituting development theory as the basis of their interventions.   
Third Dimension: Complementarity 
Deepening and contextuality engage at very specific points of the 
comprehensive approach. In contrast, complementarity operates across each of 
the three constitutive elements of the comprehensive approach (democracy 
promotion, development and security). Prior to the emergence of a 
comprehensive approach, each of these elements had been individually 
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approached and engaged. The comprehensive approach instead instituted a 
convention under which each element would be conceived and engaged in its  
interrelation. 
At a practical level of analysis, this establishes a clear problematic of 
integration – that is, the establishment of conditions under which each element 
can become mutually reinforcing and reproducing. In acknowledging the 
centrality of this problematic of integration, Pugh suggests that it is the central 
challenge that confronts peacebuilders in post-conflict contexts (2004, 39). For 
observers such as Pugh, integration appears almost as the Holy Grail of 
peacebuilding, the explanation of past failures and the anticipation of future 
success.  
Complementarity is, in common with deepening, associated with a 
broadening effect. Integration of each element produces, to this extent, a 
widening of conceptual and theoretical parameters (European Commission 
1997; UN 1992, 1995; Paris 2001). Closer attention reveals that integration and 
broadening are essentially synonymous (Smith 2004, 55; UN 1999; Ammitbøll 
and Torjesen 2007, 36). The sustained conceptual and practical engagement of 
interrelations (OECD 2005, 12; DfID 2010, 6) similarly reproduces a more 
balanced, integrated or synergised approach to conflict intervention.  
A final point of clarification should be added. A potential point of 
confusion arises from the way that, within the literature, the terms 
‘comprehensive’, ‘integrated’ and ‘broadened’ are used interchangeably. This 
has the potential to confuse because the term ‘broadened’ has different 
implications when it is used in relation to the first and third dimension (in the first 
instance it evokes a substantive democratisation; in the third it evokes the 
potential of a cross-sectoral approach). The term ‘comprehensive approach’ will 
therefore be used in relation to all three dimension; the words ‘broadened’ and 
‘integrated’, in contrast, will only be used in relation to the final dimension 
(complementarity).  
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Three Dimensions of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
Dimension Associated Development 
      Deepening Progression towards a 
substantive/deepened 
framework of democratic 
reference. 
      Contextuality Reconciliation of internal–
external tensions through a 
heightened assimilation of 
context. 
      
Complementarity 
Integration of constitutive 
elements of post-conflict 
peacebuilding (democracy, 
development and security), 
thus overcoming internal 
tensions and contradictions. 
 
Complementarity: Practice and Discourse 
In touching upon themes of discourse, the first three chapters of this 
thesis have repeatedly returned to practical reference points. My discussion of 
this practical field of reference has, in turn, repeatedly addressed its epistemic 
conditions and correlates. This serves to reiterate that discourse, practice and 
knowledge should be engaged and understood in their interrelation, being 
conceived and understood as the respective components of a governing 
ensemble that situates the individual subject within a range of constitutive 
relations.  
The interrelation of knowledge and practice has been explicitly 
acknowledged by an OECD document, being clearly invoked within the 
assertion that the ‘pattern of learning while doing has been established’ (1997, 
9). This is an article of faith for international practitioners, being reproduced 
within their textual products and the array of practical innovations enacted 
within post-conflict contexts. The conflation of peacebuilding discourse, 
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knowledge and practice suggests that it would be appropriate to invoke a 
peacebuilding praxis. 
While my own analysis is focused upon the discursive structuring of 
peacebuilding, it ultimately relates to practical points of reference. In the 
Literature Review I have therefore already, with reference to the work of  
Jahn (2007), distinguished between three practical points of reference: 
democracy promotion, development and security. This distinction establishes 
the basis for the complementarity chapter, which is explicitly focused upon the 
discursive encounter, and ultimate reconciliation, of each of these three 
discursive components. In this respect, this chapter builds upon Heathershaw’s 
recommendation to explore ‘multiple discourses of the liberal peace’ (2008, 
603).  
This raises the question of how I intend to distinguish between each of 
the three reference points. Policy documents may not necessarily refer to the 
general concept (democracy promotion, development and security) but rather to 
the individual practices that constitute them. This raises the question of how I 
intend to distinguish each of the individual practices. Upon what basis can I 
distinguish a practice of security from a practice of development or democracy?  
I should begin by observing that there is a degree of overlap between 
each of the three individual points. This is to be expected and possibly even 
welcomed – it is, after all, entirely consistent with the overarching rationale of 
the comprehensive approach. In registering and acknowledging this overlap, 
observers still tend to habitually distinguish between each of the components. In 
the course of ‘unpacking’ the liberal peace, Heathershaw relates a ‘tripartite 
discursive environment’ (2008, 597). This provides the basis for the division of 
‘pragmatic peacebuilding’ (2008, 598) into its respective components of  
democratic peacebuilding, civil society and statebuilding. Schwartz (2005) uses 
a slightly different terminology, but with essentially the same meaning, to 
distinguish between security, representation and welfare. In building upon this 
tri-partite framing of the liberal peace, I will now attempt to relate specific 
practices to each of the general concepts. This will then establish the basis for 
the complementarity chapter, which will attempt to trace the interrelation of each 
constitutive element. The following groupings list the practices that fall under 
each constitutive element. 
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Democracy  
• Reform of domestic political parties  • Reform of domestic electoral process 
• Improved state–societal relations  • Empowerment of socially excluded 
groups  
• Upholding political rights  • Improved public participation in 
governance 
• Institutional reform  • Heightened accountability of state elites  
• Heightened civil society engagement by international and domestic actors 
• Improved levels of state responsiveness 
 
Development  
• Technical reform of state bureaucracy • Improved practices of public 
administration 
• Introduction of good governance agenda • Improved provision of public 
services 
• Heightened accountability of public authorities  • Public inclusion in 
service provision  
• Institutional reform (legal, political, economic)  • Macro-economic and 
regulatory reform;  
• State decentralisation • Poverty alleviation/ pro-poor 
interventions  
• Civil society engagement and empowerment   • Sustainable development 
• Upholding social and economic rights 
• Integration into global economic processes and structures  
 
Security  
• Security Sector Reform (SSR) • Statebuilding activities  
• Enforce Rule of Law • Substitute for weak or absent domestic 
security agencies 
• Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) training and 
development of domestic security agencies  
• Assisting domestic security actors to function in accordance with international 
standards/requirements  
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Complementarity: A Broadened Framework of Reference 
Complementarity implies that each of the constitutive elements are no longer 
understood in isolation. In understanding the interrelations between each of the 
constitutive elements, peacebuilding actors will move towards a more 
comprehensive or ‘broadened’ framework of analytical and practical 
engagement. In this sub-section, I briefly sketch a ‘broadened’ model of each 
constitutive element, setting out the conceptual and theoretical reorientation 
that has occurred as a consequence of sustained integration.  
A Comprehensive Approach to Democracy/Governance 
A comprehensive approach to democracy rests upon the understanding 
that it is more than a limited process of decision-making. In the Literature 
Review I clearly distinguished two models of democracy promotion. In the first 
instance, I offered a ‘limited’ or ‘narrow’ model of democratic reform which was 
intelligible in its relation to a precise model (Carothers 1999, 86) and set of 
associated expectations. This model, which is associated with elections, the 
accountability of state institutions and electoral arrangements is orientated 
towards the reproduction of a very specific range of effects.  
After describing this model, the Literature Review chapter then turned its 
attention to a more substantive framework, which is orientated towards a more 
pervasive (or ‘deeper’) project of societal reform. Policy actors sometimes 
substitute the word ‘informal’, thereby succeeding in situating their interventions 
in direct opposition to a formal policy process. As Foucault recognised, the pre-
eminence accorded to the social or informal is hugely significant, anticipating a 
whole new horizon of disciplinary intervention.  
For purposes of clarification, it should be recognised that this proposition 
of a progression does not negate or absent the formal policy sphere. On the 
contrary, the heightened focus upon the informal or social instead corresponds 
to a shift of emphasis or a change in tenor.  
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A Comprehensive Approach to Development 
A number of the key concepts and themes are expounded within the 
peacebuilding field have been subsequently (that is, after their full development) 
extracted and applied. This cross-fertilisation is largely attributable to the 
heightened pre-eminence of important development actors, such as the OECD 
and World Bank, within the peacebuilding field. Both peacebuilding and 
development actors therefore converge upon a shared agenda focused upon 
techniques of ‘empowerment’, ‘capacity-building’ and ‘good governance’.   
Mark Duffield had precisely this convergence in mind when he  
referred to the ‘radicalisation of development and its reinvention as a strategic 
tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction’ (2003, 1049). However, it is 
not merely the external (or real-world) application of developmental techniques 
that are deserving of closer attention; to the same extent, internal evolutions 
within development theory have proven to be equally significant. Close attention 
should therefore be given to the discursive reframing of development as an 
emancipatory project that is concerned with social transformation.  
This has corresponded to a shift of perspective, in which development is 
no longer perceived from the vantage point of external actors who seek to 
extend the benefits of external knowledge. Under the aegis of local-level 
empowerment, development orthodoxy has instead converged on the insight 
that its primary concern is to provide tools and techniques that will enable local 
actors to overcome the challenges of under-development. Precisely because 
development is an endogenous enterprise, the means and ends of development 
will vary across different contexts. This is why the OECD has asserted that 
‘there is no advance blueprint’ (OECD 1997c, 18). It also explains why the same 
organisation has asserted that ‘the developing country [should be] the starting 
point for [the organisation of] co-operation efforts’ (1996, 14). Development, to 
put it slightly differently, is an open-ended process and not a prescribed end.  
 
 
This brings to mind our earlier discussion of post-conflict peacebuilding, 
which we had previously defined as an open-ended project rooted within  
social needs and requirements. Just as with post-conflict peacebuilding, 
development actors frequently endeavour to further the impression that they 
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have comprehensively rejected top-down frameworks of engagement. Mosse 
therefore reminds us that it is something of a development axiom that 
development actors have consciously rejected ‘standardised-package, top-
down models and development blueprints’ (Mosse 2001, 16-17). 
Empowerment, participation and ownership are the central corollaries of this 
development.  
This heightened emphasis upon local engagement has also resulted 
from a recognition that the imposition of neo-liberal reforms has previously 
produced a range of highly negative social and political impacts. Under these 
circumstances, economic reform and peacebuilding have been at cross-
purposes, ultimately working across and even against each other. It should, 
however, be recognised that the actual purchase of this conceptual, theoretical 
and practical reorientation has been limited: more often than not, development 
actors have sought consolation within the illusions that the tensions and 
contradictions of neo-liberalism can be overcome through improved sequencing 
and a heightened sensitivity to individual context.  
A Comprehensive Approach to Security 
The range of actors that are concerned with the promotion of 
enhancement of security is one further confirmation of the shift towards a more 
comprehensive mindset and practical framework of engagement. Just as 
development is no longer primarily conceptualised with reference to economic 
growth, security is no longer solely concerned with the enhancement of state 
security. In both instances, adjustments to the prescribed end objective have in 
turn opened up space for the inclusion of a range of non-military actors.  
In addition to creating the space for wider participation within security 
debates and engagements, the comprehensive approach also implies a 
qualitative readjustment of the terms in which conflict is analysed and 
understood. This reorientation has been ongoing since the early-mid 1990s, 
when the emergence of ‘human security’ frameworks brought about a 
fundamental revaluation of security and the means through which it could be 
achieved (UNDP 1994; Paris 2001, 97).  
Debates within the statebuilding literature have been an important 
accompaniment to this recalibration of security. Rather than focusing directly 
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upon the Weberian state, policy actors have instead directed their attention to 
the linkages and interactions which conjoin state and society. Rather than being 
conceived as an objective condition, ‘security’ has therefore been theorised as 
a derivative of political relations that are internal to the given society, with 
increased attention therefore being given to politico-military questions. From this 
perspective, the state’s authority is not conditional upon its ability to exert force, 
but is instead contingent upon its ability to meet social needs and requirements. 
This is one illustration of how the mutual integration of security, development 
and democracy has resulted in a ‘broadened’ understanding of security. In 
welcoming this development, the International Development Committee (25 
October 2006, HC923-1, para 11) has stated that the ‘idea of human security 
should form one of the building blocks for policies towards weak and failing 
states’.  
An ‘inside-out’ analysis necessitates a clearer appreciation both of the 
limitations of external knowledge and the potential contribution of local 
knowledge. Security is a subjective condition which is rooted within the insights 
and priorities of local communities. Insecurity, by implication, originates within 
the restriction or denial of human rights and needs (International Development 
Committee, 25 October 2006, HC923-1, para 7).  
The British Government and the Comprehensive Approach to 
Peacebuilding 
The election of the New Labour government in 1997 had a number of 
important implications for the government’s foreign policy. One of the most 
important was the formation of a new Department for International Development 
(DfID). The publication of the government’s first white paper, Eliminating World 
Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century, set out an ambitious development-
centred agenda - its domestic significance was underlined by the fact that it was 
the first white paper on development that the government had published in 22 
years. The establishment of the DfID as an independent government 
department reiterated the government’s intention to uphold its commitment to 
the Millennium Development Goals. In comparison, its predecessor, the 
Overseas Development Administration, had been part of the Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Office (FCO). In addition, the 2002 updating of the Overseas 
Development Act established poverty alleviation as DfID’s mandate.  
My focus on the British government largely derives from the emergence 
of DfID and its specific contribution to development approaches that integrate 
and incorporate an analysis of conflict. DfID has played a hugely important role, 
both internally and externally, in establishing and further developing the 
comprehensive approach agenda. Securing Security Sector Reform, which was 
published by DfID in 2002, sets out the respective departmental contributions in 
more depth and detail. The FCO is described as setting the political framework 
and the DfID is primarily concerned with the ‘governance’ context in which the 
security services operate, including accountability of security services, training 
and development of policy frameworks. The MoD is responsible for direct 
military assistance (DfID 2002, 10).  
During the relevant period, the DfID developed innovative and flexible 
responses to conflict intervention, which were applied in instances where state 
capacity had either degraded or collapsed entirely. In contrast to other 
development agencies, its interventions were guided and motivated by poverty 
alleviation and came to be deliberately focused upon weak, failing or failed 
states. In emphasising the need to work through local capacities and 
capabilities, it also had an important influence on the international shift away 
from conditionality.  
Although peacebuilding is a cross-departmental concern, the DfID has 
emerged as the pre-eminent departmental actor in this respect, and the list of 
policy documents described in this paper further reiterates this point. The work 
of the DfID’s Conflict, Humanitarian Affairs and Security (CHASE) department 
has enabled it to develop increased levels of conflict sensitivity. This is 
particularly important because development agencies have historically worked 
from the understanding that development is subsequent to the establishment of 
peace; the development of instruments for analysis, such as Strategic Conflict 
Assessment (SCA), enabled DfID to address and overcome this lacuna within 
development orthodoxy.  
The British government also took a number of steps to enhance ‘policy 
coherence’ (DfID 2002, 10). These were not necessarily justified under the 
heading of the comprehensive approach, but were manifestations of ‘jointed-up-
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government’ (see Short 1999). The Conflict Prevention Pools, a cross-
departmental funding mechanism, the Stabilisation Unit, which draws upon the 
respective contributions of the FCO, DfID and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
and the Stabilisation Unit previously known as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Unit (PCRU) were important innovations in this respect. All three departments 
were also parties to a public service agreement objective that committed them 
to address the structural causes of violence, and to work together to manage 
tension and assist post-conflict reconstruction (International Development 
Committee, 25 October 2006, HC923-1, para 60).  
The House of Commons International Development Committee 
previously observed that the British government has clearly stated, in written 
evidence, its intention to ‘combine different perspectives from foreign policy, 
defence and international development’ (25 October 2006, HC923-1, para 60). 
This interdepartmental agenda was previously reproduced within documents 
such as Supporting Security Sector Reform (DfID 2002) and Fighting Poverty to 
Build a Safer World (DfID 2005). The emphasis on an integrated or cross-
departmental approach arose, in large part, from the insight that the challenges 
of conflict intervention cut across different departments. The attention of policy 
actors increasingly converged on a range of bureaucratic innovations and 
mechanisms that would enhance and improve interdepartmental co-operation.  
These developments affirm that the debate surrounding post-conflict 
peacebuilding did not occur in isolation but was part of a broader discussion on 
how the different stages and phases of conflict intervention could be integrated 
into a generally cohesive framework of engagement. Each phase, from 
preventative to post-conflict, and each dimension, economic, political or social, 
was increasingly understood and engaged in its interrelation. As Simon Lawry-
White observes, the British government’s approach to the comprehensive 
approach originates within an understanding that ‘sees the origins of conflict as 
complex, requiring a systematic and joined-up approach that draws in a variety 
of actors to develop solutions in partnership’ (2003, 16). Conflict intervention is 
therefore a process, in which the respective parts are interrelated and 
conjoined.  
Accordingly, the British government has established this framework and 
is now actively exerting its influence in order to persuade other international 
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actors to work within a shared framework of reference. In a speech at King’s 
College, Clare Short, then Secretary of State for International Development, 
observed that the government sought to ‘integrate a security sector reform 
perspective into [the] thinking of other donors and other multilateral 
development institutions, such as the European Union and the international 
financial institutions’ (1999). 
Almost from its inception, DfID therefore perceived itself as a leading 
innovator that had the capability to guide and lead the terms of the broader 
policy debate. In retrospect, this self-confidence appears attributable to DfID’s 
self-perception, in which it understood itself to be concerned with the 
development of ‘evidence-based’ policy and ‘lessons’ that could be transferred 
to other institutional contexts. It is therefore significant that Simon Lawry White’s 
study of British peacebuilding, which was commissioned by DfID, was tasked 
with assessing the level of ‘horizontal consistency’ (that is, the level of 
coordination), between the British government and other international donors 
(2003, 17). In further recognising DfID’s international significance, the OECD 
has also explicitly acknowledged the department’s contribution to the 
engagement of fragile states (International Development Committee, 25 
October 2006, HC923-1, para 31).  
The Relevant Period (1997-2016) 
Post-conflict peacebuilding first emerged as an important framework in 
the early 1990s. During the following years, the UN emerged as a key innovator 
in developing post-conflict intervention capability. However, this gradually 
began to change as states started to integrate and develop post-conflict 
intervention capabilities. Over time, peacebuilding has gradually emerged as a 
collaborative enterprise, which incorporates the shared contributions of 
international institutions (OECD, World Bank), state actors and sub-state actors 
(a whole plethora of NGOs and research institutes). If we were primarily 
interested in UN peacebuilding it would make sense to begin at the beginning of 
the 1990s; however, as we are instead interested in the question of this 
framework has filtered down to the state level, then it makes sense to engage at 
a later point within the decade. 
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This period is also of interest because it overlaps with a series of 
important developments in the theorisation and practice of conflict intervention. 
As I have noted, the terms in which security, development and democracy were 
theorised and understood had shifted substantially. The election of a New 
Labour government in 1997 represents the point at which the British 
government began to engage with these broader developments and assumed a 
prominent role within international discussions and debates. 
Finally, the election of a new government in 1997 also represented the 
point at which the documentary output of the British government began to 
substantially increase; a point clearly defined by a 22-year gap between the 
government’s development white papers. A documentary analysis of the 
government’s policy positions prior to 1997 would be extremely limited in scope 
and implication. While it would perhaps be possible to sustain an analysis of UN 
peacebuilding during this period, it would not be possible to sustain an analysis 
of the British government’s approach to peacebuilding. The concluding year of 
the timeframe was chosen because peacebuilding is a continually evolving and 
continually developing field of reference; by situating the end point in the current 
year, there is an increased likelihood that our analysis will cover the most recent 
innovations.  
Table Overview/Textual Selection 
Table A provides a visual overview of the framework that will guide my 
critical engagements with core comprehensive approach texts. The table breaks 
down into each of the three dimensions of the comprehensive approach: 
deepening, contextuality and complementarity. Deepening and contextuality are 
broken down into three features; for instance, deepening breaks down into 
governance, empowerment and local knowledge. Complementarity, in contrast, 
is engaged with reference to each of the three constitutive elements of post-
conflict peacebuilding: democracy promotion, development and security. For 
deepening and contextuality, each of the three features descend vertically in 
columns beneath the general dimension. The second column contains the initial 
framework of reference and engagement for peacebuilding actors. The third 
column sets out the effect that results from the emergence and consolidation of 
a comprehensive approach. The fourth column then provides an empirical 
 116 
example which is related to each given condition.  The final column provides a 
critical reading that interprets each empirical example by relating it back to the  
purported progression. The purpose in each of these instances is to identify 
how the given progression is empirically reproduced within core texts. 
Table B contains a range of policy documents that were published by the 
British government during the period 1997-2016. Each of the documents relates 
either to one of the aspects of the comprehensive approach – democracy, 
development and security – or to an aspect of the peacebuilding agenda, e.g. 
statebuilding, governance, poverty-reduction. Documents were primarily 
identified through online sources and internal referencing beginning with a key 
publication such as a white paper and then moving onto secondary or 
supplementary documents that were referenced within this document. DfID 
documents account for the largest proposition of the documents; MoD and 
Stabilisation Unit documents are cited to a much lesser extent.  
Each identified document was then assessed with reference to a number 
of attributes: firstly, the number of occasions it was cited within other policy 
documents; secondly, whether it can be classified as a peacebuilding document 
(usually documents did not explicitly refer to peacebuilding, but were concerned 
with issues or themes that had peacebuilding implications); thirdly, with 
reference to its claim to operate within a comprehensive approach (e.g. whether 
it references or engages each of the constitutive elements of the 
comprehensive approach). The fourth, fifth and sixth vertical columns assess 
the extent to which the three dimensions of the comprehensive approach were 
engaged in the document.  
After assessing each of the texts highlighted in Table B according to 
these six attributes, I then sought to identify nine texts. The three deepening 
texts roughly corresponded to the six attributes and engaged with the theme of 
deepening, touching upon issues such as governance, participation, 
accountability, responsiveness. Governance, Development and Democratic 
Politics presented itself as an obvious choice in this respect. The three choices 
for the contextuality chapter were selected on the basis of their close 
engagement with statebuilding themes and agendas.  
Each of these two chapters had drawn strongly upon sources that were 
concerned with governance-related issues. I therefore sought to approach the 
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final chapter, Complementarity, from within a security perspective. The three 
chosen documents – two of which were published by the Stabilisation Unit and 
one of which was published by the MoD – enabled me to do this. In total, nine 
texts were selected. Texts that were internally cited were also discussed in each 
of the chapters; in addition, in a few instances where no texts were internally 
cited, I identified and extracted additional sources from Table B.  
 
Selected Texts 
Deepening 
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DfID’s Work in Building 
More Effective States (2006) 
Building the State and Securing the Peace (2009) 
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011) 
Contextuality 
Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States (2007) 
Building Peaceful States and Societies (2010) 
States in Development (2008) 
Complementarity 
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014) 
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: 
Lessons Identified by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit (2010) 
Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (2009) 
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Chapter Four 
Deepening and Democratic Participation 
Introduction 
Critical engagements with the democratisation literature have highlighted 
conceptual and theoretical limitations (Labonte 2003; Chopra and Hohe 2004; 
Richmond 2005), forcefully making the case for a substantive democratisation. 
For some observers, the shift towards a more substantive framework should be 
conceived as a progression beyond more ‘circumscribed’ frameworks (Labonte 
2003, 262; Barnett et al 2007; Berdal 2009). Chopra and Hohe similarly set out 
the case for an overhauling of exclusionary social structures (2004, 289); 
Newman calls for an approach that ‘aspir[es] to cosmopolitan aspirations and a 
positive peace’ while Oliver Richmond rejects the abstracted, depersonalised 
and rationalised liberal peace and proposes that democratic engagement 
should be rooted within the ‘everyday’ (2011, 13). 
In addition to these normatively loaded conceptions of democratic 
engagement, there is a functional counterpart which conceives of popular 
mobilisation as a means through which heightened efficiency and improved 
operational outcomes can be sought. Popular engagement, for instance, can be 
justified upon the basis that it provides elites with improved access to 
information, resulting in heightened levels of accountability and responsiveness 
in the process.  
While this model of democratic engagement has an intuitive appeal to 
policy makers fixated upon a wider statebuilding agenda, it is vulnerable to the 
criticism that it offers a very limited account of political mobilisation and 
engagement. Carothers has therefore, with vaguely pejorative overtones, 
previously referenced a democracy ‘template’ (1999, 86) which has, until 
recently, held international policy makers in its thrall. In adhering too closely to 
its stipulations, policy makers have been exposed to the accusation that they 
have been too top-down in their approach, paying insufficient regard to local 
context and its influence upon peacebuilding interventions. 
In seeking to transgress beyond the ‘narrow’ parameters, liberal 
peacebuilders have made extensive use of peacebuilding theory, finding in it a 
resource that provides liberal peacebuilding with a renewed impetus and 
 139 
momentum. The contribution of authors such as Burton, Galtung and Lederach, 
which substantially predates the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding, enables 
the articulation of a transformative agenda directed towards the underlying 
causes of violent conflict.  
As one illustration of how the terms of debate might be progressed, 
Richmond’s stress upon the ‘everyday’ progresses the terms of reference 
beyond the dry, abstracted and arcane vernacular of democratic theory. 
Richmond therefore posits a lived experience that is part and parcel of the 
‘everyday’. In reiterating the centrality of an engagement that goes beyond the 
state, Chandler observes that the ‘problematic of how states can be 
strengthened through accessing and influencing social or societal processes 
has therefore become positioned at the heart of the peacebuilding problematic’ 
(2013, 21).  
The problematic of social and societal engagement anticipates and 
sustains a whole new order of democratic engagement. In opposition to its 
‘narrow’ counterparts, this ‘deepened’ framework of democratic reference is 
considerably less suited to, and can even be seen as diametrically opposed to, 
managerial or technocratic counterparts. In rooting practice within local 
perspectives and capacities, and in evidencing a close attention to the ends, as 
opposed to the process, of democratic practice, this deepened framework does 
not anticipate a heightened systemic functionality or efficiency, but rather the 
fundamental transformation of the ‘root’ causes of political violence 
(Fetherstone 2007, 202-203; Keating and Knight 2004, xxxiv).   
This preoccupation with ‘root’ causes can be traced back to the influence 
of peacebuilding theory. In the introductory chapter, I noted that peacebuilding 
theory, along with technocracy and liberal ideology, appeared as one of the 
three sources that feed into liberal peacebuilding. From a different perspective, 
the emphasis upon a ‘deepened’ form of democratic engagement could also be 
justified as an instance of lesson learning – that is, as an adjustment to, and 
transition away from, top-down managerial or technocratic distortions (Bellamy 
2004; Gawerc 2006; Ahmed 2007).  
In this chapter I will engage with the question of how this ‘deepened’ 
framework has been assimilated into British policy documents, serving as the 
embodiment of a progression within the terms of democratic reference.  
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This chapter does not examine whether the British government has 
actually managed to achieve or manifest this shift; instead, it proposes to 
identify precisely how this shift has been textually reproduced. My essential 
concern is to identify precisely how, to borrow a Foucauldian term, the concept 
of democracy is ‘made to function’ within core peacebuilding documents. I do 
not propose to engage this question at a general level of analysis; rather, I will 
break the general proposition into three specific points of engagement: 
governance, empowerment and local knowledge.  
‘Governance’ is, it might be tentatively observed, a word that is as 
frequently invoked as it is undefined. In its contemporary usage, it appears to 
suggest a framework of reference that is no longer grounded within the state. It 
opens up space for the inclusion of a wider range of social actors, clearly 
heralding a shift away from hierarchical or bureaucratised structures (in this 
respect, government can be clearly contrasted with governance).  
 It also brings in economic and social processes, thereby providing an 
added degree of complexity. Governance can also be conceptualised as an 
adjustment to rapidly altering social and economic circumstances. The work of 
Joseph (2012), to take one example, brings out the neo-liberal dimensions of 
the concept, clearly illustrating how it has been closely tied up with the 
development of subtle and indirect styles of economic management and 
oversight. Governance corresponds to a new governing rationality, which does 
not seek to directly control or coerce; on the contrary, it instead seeks to 
inaugurate more efficient and effective forms of social and economic 
management.  
In his engagement with the concept of empowerment, Kenneth Bush 
suggests that it essentially corresponds to the creation of domestic ‘space’. He 
therefore suggests that the word is co-terminus with the absenting of external 
influence and the prioritisation of local agency (1996, xxxvi). Empowerment, in 
keeping with the accounts that were discussed in the Literature Review chapter, 
is therefore closely linked into the accentuation of local contributions and the 
deliberate and conscious attenuation of external inputs (DfID 1997, 37; 2009, 3; 
OECD 1997b). 
It will be recalled that this representation of empowerment is almost 
diametrically opposed to the interpretation that Barbara Cruikshank offers in the 
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Foucault chapter. Empowerment, she reflects, is characterised by the 
democratically unaccountable exercise of power and relations that are both 
coercive and voluntary. In this respect, her contribution closely corresponds to 
Richmond’s invocation of technologies that are ‘of both emancipatory and 
repressive’ character (2010, 200). In reminding us that empowerment can 
assume repressive dimensions, Richmond notes that it, when articulated within 
a neo-liberal vernacular, functions as a means through which local actors are 
incorporated into wider structures of oversight. This serves to again reiterate 
that, under conditions of neo-liberal governance, freedom (of which 
empowerment is but one dimension) serves as the conduit through which power 
is embodied and reproduced.  
Closer attention reveals that the lack of predetermination is an important 
corollary of empowerment. By virtue of its deep conceptual and theoretical debt 
to peacebuilding theory, liberal peacebuilding is more predisposed to an open-
ended form of empowerment. The absenting of external influence is not merely 
an aspiration to be achieved but is actually a defining attribute. A closer 
engagement with the peacebuilding literature reveals that this emphasis can be 
traced back to two points: in the first instance, it is a normative commitment 
which has been reinforced by the more general ‘local turn’ (Richmond, 2013); in 
the second, it is a belated acknowledgement of the constraints that the post-
conflict context imposes upon external actors (DfID 2009, 3).  
Empowerment is discursively and practically linked to local knowledge, 
which has become an increasingly important resource within peacebuilding 
interventions. Both points of emphasis produce the same conclusion – external 
actors should acknowledge and engage the local at all points, resisting the 
temptation to impose their own perspectives and insights. Both local knowledge 
and empowerment are thereby established as limiting points.  
However, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile this representation with the 
accounts of exteriority that we have previously encountered. In these 
contributions, there was a clear sense that liberal peacebuilding was guided by 
external knowledge and priorities, and that it was ultimately predisposed 
towards the reproduction of externally derived frameworks and templates. For 
other critical observers, liberal peacebuilding is a governmental technique that 
subtly reconfigures the domestic context. For these observers, it is deeply 
 142 
problematic, and indeed counter-intuitive, to recast a disciplinary or regulatory 
instrument as a means of emancipation and social transformation. From this 
perspective, local knowledge would be constituted within the interaction 
between the international and local, serving to further perpetuate and entrench 
established relations. In opposition to the liberal claim that local knowledge 
qualifies excesses of external influence, it would instead be the case that this 
local knowledge would be a by-product of this same influence.  
In this chapter I seek to narrow in on governance, empowerment and 
local knowledge. I seek to demonstrate that a closer engagement with the 
purported progression brings out a whole host of concealed tensions and 
contradictions, suggesting a referent object that is considerably more complex, 
convoluted and ambiguous than the initial terms of engagement suggested. 
Technocratic and managerial points are not surpassed, but are instead 
reconfigured, often in highly complex and convoluted ways. The wider neo-
liberal context frequently asserts itself, infringing upon the agency of the 
domestic subject.  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DfID’s 
Work in Developing More Effective States 
The first dimension of deepening, governance, is developed with 
reference to Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DfID’s Work In 
Building More Effective States (2006); the second dimension, empowerment, is 
developed with reference to Building the State and Securing the Peace (2009); 
the third, local knowledge, is explored through a closer engagement with   
Building Stability Overseas (2011). A single text provides the basis of my 
engagement with each dimension, although internally cited texts may provide 
an additional point of reference. To take one example, themes explored in 
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics may be developed with 
reference to Making Governance Work for the Poor (2006) or Preventing Violent 
Conflict (2007).  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DFID’s Work in 
Building More Effective States (henceforth Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics) was published in 2006, in the aftermath of the Gleneagles 
G8 summit, whose concluding statement had set out an ambitious target for the 
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reduction of global poverty and the advancement of development aims and 
objectives. The booklet was intended as a contribution to a larger debate about 
the political dimensions of development, something which was reflected in its  
focus upon capable, accountable and responsive (CAR) states and its 
development of a range of sophisticated analytical tools (such as Drivers of 
Change and Country Governance Analysis).  
 At the national level, the document followed on from issues and themes 
that had been elaborated in the 2006 White Paper. Within the context of the 
DfID’s work, the document arose in response to the clear need to articulate the 
concept of governance. This was a particularly important undertaking because it 
was the prelude to an approach which could engage with the political 
dimensions of development and underdevelopment.  
The booklet is organised into seven chapters. These chapters provide 
working definitions of governance, link governance into poverty alleviation 
agenda and demonstrate how the concept of governance can be practically 
applied. Although Governance, Development and Democratic Politics does not 
explicitly reference post-conflict intervention, it has a number of important 
implications for DfID’s conflict engagement activities in general, and therefore 
for post-conflict peacebuilding.  
The booklet begins by rooting governance within social relations; 
authority is not exerted over society; rather, it is produced within it. This point is 
made clear when the booklet observes that ‘governance is about power and 
authority and how a country manages its affairs’ (2). The emphasis upon 
‘country’ is significant because it reiterates that governance is a collective 
endeavour rather than the possession of a single institutional authority.  
In incorporating a wider array of social actors, governance gives rise to  
‘complex’ or ‘networked’ political arrangements which can be directly contrasted 
with static and hierarchical state bureaucracies. This provides the basis for a 
different form of politics, a point which Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics explicitly makes when it observes that ‘democracy is about 
much more than having a vote’. In both procedural (inclusive political processes 
that engage different sectors of society) and substantive (the agenda to which 
political mobilisation is directed) terms, this democratic framework can be 
directly contrasted with formal models.   
 144 
Its fundamental meaning is subsequently made clear when the document 
asserts that governance is concerned with ‘people and their relationship with 
the state’ (2, 6). This establishes a clear overlap with the literature on state-
societal relations, establishing the basis for a discussion of how accountability 
and responsiveness can be enhanced through societal mobilisation. In defining 
governance as a relationship between state and society, the document  
comprehensively breaks with the concept of state autonomy, the core principle 
underpinning the Weberian state. In its place, Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics instead inserts the principle of reciprocity, establishing the 
mutual interaction between state and society as the basis for a more inclusive 
and efficient form of politics.  
 Given that this model of state-societal interaction is so clearly indebted to 
the literature on social structuralism, we might presume that governance is an 
essentially political relationship which is clearly distanced from technocratic 
themes and points of reference. However, a closer reading of Governance, 
Development and Democratic Politics suggests an interlinking of political 
(‘people and their relationship with the state’) and technical (‘growth, service 
delivery and the environment’ (49)) preoccupations. In the first instance, 
attention is directed towards themes of civil society engagement, institutional 
reform along with principles of accountability, participation and transparency); in 
the second, it is more preoccupied with the functional by-products of 
governance.  
In the introduction to this chapter I observed that governance suggests 
an agenda and range of practical innovations that go beyond the state. A closer 
engagement with Governance, Development and Democratic Politics suggests 
that this general characterisation is somewhat misplaced – on numerous 
occasions, the discussion flickers back to the broad agenda of state 
performance, along with associated imperatives of sustained economic growth 
and improved service provision (49). This range of preoccupations is explicitly 
invoked when the booklet notes that the ‘state is in an ‘unrivalled position to 
transform economies and societies’ (11). It is particularly significant that all 
three sections of the good governance framework – state capability, 
accountability, responsiveness – relate to the actions (or inactions) of the state 
(37). Further reiteration of these preoccupations is provided when the booklet 
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fixates upon executive-legislative relations and the design and implementation 
of state policy (20), along with the importance of elected representatives, open 
and fair elections, responsive and accountable institutions, freedom of 
association and inclusive forms of citizenship (19) (DfID 2006b, 18). 
There is the appearance of elasticity, with the terms of reference initially 
expanding beyond a given point, only to suddenly and disconcertingly revert 
back to it. Over the course of this chapter I will illustrate that this feature, far 
from being an isolated occurrence, is actually a deeply rooted attribute of the 
governance debate. The persistence of the motif of state performance is 
particularly striking in this respect, evidencing an ongoing fascination with the 
conditions under which optimal state performance can be enshrined. Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (PRS) and good governance frameworks are particularly 
instructive examples in this respect (41).  
Within Governance, Development and Democratic Politics this feature is 
sometimes occluded or understated. A clear example is provided by the 
document’s discussion of formal and informal institutions. The document initially 
focuses upon the potential contribution of informal institutions, insisting that 
‘governance is about more than government systems and capacities’ (6). In this 
instance, governance is co-terminus with an expansive realm which is defined 
in terms of what it is not. In this respect, ‘informal’ serves the same purpose as 
‘social’ – it suggests a novel sphere of political engagement that is logically 
distinct from the state. In the following contextuality chapter I will focus upon the 
concept of the ‘social’ to a much greater extent, illustrating how it actively 
militates against the imposition of one-size-fits-all models and frameworks.  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics similarly makes this 
point (37, 69), while reiterating that ‘countries need to create their own 
institutions through locally driven processes’ (9). By implication, external actors 
should begin by recognising the specificity of each context, appreciating the 
extent to which this limits their ability to engineer change (this is a clear 
illustration of how the deepening and contextuality agendas overlap and 
intersect) (3, 7, 13, 20). The imperative of context-specific solutions and the 
attenuation of external influence further underline and underscore the centrality 
of local capacities and contributions.  
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The pre-emptive rejection of one-size-fits-all approaches does not merely 
place a sanctifying seal upon local agency; to the same extent, it refutes the 
application of technical models and frameworks. In explicitly clarifying this point, 
the booklet establishes that: ‘[DfID’s understanding of governance] has gone 
beyond economic governance and the management of the economy, and 
beyond analysing and reforming public services and the public sector’ (68).  The 
impression is of a progression beyond these ‘narrow’ reference points and a 
steady advancement towards a more holistic agenda.  
This broad representation is complicated somewhat by a clear reversion 
towards a set of functional effects, which pertain to ‘growth, service delivery and 
the environment’ (49). This impression is further compounded when the booklet 
observes that ‘it is this wider political economy of institutions that determines 
state effectiveness’ (6). Social mobilisation is therefore to be understood in 
relational terms – that is, in relation to its implications for formal structures and 
processes. This impression is further reinforced when reference is made to the 
ways in which ‘informal systems influence and shape public policymaking and 
service delivery’ (68).  
Initially the terms of discourse had expanded to encompass the familiar 
concerns of the social structural literature – variation, heterogeneity and 
contextual specificity were again reiterated and elevated for our attention. 
However, the terms of reference subsequently enfolded back in upon the 
equally familiar agenda of capable, accountable and responsive (CAR) states 
(11). Far from implying an absenting of external influence, participation within 
this framework ultimately reproduces wider structures of governance while 
reinforcing a range of functional effects. This is made quite apparent when the 
booklet asserts that ‘[direct] participation by poor people in government 
decision-making processes can improve local accountability, leading, in turn, to 
more efficient public services’ (57). Participation is not intelligible in its 
specificity, but instead corresponds to a general outline or appearance.  
 In keeping with the proposition of ‘complex’ or ‘networked’ forms of 
governance, civil society engagement is ascribed a particular importance by  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics. This booklet explicitly 
recognises the role that civil society can play in ‘negotiating the balance of 
power between citizens and the state [and] building state accountability and 
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responsiveness’ (62). In clarifying this theme, it reiterates that ‘accountability is 
at the heart of how change happens’ (2006, 23, 25, 26).  
 At this point the significance of the shift to accountability should be 
acknowledged. It has taken us some distance from the initial terms of reference, 
in which emancipation and social transformation appeared as the overriding 
preoccupations. This feature is explicitly reiterated when it is asserted that:  
‘excluded people must be empowered to make demands of government and 
hold it to account’ (34). Here it will be noted that empowerment is not conceived 
in open-ended terms but is instead recoded and accorded a very specific 
function. Accordingly, it is envisaged that local actors will project ‘voice’, with a 
view to positively influencing governance practices (32, 33, 34, 68). 
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics therefore discursively 
links civil society mobilisation into the state’s governing practices, establishing 
this as the basis upon which ‘appropriate’ interactions (15) and improved levels 
of state performance can be entrenched. Participatory ‘inputs’ enhance state 
capability, accountability and responsiveness (14, 29), adding further impetus to 
an established agenda. Governance, Development and Democratic Politics is 
quite explicit on this point: ultimately it envisages a set of circumstances in 
which participation organises and influences state policy and practice (19).  
This chapter began by drawing attention to the nebulous and elliptical 
character of governance. In contrast, Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics orientates towards precise and exact stipulations. This 
convergence upon a precise reform agenda is clearly reiterated when it is 
stated that ‘the state can play a key role in enabling poor people to participate in 
and benefit from economic growth’ (36).  
Accountability, efficiency and responsiveness appear as the core 
preoccupation (14, 38, 39, 49), which enshrine and uphold a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. It is particularly telling, for instance, that Governance, 
Development and Democratic Politics justifies decentralisation upon the basis 
that it will bring decision-making closer to citizens, thus inculcating a heightened 
state responsiveness (57). However, the document treats the state with a 
certain ambivalence. In the first instance, it appears as the means through 
which empowerment is enabled; in the second, it is instead an object of 
suspicion, a potential site of deviation in need of surveillance and oversight. 
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Civil society is conscripted as a mechanism through which these outcomes can 
be enabled, diverging considerably from its initial role as an incubator of organic 
and autonomous agency. Governance, Development and Democratic Politics is 
strikingly candid on this point, conceiving of local participation as a form of 
‘bottom-up’ discipline which will ‘mobilise civil society against corruption’ (30). 
In advancing their interests at the level of the state, social actors will 
work to ensure that it is responsive to the ‘needs and rights of citizens’ (14). 
Again, it is reiterated that local agency disciplines the autonomy of the state, 
inculcating ‘appropriate’ forms of conduct from below (also see Making 
Governance Work for the Poor 2006, 66). As a consequence, the state is 
hemmed in, being subtly orientated towards the insight that its essential 
concern is ‘to get things done through effective policies’ (15). Even the precise 
definition of efficiency is not left open, with the booklet endeavouring to remind 
us that one of the state’s ‘essential roles’ is to establish conditions conducive to 
economic growth (37). 
In reflecting upon this close imitation of established imperatives, we 
would surely be forgiven for observing that it possesses little of the spontaneity 
or originality that we might otherwise attribute to a deepened form of democratic 
engagement. Quite the contrary, this is a stale repetition of imperatives that 
have become inextricably interwoven into the wider neo-liberal reform agenda. 
Although local agency is the ostensible point of reference, it is only intelligible in 
its relation to an encompassing background.  
The tenor of neo-liberal reform may be understated or occluded, but it is 
continually there. At certain points, it is asserted with a disconcerting and 
abrasive immediacy. Governance, Development and Democratic Politics 
illustrates this when it reverts to a strikingly impersonal, removed and almost 
mechanical vernacular, contending that governance analysis is concerned with 
‘all the mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests and exercise their rights and 
obligations’ (6, 15). This surreptitious insertion of ‘interests’, ‘rights’ and 
‘obligations’ again takes us some distance from the emancipatory or 
transformative vernacular of peacebuilding theory.  
When conceived in this framework, civil society engagement, 
empowerment and participation are brought into alignment with neo-liberal 
 149 
reference points, being predisposed towards the reproduction of a range of 
functional effects. Politics is functionalised, being made to function and 
correspondingly being rendered as a condition of effective implementation.  
Transparency, accountability and responsiveness (70) are the guiding 
imperatives of this rationalised politics, with previously open-ended concepts 
closing in upon a precise reform agenda. In registering the perpetual 
reassertion of efficiency, functionality, responsiveness and accountability, the 
reader is confronted by a certain circularity of discourse 
This feature is further reiterated when Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics announces its intention to ‘ground technical solutions in the 
governance and political environment in which they operate’ (39). The 
adjustment of technical frameworks to context represents an important 
innovation, replacing the more frequently voiced proposition that the limitations 
of technocratic approaches have been acknowledged and integrated into 
peacebuilding strategies. The ‘technical’ and ‘political’ are no longer situated in 
diametric opposition but are instead intertwined within a range of complex 
formulations. In place of an inexorable progression, it would perhaps be more 
appropriate to propose a set of subtle pivots or manoeuvres.  
The incorporation of the local context into wider neo-liberal governance 
has important implications for the level of heterogeneity and contextual variation 
that can be envisaged. When Governance, Development and Democratic 
Politics asserts that there is ‘no single best path’ (37) it does not, in contrast to 
the social structuralism literature, anticipate limitless variation but instead 
envisages variation within the parameters that have been established by neo-
liberal governance. Although the terms of reference tantalisingly hinted at the 
broad expanse that lies beyond state functionality, there is a deeply rooted 
recidivism, a predisposition to revert back to this agenda. The social is 
undoubtedly engaged, but the terms under which it is assimilated into the neo-
liberal reform agenda are considerably more convoluted than the initial 
depiction of deepening allowed or envisaged.  
Building the State and Securing the Peace  
Building the State and Security the Peace (henceforth Building the State) 
was an important contribution to an internal debate within DfID that could be 
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traced back to 2004/2005. In engaging with the theme of state fragility, it 
engaged the convergence of the statebuilding and peacebuilding agendas, 
reflecting and reiterating an understanding that development objectives could 
only be achieved through a sustained engagement with the drivers of conflict. 
DfID sought to situate this security-development nexus within a wider process of 
institutional learning, suggesting that its heightened awareness on this point 
had been driven by the insight that many of the states in which it was operating 
were confronted by twin challenges of underdevelopment and insecurity 
The document provided an acknowledgement that, in working towards 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, development actors 
needed to integrate a heightened conflict-sensitivity into their work, adapting to 
drivers of conflict in the process. This represented an important innovation, 
overcoming the temptation (which had previously been deeply entrenched 
within the development field) to ‘work around’ conflict. Building the State and 
Securing the Peace (henceforth Building the State) is therefore part of a wider 
recognition that ‘building peaceful states and societies needs to be central to 
donor responses in conflict-affected and fragile states’ (3).  
Building the State was written as an emerging policy paper and was 
published in 2009. It represented a contribution to an ongoing discussion (which 
subsequently resulted in a policy paper) about how the statebuilding and 
peacebuilding agendas could be brought together. It breaks down into four 
sections: the first two sections engage political settlements, responsive 
statebuilding and the relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding; the 
third section outlines the specific attributes of statebuilding frameworks before 
progressing to the more general attempt to develop an integrated approach to 
conflict engagement and intervention. The document highlights potential points 
of integration and associated contradictions and tensions. A final section 
extracts operational implications from DfID’s previous engagements with fragility 
and conflict.  
In engaging at a general level of analysis, the document develops DfID’s 
strategic framework for engagement with conflict and fragility (it should however 
be recognised that engagements under the Fragile and Conflict Affected States 
(FCAS) framework are not restricted to the post-conflict intervention phase).  
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The text situates conflict engagement within a broader framework of reference 
by invoking both the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the 
OECD-DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations (2007). It roots itself within an endogenous approach and commits 
itself to draw upon internal capacities (3, 4). In addressing itself to the 
challenges of the conflict environment, it commits itself to engage within a 
political framework of reference (4).  
Building the State demonstrates how capable, accountable and 
responsive (CAR) states can be constructed through a more sustained 
conceptual and practical engagement with both state–societal relations and 
informal political processes; it privileges both reference points because they 
root analysis and practical intervention firmly within the host society. Political 
settlements at the domestic level, the establishment of responsive state 
structures and the alignment of internal and external processes and relations.  
Building the State engages with the broader theme of empowerment at 
three points. Empowerment is closely associated with three key points of 
reference. The first is social processes and structures. In the terms initially set 
out in this chapter’s introduction, ‘social’ implies a different order of democratic 
engagement and an alterity within the terms of political reference. Secondly, it is 
concerned with the point at which the statebuilding and peacebuilding agendas 
interface. While the statebuilding literature has become increasingly sensitive to 
heterogeneity and variation, there is still a residual suspicion that statebuilding’s 
underlying impulse is to universalise, rationalise or standardise. In direct 
contrast, peacebuilding has been, since its inception, associated with the 
cultivation of endogenous capacities and processes.  
Finally, I will engage empowerment at the point where technical and 
political rationalities collide. This necessitates a closer critical deconstruction of 
how expertise, generally applicable bodies of knowledge, are integrated and 
‘reconciled’ with the various dimensions of the deepening agenda. In the 
context of the current engagement, these present particularly important points 
of engagement because the dimension of democratic deepening is premised on 
the move away from, or attenuation of, managerial and technocratic terms of 
reference.  
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In a comparable manner to my other textual engagements, my 
discussion of Building the State and Securing the Peace will also engage 
internally cited texts. I will therefore also reference a DfID White Paper (Making 
Global Governance Work for the Poor), a policy paper (States in Development: 
Understanding Statebuilding) and a briefing note published by DfID in 2010 
(Aligning With Local Priorities).  
In engaging with the concept of positive peace, Building the State begins 
by enlarging one of its core tenets, namely, the proposition that a genuine 
peace requires a more sustained engagement with societal reference points. 
This concern is further reiterated when it is observed that a closer engagement 
with ‘complex social and political processes’ (3) anticipates a more sustainable 
‘social peace’ (9). ‘Social peace’, in these terms, is understood to rest upon an 
approach that engages forms of violence that are rooted within social processes 
and interactions.  
This suggests a ‘deep-rooted’ engagement that goes beyond the 
limitations of appearance and which penetrates deep into societal content. A 
‘limited’ engagement will, by implication, only serve to reproduce pre-existent 
forms of violence in subsequent effect. The proposition of a ‘social peace’ 
clearly recalls the work of Johan Galtung, whose work had previously engaged 
with structural forms of violence that are deeply embedded and rooted. This 
distinction established a clear basis for his distinction of ‘negative’ (in which the 
symptoms of violence are mitigated or removed) and ‘positive’ (in which the 
structural roots of violence are comprehensively addressed) forms of peace.  
Because social peace emerges within and through society, it cannot be 
conceived as an external imposition; presumably, this can be taken to imply that 
its exact meaning will vary across or between societies. However, the concept 
of ‘positive peace’ that is reproduced within Building the State, in common with 
the version that is produced within Governance, Development and Democratic 
Politics, appears to be considerably more enclosed and predetermined. This is 
apparent when the document adapts an OECD definition to observe that 
‘positive peace’ is characterised by: ‘social peace, respect for the rule of law 
and human rights, and social and economic development, supported by 
dynamic and representative political institutions capable of managing change 
and resolving disputes without resorting to violent conflict’ (9).  
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This quotation essentially integrates the proposition of a deeper, social 
peace with an agenda that is focused upon a more formal framework of 
reference, a feature that is reiterated by the allusion to ‘representative political 
institutions’. It is as if the agenda of ‘positive’ or ‘social’ peace has been 
refracted through a lens and reconstituted as a vision of good governance. 
Accordingly, informal institutions are therefore engaged and understood with 
reference to the ‘relationship between state and society’ (2). Social actors are 
also, in a manner which clearly recalls Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics, to be empowered in relation to a specific object – that is, in 
relation to the state.  
The concept of the ‘social’ is not self-referential or conceived in isolation; 
rather, it is situated in relation to a very precise set of expectations and related 
to an equally exact set of outputs.  The ‘informal’ or ‘social’ are, in this manner, 
incorporated into, and aligned with, governance networks. This feature recalls 
the Foucault chapter, which previously demonstrated how various aspects of 
freedom (a condition embodied within various forms of ‘empowerment’ and 
‘participation) become embedded within broader governmental imperatives. 
Freedom, it is again reiterated, does not therefore function as the point at which 
power is denied or resisted, but rather as the means through which it is 
embodied and circulated.  
The concept of civil society engagement plays an important role within 
the democratic vision of liberal peacebuilding, and the regularity with which the 
concept is invoked within policy documents testifies to its perceived political 
significance. The ambiguity of the concept derives, in part, from the fact that it 
relates to the unspecified space between the state and citizen. In direct contrast 
to the formal political process, it cannot be exactly defined as ‘political’ but 
instead appears to be more ‘social’ in character. Empowerment within and 
through this framework of reference is not therefore defined in the vernacular of 
political theory, but is more frequently defined in relation to socio-economic 
needs and requirements.  
This feature is clearly reproduced within the framework of ‘social’ agency 
that is reproduced within Building the State. Social agents engage through civil 
society or informal institutions – a term which the document references on thirty-
three occasions. Empowerment through this mechanism imposes a set of 
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restraints and inhibitions upon state autonomy; accordingly, the domestic state 
becomes inculcated in an ‘appropriate’ conduct and is therefore less prone to 
the vices which have frequently tempted developing states – corruption, 
inefficient public administration, arbitrary and ‘excessive’ state intervention in 
the domestic economy.  
‘Empowered’ social actors do not seek to realise or embody political 
ideals or concepts. The legitimisation of the state through its interactions with 
society is not strictly political, but is instead grounded within a set of functional 
expectations. Building the State makes this quite clear when it anticipates a 
happy eventuality in which ‘the political settlement expands beyond elites to 
reflect a broader compact between the state and society, based on delivery and 
accountability’ (8). The basis of political authority therefore does not originate 
within a political ideal or rationality, but rather within its ability to respond to 
expectations and provide efficient forms of service provision.  
This presents us with a strikingly depoliticised version of empowerment, 
which has as much in common with rational choice frameworks as it has in 
common with theories of participatory democracy. In engaging politically, social 
actors ultimately seek to embed an optimised state functionality, which will 
embody and further their personal socio-economic interests. Building the State 
presents us with an almost apolitical form. This is disconcerting because we 
might intuitively assume empowerment is an essentially political term, which is 
essentially concerned with the process and circumstances under which political 
agents fundamentally alter their political conditions of existence.  
The document reproduces the understanding which was initially 
advanced by the OECD; namely, that ‘civil society has a key role in demanding 
good governance and in service delivery’ (2). Empowerment, when situated in 
this manner, becomes a mechanism through which ‘appropriate’ and 
‘proportionate’ practices are reproduced. The democratic engagement of social 
or informal actors, far from functioning as a site of alterity, spontaneity or 
variation, ultimately reproduces a set of functional effects.  
Far from functioning as a means through which a range of unilateral 
demands are advanced, empowerment instead appears as a ‘compact’ (11) 
which incorporates domestic actors into the distinctive prerogatives and 
practices of neo-liberal governance. Within this framework of reference, 
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‘democracy’ becomes reformulated as ‘an institutionalised mechanism for 
expressing expectations, protecting rights, and holding government to account 
for its delivery and actions’ (6). Here it is again important to note that 
empowerment has been redefined in relational terms, that is, in relation to the 
state and its provision of essential services. This relational attribute is similarly 
reproduced within the assertion that ‘democratic institutions and processes can 
help to rebuild state legitimacy’ (6). It is similarly significant that the ostensibly 
political concern of democratic engagement has become redefined in 
anticipation of a range of policy outputs (15, 26).  
Empowerment does not therefore function as a means through which 
established power relations are challenged and reconfigured. Building the State 
reconfigures civil society (which it references twenty times) and demonstrates 
how it provides improved ‘monitoring, facilitation and service delivery’ functions 
(14). This echoes Making Global Governance Work for the Poor (2006), a 
previous DfID White Paper, which had presented local-level empowerment as a 
means through which heightened levels of transparency and elite accountability 
could be achieved. (6). In both instances, empowerment ultimately works 
towards the reproduction of a set of generalised or standardised effects.  
In Building the State we therefore encounter concepts of ‘empowerment’, 
the ‘social’ and the ‘informal’ as features or attributes of the statebuilding 
agenda. The understandings that we might intuitively attribute to each of these 
reference points – ‘empowerment’ as the alteration of power relations; ‘the 
social’ as a site of specificity; the ‘informal’ as the diametric opposite of the 
‘formal’ – are subtly altered and reconfigured. As a consequence, each of the 
three reference points becomes intelligible in their relation to the overarching 
statebuilding theme. Herein lies the significance of the assertion that ‘informal 
systems of governance have a profound impact on statebuilding and 
peacebuilding dynamics’ (22). Far from being a single feature of the 
statebuilding agenda, this instead provides the overarching rationale of the 
entire enterprise, and Building the State explicitly underlines this point when it 
observes that ‘in all contexts, statebuilding is principally about strengthening the 
relationship between state and society’ (4).  
As I observed in my discussion of Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics, this specific feature (the functional outputs that derive from 
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a specific configuration of state–societal relations) can be traced back to the 
general framework of neo-liberal governance. The document’s preoccupation 
with accountability and transparency, both of which are essentially presented as 
derivatives of social agency, further underscores and reiterates this feature. 
Whereas we might intuitively be predisposed to associate ‘empowerment’ with 
direct engagement and participation, in Building the State it is instead 
recapitulated as a form of indirect influence, that is, as a mechanism through 
which accountability (which is referenced twenty-four times in Building the 
State) and appropriate forms of state conduct can be inculcated.  
A closer engagement with the ‘how’ of empowerment reiterates that it is 
constructed within and through neo-liberal governance, and conceived in 
relation to the range of imperatives and outputs that correspond to this point of 
reference. In engaging with the ways in which empowerment is reproduced, I 
have attempted to demonstrate that the essential question is not whether 
peacebuilding actors engage with ‘empowerment’ or ‘participation’, but rather, 
how both reference points, which I have presented as inherently supple and 
adaptable, are reconfigured, recomposed and aligned with broader imperatives 
and frameworks.  
This distinctive framing of empowerment can also be engaged at the 
points where peacebuilding and statebuilding discourse come into contact. In 
the Introduction and Literature Review I defined peacebuilding as a set of 
interventions which are directed towards the underlying causes of violent 
conflict. Although statebuilding interventions can conceivably assume an 
equally wide range of forms, they are ultimately directed towards a more precise 
objective – that is, the consolidation of state authority within a given territory. 
While I distinguish between the two frameworks on this basis, it is also 
important to acknowledge that statebuilding (and this is a point that I make in 
the Literature Review chapter) can be understood as an aspect or dimension of 
peacebuilding. 
As illustrated in the Introductory chapter, peacebuilding theory logically 
implies a ‘deepened’ or more substantive understanding of democratic 
engagement. By virtue of a prior structural analysis of power and violence and a 
prior emancipatory or transformative commitment, peacebuilders are 
predisposed to engage at the ‘roots’ of society. Building the State further 
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unravels this prior commitment and anticipates a more sustained engagement 
with: a) inclusive peace processes and settlements, b) mechanisms that resolve 
conflict peacefully and c) interventions that are simultaneously addressed to the 
causes and effects of violent conflict.  
In engaging at the ‘nexus between statebuilding and peacebuilding’ (3) 
and in developing and applying an ‘integrated approach’, Building the State 
attempts to demonstrate how peacebuilding techniques and practices can be 
integrated into ‘long-term efforts to build state capacity and legitimacy’ (15). This 
establishes the conceptual, theoretical and practical basis for a ‘broadened’ 
statebuilding agenda (13). Although this framework stretches across a wide 
range of reference points, it is ultimately predisposed to return to formal points 
of reference. Building the State reiterates this point when it asserts that ‘there is 
no substitute for the state in managing serious risks of violence’ (3). The 
prospects of alternative political arrangements are briefly considered (in the 
form of shadow alignment), but it is made clear that this exception will only 
emerge as an active consideration under very limited circumstances.  
This raises the question of who is to be the subject of empowerment. In 
the previous account, the subject was a range of social actors who were to be 
empowered in relation to the state. However, the assertion that there is ‘no 
substitute for the state’ instead, in contrast to the underpinning logic of 
peacebuilding (which is instead premised upon a more sustained social 
engagement with ‘social’ actors and processes) there is instead the proposition 
of a closer alignment with partner country ‘policies, strategies and priorities’ (1). 
This suggests a reversion to the formalised preoccupations of statebuilding 
literature, which are the ‘parliaments, the judiciary, the media, civil society, 
political parties and human rights bodies, as well as elections and the electoral 
cycle’ (24)) associated with the formal political process.  
This also suggests a subtle alteration within the terms of empowerment. 
Whereas empowerment had previously been grounded within society, it is now 
instead grounded within the state, and conceived of with reference to the 
question of how its capacities can be constructed and enhanced. The agency of 
social actors is not conceived as in opposition to formal structures and 
processes, but is thought of as constituted within and through it. Ultimately 
social actors orientate towards the formal political process and seek inclusion 
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within it. Thus, ‘maintaining stability will depend on the political settlement, an 
accommodation between all groups that have a stake in the way that power is 
shared, and the state having a representative function’ (18).  
The peacebuilding agenda, in this manner, is subtly adapted and 
refracted through the statebuilding lens. And civil society empowerment 
becomes a mechanism through which improved levels of transparency and 
accountability can be achieved and reproduced within governance practices 
(13, 15, 21). The empowerment of local actors produces a range of positive 
feedbacks and impacts (5) which impact upon the broader policy process (6) 
and enhance the performance capabilities of formal institutions.  
One of the most frequently repeated axioms of statebuilding literature is 
that it is an inherently political process, which cannot be sufficiently conceived 
and conceptualised in technocratic terms. Responding to Stabilisation 
Challenges therefore reproduces something of a widely accepted orthodoxy 
when it asserts that ‘there is no such thing as an apolitical engagement in a 
conflict environment’ (Stabilisation Unit 2010, 1). This understanding is also 
reproduced within the assertion that: ‘stabilisation activities do not readily lend 
themselves to linear planning, or to conventional monitoring and evaluation 
based upon a straightforward causal logic between inputs, outputs and 
anticipated outcomes’ (2010, 13).  
In working within this framework of reference, the Stabilisation Unit has 
previously asserted that the development of ‘the best political approach is more 
important than delivering technical assistance’ (2010, 25). The insufficiency of a 
technical rationality is again reiterated and reaffirmed. Ultimately, stabilisation 
actors should not direct their attention to the reproduction of an exact template 
but should adjust to the contingencies and complexities of context. Responding 
to Stabilisation Challenges reiterates this point when it asserts the importance 
of a ‘contextual understanding [of] the history, socio-economics and political 
economy of a country or region’ (2010; 11). A contextual understanding will not 
be predisposed to reproduce prior templates and frameworks, but will instead 
approach the domestic context from within an open-ended framework of 
reference. This is the core implication, which derives from, and which sustains, 
Whaites’s abrupt rejection of ‘development dogma’ (2008, 6).  
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Building the State asserts the centrality of a local-level engagement 
when it states that peacebuilding and statebuilding are ‘primarily internal 
processes within countries’ and that ‘donors do not ‘do’ either process. This 
again presents a simultaneous assertion of internal agency and limitation of 
external influence as essential conditions of democratic engagement. This does 
not imply an absenting of external influence, but rather its reconfiguration within 
a primarily facilitative or supportive role (2010, 3). However, this does not result 
in the absenting of external influence; rather, it instead becomes recast within a 
supportive or facilitative role (3).  
From this perspective, the purpose of external assistance is to ‘enable’, 
‘assist’ or ‘empower’ local actors. The purpose of external engagement is not to 
predetermine, but rather to help to establish the conditions under which local 
agents are enabled to bring about effective change. Upon a closer reading, the 
reader does observe a tendency to switch between two propositions of 
empowerment: the first in which local agency emerges in the absence of 
external intervention, and the second in which local agency is produced within 
and through various forms of external mediation.  
In the second instance, there is frequently a certain understatement, in 
which the respective contributions of internal and external actors are not made 
clearly apparent; for instance, it is quite frequently only through various forms of 
external assistance – administrative support, staff secondment and training – 
that internal agency is enabled. Further, it is possible to find instances in which 
the respective contributions of internal and external actors are clouded or 
occluded. This feature is evidenced when Building the State presents 
Community Driven Development Programmes (the use of the word ‘community’ 
being understood to imply a high degree of local ownership) as a means 
through which local actors can influence, that is, indirectly influence, the 
‘identification, design, management and monitoring of local interventions’ (9).  
However, it is also possible to identify other instances in which external 
influence is conversely afforded a precise significance. Aligning with Local 
Priorities (the title itself denotes a prior exteriority) observes that local agency is 
not self-sustaining, but that it is only enabled and perpetuated through various 
forms of external influence (DfID 2010b, 9). In further expanding this theme, the 
document observes that the ‘quality of the participatory processes that are put 
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in place and their sensitivity to local context are therefore crucial and often need 
support from external facilitators’ (ibid). 
The use of the word ‘quality’ is significant because it highlights how 
domestic processes are reconstituted and assessed against external 
benchmarks and standards. It also suggests that these processes are to be 
assessed in relation to a prior set of criteria and expectations. Equally 
significantly, they are not self-sustaining, but are instead only enabled and 
sustained through various forms of external intervention and engagement. This 
provides one clear illustration of how ‘local’ agency is – contra its idealised 
representation – immersed within various forms of external influence. The 
proposition of an ‘alignment with local priorities’ is therefore far from an isolated 
instance or occurrence, rather, it reveals something quite fundamental about 
internal-external relations within statebuilding frameworks.  
Whaites, in rejecting ‘development dogma’, similarly appeals to this 
sense of local agency. His stress upon autonomous agency interjects a clear 
sense of contingency into his analysis, and by implication, this makes it difficult 
to sustain the proposition that general frameworks and templates should be 
transferred across different societies. A contextual analysis rooted within social 
specificity is poorly adjusted to a technocratic mentality, which is premised upon 
transferability, standardisation and predictability. From this perspective, the 
transfer and application of generic lessons is contextually constrained. As 
Whaites observes, a ‘political’ analysis which is rooted within the specificity of 
each individual context is therefore synonymous with a sense of heterogeneity 
and variation (2008, 5). If complexity, contingency and context are taken to be 
determining, this imposes clear limitations and constraints of generalisation that 
can be envisaged and enacted. Context, from this perspective, is a limiting 
factor which constrains generalisation or universalisation.  
Whereas ‘political’ interactions are essentially ‘messy, implicit and 
nonlinear’, their technical counterparts are instead predictable and linear. In 
pointing out how stabilisation interventions are impacted by political 
considerations, Responding to Stabilisation Challenges suggests that a 
technocratic framework should not be superimposed upon stabilisation 
practices. Far from establishing the basis upon which stabilisation could be 
understood and analysed, this framework of reference instead distorts and 
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disfigures. In establishing political factors as the core concern and basis of 
analysis, the document simultaneously underscores the analytical limitations 
that derive from a technocratic framework of reference.  
Alan Whaites provides a different perspective when, with reference to 
political settlements, he distinguishes between technical (‘the process through 
which states enhance their ability to function’) and political (‘the forging of a 
common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are 
served by a particular way of organising political power’) dimensions of 
statebuilding (2008, 4). In openly acknowledging and reiterating the technical 
dimensions of his object of reference, Whaites clearly diverges from a number 
of previous contributions, which had been more predisposed to understate or 
even occlude technocratic implications. In Building the State it is also possible 
to identify instances in which referent objects are engaged and conceived at the 
level of generality, as with the statebuilding CAR (capability, accountability and 
responsiveness) framework of reference. After stripping away superfluous 
detail, Building the State clearly identifies a number of ‘core’ functions that are 
common to all ideal-type states. In further elaborating these ‘core’ attributes, the 
document, in a discussion which frequently qualifies universalising 
assumptions, outlines a model of the state which is founded upon general 
attributes – the establishment of the rule of law, the provision of security and 
non-discriminatory service provision (7). 
Building Stability Overseas Strategy 
The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (henceforth Building Stability 
Overseas) was a joint publication of the MoD, FCO and DfID which was 
published in 2011. Although the broad theme of state fragility follows on from 
Building the State, it is more explicit in highlighting the promotion of national 
interests as its core priority. The document was written at a time when the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’ was in its infancy. At this point in time the overthrow of 
authoritarian leaders was still viewed with optimism, as an opportunity to 
promote and inculcate more open, accountable and responsive systems of 
governance. The ‘Arab Spring’ offered the opportunity to break with the legacy 
of previous interventions within the Arab World, not least the disastrous 2003 
invasion of Iraq.   
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The development of this strategic framework should also be understood 
against the background of the British interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 
acknowledging the limitations of past post-conflict interventions, it signals a 
clear movement towards forms of ‘upstream’ engagement that seek to prevent 
the outbreak of violent conflict in the first instance. This raised clear questions 
about the precise role of peacebuilding (which significantly is only referenced 
five times within the strategy) within international approaches and strategies. 
Stability interventions no longer sought to undertake effective intervention in the 
aftermath of violent conflict; rather, they instead sought to put in place the 
monitoring and oversight mechanisms that would enable integrated conflict 
management systems to function more effectively. In wider institutional 
perspective, the document could therefore be said to reproduce a profound and 
significant shift from ‘post’ to ‘preventative’ engagement.  
In engaging at a general strategic level of analysis the strategy 
incorporated the respective contributions of each of the three departments and 
sought to demonstrate how their collective efforts could contribute to a 
stabilisation of conflict situations. Although stabilisation is a broad-ranging 
framework of reference, the discussion ultimately orientates back towards 
themes of security, which is why the document references both the National 
Security Strategy and the Strategic Security and Defence Review. Building 
Stability Overseas makes it clear that ‘diplomatic, development, military and 
security tools’ (4) will be perceived through a security lens and that an 
‘integrated’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approach to security will provide the basis 
of discussion.  
Because Building Stability Overseas Strategy does not internally 
reference other documents, I have returned to the table of policy documents in 
the Engaging the Comprehensive Approach Chapter and extracted three 
documents, each of which has previously been published by the UK’s 
Stabilisation Unit, a civil-military operational unit that brings together the work of 
DfID, the FCO and the MoD. The first document, Responding to Stabilisation 
Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified by the 
UK’s Stabilisation Unit, develops within a ‘lesson-learning’ framework. It 
therefore asserts that ‘[relevant government departments] need to identify 
relevant lessons from past experience, learn from these, and adapt them to the 
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specific requirements of each new environment’ (27) and seeks to 
operationalise a ‘best practice’ of stabilisation. The other two documents were 
published by the Stabilisation Unit in 2014, and set out a general stabilisation 
framework (the UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation), and engaged with 
a specific attribute of stabilisation (Security Sector Stabilisation). 
In each of these documents, we encounter a number of reference points 
that we have previously engaged. To take one example, empowerment closely 
overlaps with capacity-building. Both relate to the question of how local actors 
can, through the development of specific abilities and skill-sets, address 
themselves to immediate challenges. Equally significantly, policy texts 
frequently depict capacity-building as a set of largely neutral interventions which 
are, in the last analysis, ultimately directed towards the absenting of external 
mediation and oversight. Finally, both frameworks of reference are also 
grounded within a knowledge that establishes and enshrines an ‘appropriate’ 
set of practices. A more sustained engagement with local actors therefore 
appears as a means through which a more complete integration of knowledge 
and practice can be attained. Knowledge production provides a mechanism that 
enables stabilisation actors to ‘feed lessons back into policy, planning and 
practice’ (2010, 27). Information from specific instances is then in turn fed back 
into more general strategic frameworks (Stabilisation Unit 2010, 2; 2014, 2, 3).  
The Building Stability Overseas Strategy, in direct contrast to 
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics, is predisposed to approach 
key questions and themes from an external perspective – that is, with reference 
to the challenges and obstacles that are associated with the development of an 
external strategy. This point is explicitly underlined by the fact that Building 
Stability Overseas does not primarily understand ‘capacity-building with 
reference to local actors, but instead predominantly focuses upon the actions of 
the British government (thus, it is stated that the stabilisation unit draws ‘upon 
expertise from across government, the police and the military’ (19). The 
purpose of ‘lesson learning’, it is made clear, is to establish the basis for 
improved forms of co-operation and interaction between different government 
departments. 
By virtue of its emphasis upon expertise, stabilisation can be perceived, 
to some extent, as a technical exercise that involves the development, 
 164 
application and integration of a body of knowledge. However, it is characterised 
by clear political features and attributes. By virtue of the fact that it cannot be 
reduced to either political or technical dimensions, stabilisation can therefore be 
said to be a dichotomous form. In further reiterating this point, Security Sector 
Stabilisation refers to both political and technical reference points (2014, 10). 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the two are of equivalent 
importance; quite the contrary, the document’s allusion to the ‘primacy of the 
political process’ (2014, 12) establishes a clear hierarchical order of importance. 
Building Stability Overseas also furthers this impression when it proposes a 
fundamental break with technocratic assumptions and modes of engagement 
(16). 
From the outset, it is clear that the document is ultimately concerned with 
the development of a general knowledge, that is, an identification of a 
knowledge which can be applied across and over different contexts. In its initial 
phases, the document engages with the question of how optimal working 
relationships can be established between a range of institutional actors. This, 
then, is an essentially logistical knowledge, which is directed towards the 
effective arrangement, ordering and deployment of policy resources. This 
focuses the imperative of lesson learning, which could conceivably take any 
number of government activities as its reference point, upon inter-departmental 
relations and interactions. The question of how this appropriate ordering can be 
achieved is a principally bureaucratic or technical concern, and this is reflected 
within the terms of engagement. This generalising predisposition can be directly 
contrasted with the proposition of a distinctively local knowledge which, as a 
prior condition, is deeply rooted within the specificity of each individual context. 
The UK Approach to Stabilisation acknowledges this latter form of knowledge 
when it references the need to ‘analys[e] and respon[d] to changes in the 
political context’ (2014b, 2).  
In this section of the chapter I will take the interplay between the two 
forms of knowledge as my key point of reference. I will specifically ask how they 
are interrelated, intertwined and integrated. Building Stability Overseas engages 
with this question at two points. First, it asks how general ‘lessons’ can be 
integrated into general stabilisation strategies. In engaging with the proposition 
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of generally applicable ‘lessons’, it conceives of frameworks and templates 
which can be applied across different contexts.  
In the Introductory chapter I engaged with a knowledge that seeks to 
establish the basis for a generally applicable practice of conflict intervention – 
what Fukuyama has termed as a ‘transferable knowledge’. Building Stability 
Overseas directs our attention to this project when it references ‘conceptual 
foundations for engagement in fragile states’ and a prior ‘knowledge base’ (34). 
This is a form of knowledge which exists outside of, and prior to, engagement 
with the individual context. It presupposes a framework of reference that can be 
adapted and applied as a general practice. This form of knowledge can be 
clearly contrasted with local knowledge. Whereas transferable knowledge is 
inherently practical, local knowledge instead derives from an initial claim to be 
‘organic’, ‘authentic’ or rooted within the practices and culture of the individual 
society.  
Building Stability Overseas breaks down into two parts: the first part 
addresses the ways in which ‘lessons’ have been integrated into the stabilising 
strategy; in engaging at this point, it references lessons that have ‘been learned’ 
and directs the reader’s attention to ‘a growing body of international evidence of 
what works’ (4). The second part of the document is concerned with the 
question of how violent conflict should be practically engaged (22). Whereas the 
initial part of the document is concerned with abstract reference points, the 
second part is more concerned with securitising practices. The elements are 
interdependent. Building Stability Overseas works towards a practice which is 
rooted within an improved analysis of conflict (22, 24). Practice feeds into 
analysis, just as analysis feeds into practice.  
Building Stability Overseas initially considers the links between intra-
state conflict and international security. It observes that the indirect threats that 
derive from state collapse are an increasingly important concern for the field of 
security studies. In emphasising the fact that security threats no longer present 
themselves in an objective form, Security Sector Stabilisation has previously 
emphasised the need for a ‘politico-security understanding’ (2014, 12). In 
seeking to ground its practice within this form of knowledge, Building Stability 
Overseas seeks to establish the basis for an integrated framework of 
knowledge and practice. A ‘politico-security understanding’ therefore originates 
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and sustains a range of innovative practices. In initially establishing the 
foundation of this understanding, it suggests an analysis of the ‘drivers’ of 
conflict – these are the various factors which underpin and sustain violent 
conflict (10). As the discussion within the introductory chapter established in 
more detail, this concern with underpinning or underlying causes is intimately 
associated with the proposition of a broadened analysis of security. 
A ‘politico-security understanding’ suggests an approach which is able to 
engage at and across the various political dimensions of insecurity. In outlining 
this approach, Building Stability Overseas emphasises the importance of good 
governance frameworks. This in turn leads the document to stress the potential 
contribution of legitimate institutions, free markets and open and responsive 
systems of economic and political management. In engaging at each of these 
points, Building Stability Overseas demonstrates how various capacity-building 
initiatives can contribute to heightened levels of prevention and resilience. 
Prevention is enabled and sustained by a country strategy that ‘identifies short, 
medium and longer-term measures for stabilisation and prevention’ (24), and 
this ties in to a broader agenda that is concerned with the development of 
preventative capacities; resilience, in contrast, is presented as a responsive 
capacity – that is, as the ability to adjust, in a post hoc manner, to sudden or 
unexpected shocks (5). Both aspects – prevention and responsive capacity – 
appear as part of an integrated strategy that is directed towards the sequential 
phases of the conflict cycle.  
Institutions have a crucial contribution to make to the development and 
enhancement of this responsive capacity. Legitimate institutions enable 
stabilisation actors to adjust, in a flexible and adjustable way, to sudden shocks 
(2, 5). The importance of this theme is attested to by the fact that Building 
Stability Overseas references institutions thirty-three times. It is equally 
important to note that it is the objective characteristics of these institutions – 
their inclusivity, legitimacy and adaptability – which enables them to adjust to 
these challenges and ‘manag[e] tensions and shocks’ (2, 5).  
Although these institutions are understood to be grounded within the 
local context, they are reproduced through and within a general set of 
expectations: the agenda which surrounds capable, adaptive and responsive 
(CAR) institutions is a clear reference point in this respect. Although the 
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discussion is focused upon the importance and potential contribution of ‘local’ 
institutions, these reference points are recapitulated and reconfigured as a set 
of general expectations. The overarching theme of state functionality or 
capacity is a generally applicable – and therefore externalised – framework of 
reference which is essentially superimposed upon the individual context (the 
Literature Review chapter made a very similar observation with regard to the 
concept of ‘state failure’). 
The agenda of institutional capacity and functionality appears, to this 
extent, as an external framework of reference, which relates to, and which 
derives from, a set of generally applicable and standardised expectations. This 
feature is evidenced, for instance, when the discussion turns to the question of 
responsiveness (the importance of this agenda is reiterated by the fact that the 
document references accountability on twenty-four occasions and civil society 
engagement on twenty occasions). Here there is a clear impression that the 
establishment of certain relations will in turn produce and reinforce a range of 
functional effects; these, in turn, establish the basis for a clear template of 
reform.  
Upon reading Building Stability Overseas, the reader’s attention is 
continually brought back to a level of generality, that is, to a set of abstracted 
propositions which are divorced from the context to which they will be applied. 
The reader therefore repeatedly encounters stabilisation as a generalising 
knowledge, which can be adapted and applied across a range of different 
contexts. However, the feature of functionality frequently comes up against a 
more contextual knowledge and practice. Upon a closer reading, this can make 
the document appear internally contradictory – as if it is attempting to bring 
together two mutually opposed positions or, to put it slightly differently, 
‘reconcile irreconcilables’. 
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure 
Environments (2010) situates analysis within a generally applicable framework 
of reference when it refers to a ‘growing field of understanding’ (Stabilisation 
Unit 2010, 3). This ‘growing field’ will be sustained by the ‘development of 
systems to feed lessons back into policy, planning and practice’ (2010, 27). 
Knowledge and practice will be integrated in a way that reinforces and 
reproduces generally applicable policy frameworks. The detached vantage point 
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of policy actors will in turn enable them to extract, adapt and apply ‘stark 
lessons’ (Stabilisation Unit 2014, 3). 
This feature is evidenced, for instance, when the broad agenda of 
capacity and functionality comes up against the axiom which holds that external 
actors should resist the temptation to impose their own designs and templates 
(11). Clearly, it could be objected that this is precisely what frameworks 
premised upon ‘functionality’ and ‘capacity’ seek to do. The propositions that 
‘context is everything’ (34) and the associated commitment to ‘situation-specific 
interventions’ (24) present a similar impediment to the reconciliation of the text’s 
internal contradictions. A discourse of functionality and capacity repeatedly 
comes up against a discourse of context and specificity. The interaction 
between the two presents us with a continually reiterated tension or 
contradiction.  
Building Stability Overseas is, however, in comparison to other policy 
documents that have been engaged over the course of this document, more 
predisposed to explicitly acknowledge the importance and significance of 
external expertise (2). This represents something of a departure precisely 
because these documents had instead been more predisposed to understate, 
mitigate and even occlude externalised reference points. This feature is 
reproduced, for instance, within the proposition that capacity-building is an 
endogenous undertaking, which is driven and sustained by local actors. 
However even here, the exact contribution or significance of this external 
expertise is far from clear or transparent. To this extent, the stated commitment 
to ‘strengthen and develop effective conflict management and peacebuilding 
capacities within communities, countries and regions’ (26) does little to clarify in 
detail how external expertise will be integrated and reproduced through local 
political conditions. 
This is far from an isolated or singular occurrence. Within both the 
peacebuilding and stabilisation literature, we repeatedly encounter instances in 
which concepts such as ‘capacity-building’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘partnership’ 
are framed or presented in ways that are ambiguous or open to interpretation. 
These concepts do not present themselves in their immediacy, but only as the 
consequence of a more sustained reading which disentangles the nuances and 
subtleties of the conceptual reference point. This disentangling consciously and 
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deliberately situates its object of engagement within a broader set of relations 
and interactions. As one illustration, while capacity-building takes the agency of 
local actors as its point of engagement, it is invariably reproduced through, and 
sustained by, a wider field of knowledge and expertise.  
In my reading of Building Stability Overseas I encountered a perpetual 
oscillation between two forms of knowledge –a knowledge that applies across 
different contexts and a knowledge that applies within specific contexts. Upon a 
closer engagement with the text, the reader encounters something of a tension 
between the proposition that ‘context is everything’ and the range of 
universalising and rationalising reference points that are built into stabilisation 
texts. A critical reading does not therefore render a smooth and linear 
progression towards a ‘deepened’ democratic agency; rather, it presents an 
ongoing tension between the local and the external, the technical and the 
political and the general and specific.  
Conclusion  
In the initial stages of this chapter, I briefly summarised the central 
grounding assumptions of democratic deepening, and examined how it is 
closely intertwined with a form of democratic engagement which is more than a 
process; democratic deepening, in the terms that I established, is intimately tied 
into the proposition of a substantive framework of democratic reference. It is not 
only concerned with the democratic legitimacy of specific processes and 
procedures, but also the ends to which this democratic process is directed. I 
proposed to ask over the course of the chapter how this deepened form of 
democratic engagement is reproduced within a range of peacebuilding and 
stabilisation texts. In engaging with this question, I sought to explore the 
proposition of a democratic deepening at three separate points: governance, 
empowerment and the integration of local knowledge.  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics begins by outlining a 
‘political’ analysis of governance which is rooted with social processes and 
structures and which is directed towards informal reference points. In engaging 
at these points the document initially establishes an impression of a clear 
graduation beyond managerialism or technocracy. In defining its own terms of 
engagement in direct opposition to technical reference points, Governance, 
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Development and Democratic Politics furthers the impression that the technical 
and political are diametric opposites.  
However, this broad representation clearly contrasts with my analysis of 
governance. In my own reading, the document evidenced a tendency to 
reproduce technocratic, functionalist and managerial reference points. Rather 
than progressing in a unidirectional manner beyond technical and managerial 
reference points, the document more frequently (and most obviously with 
reference to the imperative of capable, accountable and responsive (CAR) 
states) evidenced a tendency to revert to these points. Under the aegis of neo-
liberal rationality, the document evidenced a tendency to regress to a 
functionalist discourse.  
Far from denying or negating democratic agency, the discourse of 
functionality expands to incorporate it into its own framework of reference. This 
is illustrated by the way in which Building the State engages and adapts the 
concept of empowerment. Just as Governance, Development and Democratic 
Politics is directed towards social reference points, Building the State also 
begins from the assumption that empowerment is rooted within social capacities 
and capabilities. In referring back to peacebuilding frameworks, it stresses the 
centrality and political significance of ‘social peace’ (9). Empowerment is not 
therefore presented as an abstract political concept, but is instead conceived to 
be rooted within social processes and dynamics. Precisely by virtue of this 
feature, empowerment will not present itself as a general practice, but will 
instead vary in accordance with social conditions.   
Building the State initially establishes empowerment as an open-ended 
concept, which is not predetermined in any sense. However, a closer reading 
suggests that the concept of ‘empowerment’ is considerably more hemmed in 
than these initial terms of reference had suggested. The interjection of a 
discourse of functionality serves to orientate the terms of discussion back 
towards a more circumscribed framework of reference; a similar effect was 
evidenced in my discussion of governance. This feature clearly recalls 
Richmond’s account of how the concept of ‘ownership’ becomes reformulated 
when it is conceived within the terms of liberal peace (2012, 356). 
My own analysis of empowerment similarly underscores the sense of 
limitation or constraint which is imposed by a discourse of functionality. 
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Whereas the idealised form of ‘empowerment’ and ‘social’ presents an open-
ended range of possibility, the textual products instead present a more 
circumscribed or predetermined framework of reference.  
Empowerment does not, contra the initial terms of reference, correspond 
to an absenting of external influence. It instead corresponds to its subtle 
reformulation and reconfiguration. This is shown by the way that empowerment 
is not conceived in isolation, but is theorised in its relation to, and implications 
for, formal institutions. Far from being open-ended, empowerment is instead 
reconstructed and rendered as a functional input. The principal proposition 
here, as Richmond has observed in his discussion of ownership, is not the 
absenting or mitigation of external influence; quite the contrary, it is instead 
‘participation and compliance within international regimes’ (2012, 360).  
Empowerment, in this understanding, is conceived within a very specific 
framework and directed towards the reproduction of an equally specific range of 
outputs. Under conditions of neo-liberal governance, empowerment is not 
predisposed to challenge or contest, but rather to optimise or enhance. A closer 
reading of Building the State renders an instance in which the ‘social’ no longer 
appears as a site of difference or alterity; rather, it presents itself as a 
standardised input which is guided and orientated towards the reproduction of a 
range of beneficial effects (e.g. heightened levels of transparency and 
accountability). In acknowledging the ways in which empowerment is 
reformulated and applied as a technique of government, it would, in direct 
contrast to the proposition of a spontaneous or self-directing local agency, be 
more exact and appropriate to speak of a mobilisation of local agency.  
This mobilised agency is directed towards the reproduction of a number 
of core neo-liberal tenets – heightened efficiency, responsiveness and 
functionality. Empowerment comes to function as a form of ‘bottom-up’ 
discipline which inculcates an ‘appropriate’ conduct of the state (DfID, 2009; 8). 
In both Building the State and Governance and Development and Democratic 
Politics, an emancipatory, participatory and transformative discourse becomes 
reconfigured as a functional input which impacts upon the statebuilding process 
(DfID 2010, 3). Empowerment therefore comes to function as a means through 
which a range of functional outputs – monitoring, facilitation and service 
provision – are reproduced.  
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In a similar manner to empowerment, local knowledge also comes to 
function as a means through which a whole range of externalised imperatives 
are consolidated and reproduced. Far from surmounting or going beyond formal 
or technical reference points, stabilisation discourse instead reconfigures and 
realigns both features into a set of novel and original formulations. The 
essential proposition is not therefore of a surmounting of formal and technical 
points of reference; rather, it is one of adaptation, in which democratic agency is 
‘made to function’. This functional discourse orientates social agents towards 
the reproduction of a very precise and exact set of governance outputs.   
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Chapter Five  
Contextuality and the State 
Introduction 
Contextuality is not an isolated development but can instead be said to 
be part of a broader paradigm shift, in which statebuilding actors have sought to 
incorporate increased variation and heterogeneity into their statebuilding 
strategies. Richmond and MacGinty speak of a ‘local turn’, which they define as 
a ‘dangerous and wild place where Western rationality, with its diktats of 
universality and modernisation, is challenged in various ways’ (2013, 763; also 
see Chandler 2013).  
In seriously engaging with the proposition of contextual engagement, 
statebuilding actors should not attempt to impose their own preferences and 
priorities. The ‘local turn’ logically implies a more inductive framework of 
engagement, in which context is articulated in the process of intervention. 
Whereas deepening was co-terminus with a shift towards a more substantive 
framework of democratisation, contextuality is synonymous with a shift from the 
external to the internal.  
Just as deepening appears as a response to deeply ingrained tensions 
and contradictions, contextuality can also be said to be an innovation that has 
occurred in response to the externalisation of peacebuilding paradigms and 
interventions. Bickerton, in previously acknowledging the limitations of the 
previous framework of engagement, disapprovingly observes statebuilding 
interventions that have ‘shallow roots in the societies [in which] they are being 
built’ (2007, 53; also see Chandler 2006; Hameiri 2010). Rubin, in offering a 
very similar critique, has suggested that ‘international actors often try to 
introduce ready-made solutions from outside, trying to impose a model of a 
liberal democratic state without regard for the specific social relations and 
institutional history of a nation or territory’ (2005, 104). Exteriority, a point of 
reference which was examined in detail in the Foucault chapter, is therefore the 
essential problem to which contextuality is addressed.  
In recognising the limitations of how an over-reliance upon external 
perspectives, resources and inputs has undermined previous interventions, 
statebuilding actors have increasingly sought to ground their interventions 
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within local context. Through engaging with local actors, processes and 
structures, peacebuilding actors will in turn be able to adjust their interventions 
to the needs and requirements of each individual context. A heightened 
understanding and acknowledgement of context will, upon the basis of this 
understanding, result in approaches and frameworks which are aligned with the 
specificities of individual societies and cultures. Hameiri speaks, in precisely 
these terms, of replacing ‘outside-in’ with ‘inside-out’ frameworks of reference 
(2010, 5).  
Doornbos (2002, 60) relates the required shift in mentality when he 
relates the need to ‘de-generalise’. Despite this, as Berger observes, there is 
still a persistent assumption that the ‘right’ set of policies can be implemented 
without reference to ‘the specificity of the local, regional and global context’ 
(2007, 21). Thus, while statebuilding actors broadly recognise the limitations of 
their conceptual and theoretical framework of reference, there is still a tendency 
to work within it. In short, statebuilding actors continue to give way to the 
seductive allure of generally applicable paradigms, theoretical frameworks and 
practices.  
At the same time, a range of institutional actors have come to 
acknowledge the centrality of social reference points within peacebuilding 
process. This is part of a broader reorientation. Richmond and MacGinty 
observe that, ‘[a]s the first decade of the twenty-first century progressed, the 
word ‘local’ became ubiquitous, suggesting that international organisations are 
aware of the legitimacy and sustainability advantages to be gained by 
cooperating with local partners’ (2013, 771). Previous OECD guidelines on 
conflict, peace and development co-operation observe that ‘a comprehensive 
and integrated knowledge of the need for state and civil society to work properly 
together is key to understanding the origins and dynamics of civil conflict’ (1997, 
Point 7). The same organisation further reiterates that the ‘strengthening of 
public institutions must be suited to the political, economic, social, cultural and 
historical context in which it is undertaken’ (1997; Point 179) and stresses that 
‘[t]here is a premium on understanding local contexts’ (1997b, 26). 
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The social, cultural and contextual have therefore emerged as part of a 
shared agenda which has percolated down to the national level, as embodied 
by DfID’s integration of context analysis into its conflict evaluation frameworks. 
Contextuality is part of an abrupt shift within statebuilding theory, in which the 
most pressing or predominant concern is no longer the empirical reproduction of 
general models, templates and frameworks, but rather the cultivation of 
specificity and endogenous capacities. Bickerton reiterates that sovereignty 
should not be understood as an abstract or formal category, observing that  
‘statebuilding cleaves institution-building from the life of the society in question’ 
(2007, 107). He clarifies that state formation is not the empirical realisation of 
the grand ambitions of policymakers and technocrats, but instead originates 
within the internal dynamics of each given society (here it will be noted that 
Bickerton has, in refracting the state through society, inverted the Weberian 
model of the state).  
Contextuality implies a readjustment which is as much conceptual, or 
theoretical, as purely practical. This is why Pouligny calls for ‘fundamental 
changes in the intelligence and communication capacities of outsiders, in order 
that they might better understand local contexts and, more particularly, identify 
the local actors likely to be the major motors for change’ (2005, 505). In 
practical terms this suggests a sustained engagement with ‘deep-rooted socio-
economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, political and other structural 
causes’ (UN 2001).  
This implies that heterogeneity and variation should, under ideal 
circumstances, be deeply rooted attributes of statebuilding interventions. If each 
context is unique, then it is clearly deeply flawed to revert to a universalising or 
standardising methodology (OECD 1997, Point 39). The agenda of contextual 
engagement is therefore diametrically opposed to ‘a functional and sometimes 
technocratic view of politics that seeks to “measure” the success of political 
processes in terms of pre-conceived institutional benchmarks’ (Hameiri 2010, 
11). Specificity, heterogeneity and variation anticipate a graduation beyond 
‘one-size-fits-all’ or ‘blueprint’ frameworks (DfID 2000, 13; DfID 2001, foreword; 
Doornbos 2002; DfID 2010, 23, 29; DfID 2010a, 1; DfID 2010b).  
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I have already noted that deepening and contextuality overlap at 
particular points. The ‘local turn’ is one illustration of this, simultaneously 
producing a heightened emphasis upon local agency and contextual 
determinants. For Oliver Richmond, context can be said to imply ‘difference and 
autonomy rather than homogeneity, universalism and dependence’ (Richmond 
2011, 45). Ethnocentric and cultural biases had previously predisposed liberal 
peacebuilders to view difference or heterogeneity as deviation from a 
prescribed framework.  
Richmond, in seeking a suitable corrective, insists upon an analysis that 
disposes with templates and the persistent obsession with making the actual 
correspond to the ideal. For Richmond, ‘deviation’ should be understood as ‘the 
renegotiation of the Liberal Peace to reflect key political, economic, social and 
cultural dynamics in their local context’ (2009, 72). Lemay-Hebert makes much 
the same point, but with reference to a different vernacular. He suggests a 
‘legitimacy’ approach to statebuilding which is grounded within ‘local’ needs and 
which is consequently ‘more sociologically or anthropologically orientated’ 
(2009, 28).  
Contextual engagement begins with an awareness of the essential 
inadequacy of the Weberian state (see Herbst (1996), Ehrenreich Brooks 
(2005) and Englebert and Tull (2008)). Milliken and Krause (2002, 762), in 
expanding this point, have highlighted the contradictions and tensions which 
result when ‘reified’ statebuilding models are transferred and imposed upon 
individual contexts. Far from acting as an ameliorative, this imposition instead  
 originate its own set of contradictions.  
Hameiri has previously suggested that, in spite of their best intentions, 
technocrats invariably fail to engage with the full significance of the ‘social’. He 
observes: ‘Technocratic rule does not see its source of legitimacy as coming 
from the society that it governs but from outside these states in international 
organisations and foreign governments’ (2010, 22). For Hameiri, exteriority is 
not an unfortunate consequence which can be resolved through suitable 
innovations within statebuilding approaches; on the contrary, it is instead a 
deeply rooted, or intrinsic, attribute. David Chandler’s Empire in Denial further 
develops this point. He stresses that so-called ‘phantom states’ are the logical 
culmination of a statebuilding practice that is more accountable to external 
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donors than to subject populations (2006). Given that there is a ‘prevailing 
tendency to conceive of these operations as technical (or non-ideological) 
exercises in conflict management’ (Paris 2002, 638), it is clearly open to 
question whether the political or social can be engaged in its full significance.  
In this chapter I will suggest that contextuality confronts, but ultimately 
fails to overcome, this essential tension. In the analysis I present, contextuality 
originates two imperatives: 1) the conscious and deliberate limitation of external 
influence, as embodied when Building the State and Securing the Peace argues 
that ‘[d]onors do not ‘do’ statebuilding or peacebuilding’ (2005, 3); 2) the 
sustained engagement and incorporation of local specificity. Both points of 
emphasis serve as a reiteration of variation, heterogeneity and open-endedness 
(Hameiri 2010, 34). 
However, each of these operational imperatives frequently comes up 
against the limitations that have been imposed by the parameters of liberal 
peace, and this is why Fritz and Menocal (2007) observe that there are ‘major 
constraints to the articulation of alternatives [to the liberal peace]’. These 
‘constraints’ adhere at the discursive, theoretical and practical level. In the view 
of Fritz and Menocal, they are the derivative of a ‘clear international steer in 
favour of market-friendly economic reforms [which limits the range of] 
acceptable economic and social policies state leaders may be able to pursue’ 
(39; also see Chandler 2006). 
From our perspective, this raises an immediate question – namely, how 
does contextuality overcome the various limitations that have been imposed by 
the parameters of liberal peace? For practitioners of the liberal peace, this 
question presumably does not arise. Liberal ideology makes it quite clear that 
liberalism does not seek to impose itself upon its objects of engagement; quite 
the contrary, the advancement of reason and rationality instead represents the 
concrete realisation of an inherent potentiality.  
Critical contributions to the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature 
challenge this benign representation by bringing out the disciplinary or 
regulatory implications of liberal governance. Richmond, for example, has 
spoken of how contextual engagement has become reconfigured as a 
‘governmental technology’ that enables external actors to exert control from a 
distance (2011, 28). Far from enabling or empowering an inherent and 
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previously latent potentiality, liberalism instead presents itself as an artificial 
imposition from without. Other writers have made a similarly important 
contribution by drawing attention to the rigidities, inflexibilities and extremities of 
neo-liberalism (Pouligny 2005, 505; Barkawi and Laffey 1999).  
In engaging with the conflicted character of neo-liberal governance, 
Richmond (2011, 38) and Newman (2009, 47-51) have demonstrated how 
context can qualify or mitigate external distortions. It will be noted that both 
problem-solving and critical contributions have addressed themselves to this  
 problematic of context – that is, to the question of how it can be engaged, 
developed and applied in the course of peacebuilding interventions. Both sets 
of contributions originate within a prior assumption that the internal and external 
can be distinguished and diametrically opposed (see Berger 2006, 14). The 
internal is to be counterpoised to the external, the specific to the general and 
the domestic to the international. 
Building Peaceful States and Societies invokes these binary distinctions 
when it stresses the centrality of internal state–societal relations (DfID 2010, 7) 
and reiterates the essential limitations of external influence (ibid, 11). Edward 
Newman, in referencing peacebuilding frameworks, implicitly invokes the 
internal-external divide when he distinguishes between ‘top-down’ (external) 
and ‘bottom-up’ (internal) approaches (2009, 37). This clear distinction provides 
the basis upon which external power can be delimited and internal capacities 
can be accentuated.  
This strict demarcation of an internal and external line establishes a 
dividing line beyond which external actors should not venture. As David 
Chandler has observed, ‘[t]he politics of the local operates in the informal and 
societal sphere, out of the reach or vision of Western policy-makers and linear 
social theorists’ (Chandler 2013, 27). This clearly establishes that external 
actors should not seek to predetermine, but should instead only assist, enable 
or supplement (Yannis 2003, 77). This influence is not determining; rather, it 
instead enables an internal attribute to be more completely expressed. This is 
the essential rationale which underpins so-called ‘technologies of the self’, such 
as empowerment, ownership and participation. This is a power which acts at the 
edges, but which does not venture into the sanctified realm. 
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Upon the basis of this account, we can therefore infer that the ‘politics of 
the local’ is co-terminus with defined boundaries and constraints. The internal 
and the external appear in sanctified isolation, distinguished in binary 
opposition. This establishes a clear point of engagement for a critical analysis, 
which should directly address itself to the basis of this distinction. In this 
respect, Oliver Richmond’s work on hybridity, which seeks to arrive at more 
nuanced and sophisticated understanding of internal-external relations, is an 
important reference point. Vivienne Jabri, in offering a succinct summary of this 
branch of the peacebuilding literature, observes that it is premised upon an 
explicit rejection of the ‘dichotomous representation of agency’ (2013, 5).  
Other contributions to the statebuilding literature bring out this dimension 
of hybridity in more detail. Hameiri, for example, has previously observed that ‘it 
is the simultaneously internal-external nature of statebuilding interventions that 
gives these interventions their unique “multilevel” character’ (2010, 210). 
Contributions to the social structural and post-colonial literature further clarify 
that, rather than being in opposition to external influence, ‘context’ is instead 
actually a dimension of it (Berger 2007; de Guevara 2010; Schlichte and Migdal 
2005). 
In this chapter I build upon this insight by similarly seeking to ‘blur’ the 
distinction between the internal and external dimensions of statebuilding. In my 
view, this ‘blurring’ of the internal-external divide will enable us to question and 
problematise articles of faith that are deeply rooted within liberal peacebuilding. 
In examining the nature of internal-external interactions, I intend to show how 
context is interpolated within practices of liberal governance and forms of 
government that, to borrow Richmond’s term, operate from a distance (2011, 
28). Richmond’s critical appraisal of previous civil society engagements is 
instructive in this respect. His analysis demonstrates how local or internal actors 
are brought into the orbit of external governance, with the internal and external 
becoming intertwined as a consequence.   
My analysis is also directed towards the question of how contextuality 
overcomes the tension between the internal and external. In the self-
understanding of liberal peacebuilding, a more sustained engagement with 
context enables this tension to be engaged and ‘reconciled’. In drawing upon 
this reserve of optimism, Building Peaceful States and Societies observes that 
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‘there can be tensions between statebuilding and peacebuilding that can be 
worked through’ (DfID 2010, 18).  
I work from the assumption that contextualisation heralds an abrupt 
break with universalisation and rationalisation. I therefore propose to engage 
context as an open question, seeking to identify precisely how it is reproduced 
within core policy texts. I will seek to identify how peacebuilding discourse 
reconciles three separate tensions. These are the tensions between the internal 
and external (Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States), the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous (Building Peaceful States and Societies) and 
the general and specific (States in Development). After engaging at each point, 
I will attempt to evaluate to what extent the texts successfully overcome or 
‘reconcile’ each tension.  
Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States 
Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States (subsequently Why 
We Need to Work More Effectively) was published by DfID in 2007. It is 
predominantly concerned with the specific needs and requirements of fragile 
and conflict-affected states (FCAS) and the development of a conceptual, 
theoretical and practical framework which will enable external actors to adjust to 
the condition of state fragility. In engaging with the theme of state fragility it 
seeks to understand how deteriorations in state capacity negatively impact the 
general development process. Although it engages within a political framework, 
the document frequently reverts back to technical reference points. This feature 
becomes particularly pronounced when it turns its attention to institutional 
capacity, state responsiveness and macroeconomic governance. 
Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States is not of much 
assistance in helping to identify broader texts: it references only a single DfID 
text – Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty, a working 
paper which was drafted by Magüi Moreno Torres and Michael Anderson, 
members of DfID’s Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team. I will 
instead use this working paper to identify other textual sources. Torres’s and 
Anderson’s contribution references Making Government Work for Poor People 
(2001) and Better Government for Poverty Reduction: More Effective 
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Partnerships for Change (2003). Both texts will be used to elaborate themes 
from Why We Need to Work More Effectively in more depth and detail. 
The document is situated within a lesson-learning framework which 
seeks to draw upon ‘development expertise’ (26): ‘evidence shows what does – 
and what does not – work’ (5, 14). It prioritises poverty alleviation, and 
demonstrates how focused aid interventions can help to alleviate and even 
overcome ‘chronic state weakness’ (5). It is not merely concerned with the ways 
in which state fragility negatively impacts development, it also reverses this 
question to ask how developments interventions can be effectively addressed to 
the condition of state fragility. 
The initial discussion focuses upon the attributes that correspond to this 
general category of ‘fragility’. It outlines a typology of state fragility, with specific 
reference to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), before then 
considering the policy implications of state fragility. In reflecting upon state 
fragility, the document observes that it necessitates a considerable level of 
external support and assistance. It is therefore clear that ‘many of the [solutions] 
to fragility lie beyond the boundaries of a country’ (5, 16). This provides a clear 
contrast to contextuality, which had previously been more predisposed to  
emphasise internal capacities.  
In engaging with the theme of capacity building (the word ‘capacity’ is 
used twenty-eight times within the document), the document engages with both 
internal and external dimensions of statebuilding. Why We Need to Work More 
Effectively broadly converges upon three key themes. The first pertains to the 
link between poverty alleviation and politics, the second to institutional 
development and the third – and final – theme to governance-related themes. 
All three themes touch upon important aspects of contextuality, which include, 
the relationship between internal and external actors, the relation of formal and 
informal institutions and the interaction of ‘technical’ and ‘political’ rationalities.  
The document’s engagement with poverty alleviation relates to both 
‘government’ and ‘governance’. The shift within the policy literature towards the 
latter reflects a clear understanding that international actors should be less 
concerned with the objective appearance or form of the state and more 
concerned with its practical capabilities; this explains how ‘governance’ 
becomes linked into discussions of ‘capacity’ and ‘capacity-building’. The word 
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‘governance’ also heralds a shift towards dispersed and networks, which are 
defined in terms of their functional contribute as opposed to their objective 
attributes.  
The concept of governance also combines political and technical 
attributes. Why We Need to Work More Effectively acknowledges the centrality 
of politics when it refers to the ‘growing recognition of the need to understand 
the political incentives and the institutions that affect the prospects for reform’ 
(14).  
A further contribution from Torres and Anderson (2004) is particularly 
helpful as it helps to further define and clarify some of the central features and 
attributes of ‘governance’, a term which is, even at the best of times, somewhat 
nebulous and indistinct. They link governance into the literature on state failure 
(Helman and Ratner 1992-1993; Zartman 1995), state–societal relations 
(Engelbert 2000; Midgal 1988) and development (OECD 1996; World Bank 
1997). Themes such as the relationship between the state and development, 
the framework of fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), capacity-building in 
both political and technical terms, partnerships and poverty alleviation also 
reoccur as ongoing preoccupations.  
In taking social processes and interactions as their reference point, 
Torres and Anderson offer an ‘inside-out’ approach to fragility and development. 
In situating their analysis at the internal level, they begin with a rejection of the 
Weberian state. This emphasis is indicated by the fact that they do not equate 
‘state strength’ with objective institutions or the state’s ability to exert power 
over a given population or territory. Rather, they suggest, state strength derives 
from its ability to perform particular functions – that is, its ability to ensure ‘the 
effective delivery of basic public goods, including security, social coherence and 
the ability to raise and spend revenue’ (2004, 13).  
In addition to this emphasis upon the state’s output functions, the authors 
also examine the state’s ability to integrate into societal structures, achieving 
heightened levels of accountability, transparency and responsiveness in the 
process. As a starting point, we might therefore distinguish between the 
functional and relational determinants of state strength. The latter, it should be 
noted can be subdivided into its internal (state-societal relations, rule of law, 
civil-military) and external (interactions with international agents) dimensions. 
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The latter, which Torres and Anderson invoke when they refer to the ‘relational 
aspects of partnership’ (2004, 11), is of particular importance in post-conflict 
settings.  
Why We Need to Work More Effectively explains how the internal-
external divide maps onto a political-technical counterpart. It recognises that 
whereas the former is concerned with internal structures, processes and 
relations, the latter is instead characterised by a generalising or standardising 
tenor. By rooting their analysis within the local context, Torres and Anderson 
decisively – in a way that clearly recalls Doornbos’s earlier advice to ‘de-
generalise’ – break with this predisposition to generalise across different 
contexts. They accordingly observe that ‘there is no single model for how we 
should work better in fragile states’ (2004, 14).  
In opposing itself to a ‘narrow’ or sectoral analysis, Why We Need to 
Work Effectively insists upon a more sustained engagement with wider political 
processes. With a view to this end, it adapts DfID’s Drivers of Conflict 
framework to demonstrate that poverty, underdevelopment and conflict can only 
be addressed through an ‘integrated’ approach that addresses key 
interrelations and interactions. The document therefore aspires to understand  
 poverty, state fragility and conflict as linked and overlapping processes (8). It 
does not attempt to simplify, but instead insists upon engaging its objects in 
their full complexity.  
The document observes that poverty alleviation is the primary 
responsibility of the domestic state (16, 26) and suggests that the domestic 
state provides the policy context within which development occurs. In further 
underlining the centrality of the state, a separate DfID document expresses a 
close concern with the ‘quality of government’ (DfID 2001, 9). It will be noted 
that the word ‘quality’ is of particular significance because it suggests that the 
domestic state is to be measured against externally derived standards.  
 It is equally noticeable that each of these contributions fixates upon the 
domestic state. Why We Need to Work More Effectively, in developing the 
concept of partnership, therefore introduces a whole new order of political 
analysis, noticeably diverging from the preceding preoccupation with societal 
reference points. The agenda of state functionality is forcibly reiterated when 
the document explicitly asks ‘what kind of state functioning is required to be 
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effective in achieving the Millennium Development Goals’ (2004, 9). In 
continuing to emphasise formal reference points, the document invokes  
‘development effectiveness’ (2004, 3, 9, 12, 13) while highlighting the  
‘minimal standards’ (2004, 5) that should be expected of responsible partners. 
Here it is quite transparent that it is the partner state, as opposed to the 
domestic society, that is to be the main focus of political engagement.  
In Why We Need to Work More Effectively, all three of the conditions of 
stability that Why We Need to Work More Effectively outlines (regulation of 
participation in government, accountability mechanisms and the autonomy of 
state institutions) are defined in relation to the actions or inactions of domestic 
governments (15). Improved service provision, for instance, is referenced on 
eight separate occasions. In this regard it is significant that the document 
effectively equates state ownership of the policy agenda with contextual 
engagement. This explains why, in another instance, DfID expresses concern 
with the ‘level of genuine autonomy that countries have over their own policies’ 
(DfID 2003, 18; DfID 2001, 10).  
In the initial discussion of contextuality, contextual engagement took on a 
much wider scope and significance. A range of reference points beyond the 
state – the informal, social and cultural – were therefore engaged in more depth 
and detail. In focusing in upon state functionality, Why We Need to Work More 
Effectively instead offers a much more constrained analysis that is closed in on 
the domestic state’s governance capacities. The terms of reference enfold in 
upon imperatives of accountability, transparency and responsiveness.  
Although policy interventions are undertaken at the domestic level, they 
ultimately derive from external sources. The participation of local populations is 
essentially subsequent, occurring after key stipulations have been put in place.  
The same can be said of context, which only becomes an active consideration 
when the terms of discussion turn to the question of how implementation can be 
effectively achieved. Richmond has openly questioned whether this form of 
engagement can be legitimately bracketed under the heading of ‘local 
ownership’ (2012, 355). Jabri similarly observes that: ‘The locals, as such, may 
well be involved, and their involvement may well be indispensable, but are they 
the authors of the script? The script, as we have seen, derives from elsewhere’ 
(2013, 11). 
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This governance framework is not endogenous; rather, it is instead  
 adjusted to context. By virtue of this post hoc incorporation, context cannot be 
sustainably conceived as the foundation of engagement. It would be more 
accurate to observe that it is subsequently incorporated into a prior framework 
of reference. This closely resembles Bickerton’s criticism of established 
statebuilding practices, in which ‘domestic’ states are not founded ‘as self-
standing structures, but as nodes integrated into the international system of 
governance’ (2007, 107). David Chandler’s Empire in Denial (2006) had 
similarly depicted instances in which ‘national’ representatives were more 
accountable to external technocrats and policy-makers than to their own 
electorate.  
In other instances, ‘context’ is primarily conceived as a mechanism  
which will enable more effective policy interventions, being conceived as the 
precursor to enhanced levels of efficiency. Why We Need to Work More 
Effectively therefore asserts that ‘the contribution of the international 
development community could be more effective if it [took] more account of the 
local social and political context’ (9). It is equally striking that ‘contextual’ 
engagement is approached, in this instance, from an external perspective. A 
perspective which is, it should be recognised, diametrically opposed to the core 
tenets of an ‘inside-out’ approach to statebuilding.  
While many of the objects of the discussion are ostensibly political, there 
is a clear tendency for them to become refracted through a technical lens. The 
OECD Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation speak, in 
this sense, of ‘fostering popular participation in the governance agenda’ (1997, 
Point 123). A separate OECD publication suggests that development should be 
viewed as a mechanism that will ‘expand participation in the process of 
globalisation’ (1997b, 14). Here it will be noted that participation is not 
conceived as a self-contained activity but that it is instead situated within a 
broader framework of reference.  
Through being assimilated into this framework, essentially political 
processes take on a functional or instrumental appearance. In Why We Need to 
Work More Effectively, this feature is perhaps most clearly illustrated when the 
discussion converges on the theme of state functionality, that is, the ways in 
which state institutions can be made to function more effectively, provide ‘public 
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goods’ and meet social expectations. Here it will be noted how far we have 
travelled from the initial themes. In this depiction, the attention of social actors is 
not focused upon pervasive injustices and inequalities; rather, they instead 
reach out to optimised public service provision and the benevolent wisdom and 
foresight of ‘good governance’ frameworks.  
The tightening of the conceptual boundaries is similarly noticeable; 
previously signifiers such as ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ may have been 
left open, with a view to being filled by societal specificity; however, now they 
have instead enclosed in on very precise meanings, the terms of which have 
been ordained by the strictures of good governance. Similarly, local agency is 
not left to its own devices but is instead directed towards precise ends and 
imperatives, being guided and orientated by the imperatives of heightened 
efficiency and productivity. The emphasis is at all points functional, being 
directed towards the capacities that the domestic state must develop and apply. 
Why We Need to Work Effectively therefore evidences an abiding concern with 
the state’s ability to provide ‘public goods’ and meet public demands and 
expectations. Why We Need to Work More Effectively therefore asserts that 
‘DfID’s working definition of fragile states covers instances where the 
government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, 
including the poor’ (7). The objective form of the state is not explicitly set out but 
is instead implied, and in many respects anticipated, by the clear articulation of 
these functions.  
Why We Need to Work More Effectively is concerned with an appropriate 
conduct of the state, setting out the parameters which instil an ‘appropriate’ and 
‘proportionate’ governmentality. The principles of efficiency of functionality act 
as structuring influences, implicitly setting out the field of permissible action, 
foregrounding the extent and scope of state intervention. While DfID documents 
take care to distance themselves from models or templates, it is quite clear that 
this is ultimately what is on offer. Torres and Anderson are more candid in this 
respect when they refer to a ‘constriction around’ a ‘dominant set of policy 
aspirations’ (2004, 10). These ‘policy aspirations’ bring devotees to worship 
before the holy trinity of efficiency, productivity and utility. The faithful converge 
upon these articles of faith, being sustained by the insight that, in the absence 
of ‘state authority, regulation and service delivery, the aspirations of economic 
 187 
growth and improved human development are elusive’ (Torres and Anderson 
2004, 10).  
‘Dominant set of policy aspirations’ is therefore shorthand for an agenda 
of neo-liberal reform. This is made clear both by the fixation upon specific  
 policy interventions (DfID 2003, 1) and by an equally obvious orientation 
towards ‘macroeconomic stability, growth, good governance and social 
inclusion’ (DfID 2003, 1). The respective documents anticipate the enactment of 
‘sound policies’ (18) which are founded within an ‘almost universal consensus’ 
(DfID 2001, 11, 15). This consensus reminds us that ‘a state which applies rules 
and policies predictably and fairly, ensures order and the rule of law and 
protects property will generate confidence and attract more domestic and 
foreign investment’ (11). The prescriptiveness of this neo-liberal agenda is 
further unravelled when ‘accountability, the rule of law, strengthened institutions 
and competent macroeconomic management’ (DfID 2001, 11) are consecrated 
and elevated as unquestionable articles of faith. The exactness and 
prescriptiveness of this reform that Why We Need to Work Effectively renders 
can be clearly contrasted with the open-endedness that we encountered in our 
earlier discussion of contextuality.  
This does not cancel or annul the possibility that this agenda will be negotiated 
in practice (indeed the hybridity branch of the literature reminds us that this will 
be, in all likelihood, the ultimate outcome). Nonetheless, it does serve to remind 
us of the persistence and continual reassertion of a managerial project of 
technical of reform. We are reminded of this, for instance, when reference is 
made to the ‘core functions’ of the domestic state; the same can be said of the 
repeated reiteration of accountability, transparency and responsiveness. 
 The concept of ‘good governance’ retains an extraordinary grip upon the 
imagination of statebuilding actors, further reiterating the more general truth that 
knowledge functions as an attribute of power. This knowledge establishes the 
parameters within which this self is produced; it sketches its limitations, 
boundaries and conditions of possibility. This distinctive power/knowledge 
nexus is exerted indirectly, being sustained through a formidable architecture 
that is directed towards the wholesale transformation of state and society. The 
blurring of the internal and external is an essential prelude in this respect, 
anticipating a range of interventions that integrate the domestic context into 
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wider structures of mediation and oversight. Hameiri acknowledges when he 
refers to interventions that ‘seek to facilitate the transnationalisation of the state, 
so that transnational actors become part of its internal governance’ (2010, 96). 
 It is essential to reiterate that the autonomy of domestic actors is not 
cancelled or annulled; rather, this freedom is to be actively cultivated, opening 
up new space into which external influence can reach, inculcating ‘appropriate’ 
and ‘proportionate’ conduct. This aligns perfectly with Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality and Hameiri’s allusion to ‘forms of political rule’ that are 
produced within the interaction between the internal and external (2010, 3) 
Why We Need to Work More Effectively sets out how to demonstrate 
how the state should function, how it should engage with other social actors and 
how it should provide capable, accountable and responsive forms of 
governance. The internal and external components of a state governmentality 
are set out in extensive detail, anticipating heightened levels of economic and 
political efficacy.  
This deployment of governmental technologies serves to remind us that 
the liberal self is not autonomous; on the contrary, it is instead produced 
through and within external mediation. It is not the absenting of external 
influence but rather its refinement and reconfiguration that enables the self to 
assume form. Civil society and private sector engagement are not conduits that 
enable a previously suppressed self to emerge; rather, they instead actively 
sketch the outlines of this self, assuming disciplinary connotations in the 
process (2004, 13). At this point we are reminded of Richmond’s withering 
dismissal of civil society engagement (‘an engineered artifice that floats above 
and substitutes for the ‘local’ and for context’ (2011, 28)). 
In my discussion of Why We Need to Work More Effectively I have 
sought that the liberal self does not, contra liberal ideology, emerge in the 
space left by the absenting of external control. The ultimate intent is not the 
establishment of a level of governance that is ‘outside of external or Western 
influence’ (Chandler 2013, 26). Quite the contrary – this self is itself the product 
of technologies of the self which function in subtle and sometimes insidious 
ways, setting out the parameters of selfhood. This brings to mind, with a 
peculiar force and intensity, Vivienne Jabri’s observation that ‘the international, 
its institutions and normative structuration, weighs heavily on the local’ (2013, 
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9). It similarly recalls Thania Paffenholz’s strong opposition to the ‘construction 
of the local and the international as binary opposites’ (2015, 858). This echoes 
David Chandler’s previous observation that: ‘[r]ather than being a barrier to 
external interference, sovereignty becomes a medium through which non-
Western states and societies become integrated into networks of external 
regulation’ (2006, 37). This is a clear inversion of the terms in which we have 
conventionally theorised sovereignty: far from functioning as the point of denial 
or limitation, the internal instead functions as the condition of possibility for a 
whole host of disciplinary and regulatory interventions.  
Building Peaceful States and Societies 
Building Peaceful States and Societies is a practice paper which was 
published in 2010. It explicitly outlines an integrated approach to conflict 
intervention and state fragility. It seeks to illustrate how a heightened emphasis 
upon state–societal relations can contribute to the concrete realisation of the 
Millennium Development Goals. In engaging at this point, it seeks to 
demonstrate how statebuilding and peacebuilding – both of which are 
presented as internalised frameworks (DfID 2010, 7) – can be more completely 
integrated and aligned. It develops within the Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
States (FCAS) framework, which means it attempts to integrate an analysis of 
violent conflict into conventional development paradigms. It develops in three 
stages: firstly, it defines core concepts such as peacebuilding, statebuilding and 
state–societal relations; secondly, it establishes the essential features of an 
integrated approach; and finally, it engages the operational implications that 
stem from this integrated approach. Building Peaceful States and Societies 
establishes from the outset that it is not concerned with developing a 
technocratic framework of reference. It emphasises the fundamentally political 
character of contemporary peacebuilding, highlights the importance of a 
contextual analysis (it references ‘context’ on thirty-four occasions) and 
engages at the ‘interface’ between state and society.  
In my discussion of Building Peaceful States and Societies I will 
specifically engage with the themes of homogeneity and heterogeneity. In 
engaging at both points, I will explore the full range of discursive possibilities 
that are presented within this text. I will work upon the basis of the assumption 
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that heterogeneity relates to the level of predetermination that is evidenced 
within the text. In reading Why We Need to Work More Effectively, I noted a 
clear distinction between contextuality, which is essentially an open-ended and 
inductive, and a more precise or enclosed framework of neo-liberal governance.  
In comparing both frameworks, I sought to demonstrate how context did not 
provide an underlying basis or foundation, but was instead incorporated, in a 
largely post hoc manner, into an effectively pre-established agenda of reform. 
This in turn had important implications for the range of discursive possibilities 
that could be envisaged and enacted. 
In appealing to a ‘peacebuilding discourse’ that takes social needs and 
requirements as its core objects of engagement, Building Peaceful States and 
Societies suggests that external actors should play a supportive or facilitative 
role. This form of external influence does not predetermine, but rather cultivates 
or enables.  It does not impose limitations and is accordingly aligned with the 
core insight that peacebuilding and statebuilding are internal processes (7); it 
begins with internal reference points and endogenous developments, insisting 
that ‘[democratic reform] will have the greatest impact where international 
efforts are in line with internal drivers for reform’ (27). 
Building Peaceful States and Societies, in furthering the impression that 
discursive terms of reference remain open, asserts that international actors 
should help domestic governments to ‘analyse macroeconomic policy options’ 
(31). The word ‘options’ suggests a field of possible alternatives, along with the 
ability to choose between them. This, of course, overlooks the essential point 
that it is a fundamental illusion to speak of ‘options’ when the terms of reference 
have been, to all intents and purposes, foreclosed. Under these circumstances 
it would perhaps be more accurate to speak of variation within predetermined 
limits.  
 In acknowledging this feature, Barnes has spoken of a ‘discourse of 
functionality’ that is linked into ‘effective political processes’, ‘input legitimacy’ 
and ‘output legitimacy’ (2009, 3, 11). She clearly appreciates the significance of 
this constriction observing that, while statebuilding is a predominantly 
‘endogenous’ process, it is ‘rooted within a wider system of influence’ (Barnes 
2009, 11). In further drawing out the essential implication, Barnes highlights 
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‘subtle influences’ which attempt to ‘find ways to constructively enable rather 
than undermine/override authentic local initiatives’ (2009, 16).  
External actors are therefore confronted by a clear challenge; namely, 
how to lend external assistance ‘without overriding the very forces that might 
enable [a] transformation’ (Barnes 2009, 26). Barnes successfully captures one 
of the central features of context, clearly illustrating that it is not produced in 
opposition to external influence, but instead emerges through and within a  
 ‘wider system of influence’.  
Barnes observes that external influence can be channelled in various 
ways and accordingly speaks of ‘facilitating’, ‘fostering’ and ‘reframing’. The 
subtle dimensions of this power are clearly presented when Barnes refers to 
‘effective participation’ (6, 28). This term conflates internal and external 
reference points, simultaneously relating to both domestic agency and an 
external standard against which it can be judged and evaluated. Further 
clarification is provided when Barnes refers to ‘participation in policy processes’ 
(6). This term is significant because it brings together political and technical 
rationalities, thus inverting binary opposition while inaugurating a complex and 
novel formulation. Technical points are further invoked within allusions to  
 ‘core’ technical priorities (7, 33), ‘appropriate’ macroeconomic practices and the 
assertion that it is ‘essential for governments to implement policies that address 
fiscal and trade deficits and debt arrears [and] stabilise inflation’ (31). 
A further innovation is evidenced when the document equates the 
domestic government’s ownership of the policy agenda with contextual 
engagement per se. This is significant because, even in instances where the 
terms of reference initially stretch beyond the state, there is a deeply ingrained 
predisposition to revert back to this reference point (see Why We Need to Work 
More Effectively and Building Peaceful States and Societies). Even when 
exploring the limitless possibilities of social engagement, the document still 
evidences a clear tendency to revert back to state rationalities and structures 
(DfID 2005b; DfID 2010b).  
A closer reading of Building Peaceful States and Societies reveals the 
centrality of good governance frameworks, which essentially foreclose many of 
the possibilities of statebuilding. This introduces a clear internal contradiction – 
after all, statebuilding is ostensibly grounded within the insight that ‘the people 
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of conflict-affected societies [must] ultimately own the process of political 
change if it is to be responsive to their needs’ (Barnes 2009, 25). A closer 
reading of the document reveals the centrality of state rationality, clearly 
establishing that ‘ownership’ is to be conceived with reference to the degree of 
state influence and input.  
Under certain circumstances, this ownership can give rise to variation, 
but only within clear limitations and constraints. Richmond perhaps had this 
mind when he sceptically appraised forms of ownership that do not significantly 
allow for ‘difference or alterity’ (2012, 358). Again, it is reiterated that bottom-up 
engagement occurs within a specific context and that this context is, in many 
instances, determining (46). It is of course fundamentally flawed to speak as 
though participation and ownership can be conceived in opposition to 
preponderant power relations when they are constituted through and within 
them. Barnes’s previous allusions to ‘effective participation’ and ‘participation 
within policy processes’ (2009, 6) perfectly exemplify this point. For critical 
observers, the essential objective is to establish the precise meaning and 
significance of ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’. In many instances, it is the gaps 
between the different articulations (e.g. between a managerial and 
transformative ‘participation’) that are more telling than the invocation itself.  
It is in the interaction between the internal and the external levels of 
governance that these terms assume their precise meaning and significance. 
Technologies of the self (empowerment, participation, ownership) are situated 
at the gap between the two levels, subtly circulating and reproducing external 
influence. Why We Need to Work More Effectively makes this interrelation clear 
when it asserts that external actors should function as ‘catalysts for change’ at 
the domestic level (DfID 2005, 11). This invocation of a catalyst is important 
because it underlines that these processes are already in motion at the 
domestic level, being subtly incorporated into wider governance structures and 
processes. This distinctive governmentality does not act upon, but rather 
through and within, local actors.  
This feature is brought to the fore when Building Peaceful States and 
Societies relates how external actors exert influence through ‘non-state and 
informal institutions’ (7). Rather than functioning as a site of alterity, the 
‘informal’ and ‘social’ comes to function as a node of governance, circulating 
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and reproducing systemic imperatives. In clarifying this point, Building Peaceful 
States and Societies observes that informal institutions ‘provide a bridge 
between state and society’ (9) and contribute to a ‘deepened’ form of 
democracy which ‘promote[s] inclusive decision-making and accountability’ (44). 
The sustained engagement and incorporation of informal actors ultimately 
reproduces and reinforces the familiar outlines of state functionality.  
In the last analysis, the documents can be seen to converge upon a 
relatively standardised or homogenised framework. Social structures and local 
agency are incorporated into governance networks (9, 22, 45) while state-
societal interactions reinforce and further consolidate state authority; further 
functional benefits invariably arise as a consequence of this happy political 
settlement (DfID 2010b, 6). Upon reading through this representation, the 
reader is confronted by the sense that this a rationalised politics, made to 
correspond to clear lines and directed towards the realisation and reinforcement 
of exact expectations. State–societal relations, governance and empowerment 
are reconfigured in terms that rob them of their contingency and variability, 
instead reconstituting them as models and techniques of effective governance.  
The standardisation of each component precedes the establishment of 
reciprocal and a sequential ordering. This predictability is an essential precursor 
to the range of functional benefits that are anticipated. When Building Peaceful 
States and Societies (2010, 12) refers to the ‘quality’ of state–societal relations, 
it does in the understanding that the actual can be contrasted with the ideal. 
The invocation of ‘capacity’ and ‘efficiency’, along with the reiteration of job 
creation and service provision (43), impose a certain homogeneity upon the 
terms of reference.  
Building Peaceful States and Societies is therefore concerned with 
sketching interrelations and with bringing each of the component parts, such as 
empowerment, informal-institutions and state–societal relations, together into an 
integrated and mutually reinforcing whole. It approvingly invokes a ‘virtuous 
circle’ which ‘creat[es] a positive dynamic and strengthen[s] state–societal 
relations’ (7). This ‘circle’ conjoins the formal political settlement, the state’s 
ability to perform core functions, and the state’s ability to meet public 
expectations (13). In establishing a set of reciprocal expectations, this provides 
the basis of a ‘social contract’ (18), in which the state commits to provide ‘jobs 
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and growth, delivery of basic services (including security and justice), human 
rights and democratic processes’ (7). 
This presents us with a number of features which diverge from the 
grounding assumptions of contextuality. Firstly, there is a preoccupation with 
policy and policy implementation, which means that the state and formal 
institutions appear as the predominant focus and point of engagement. 
Secondly, the terms of this engagement are often strikingly technocratic, 
focused upon functional imperatives such as capacity, function and output and 
with a discernible attempt to standardise and regularise. However, it should be 
recognised that this does not cancel or negate the initial emphasis upon the 
‘social’ or ‘informal’; rather, both reference points are instead incorporated and 
assimilated into this ‘virtuous’ and self-reproducing circle. Far from appearing in 
their mutual opposition, the technical and political are instead interlocked and 
intertwined.  
States in Development 
States in Development: Understanding Statebuilding (subsequently 
States in Development), which was published in 2008, was authored by Alan 
Whaites and published by DfID. As a working paper, it was part of a broader 
DfID project which attempted to establish a common framework of reference for 
statebuilding interventions. In keeping with a broader paradigm shift within 
development orthodoxy, the document sought to shift the emphasis towards 
state capacity, with specific attention to the role of the state within the wider 
development process. In keeping with the general concept of governance, it 
does not focus solely upon the state, but instead expands the scope of its 
analysis to encompass a wider array of social actors. After engaging with 
different theories of the state, development, and state–societal relations, States 
in Development clarifies key concepts, engages different models of the state 
and situates the state within its wider social context. In setting out each of these 
points of engagement, it seeks to demonstrate how the reform of state 
institutions can contribute to more inclusive and responsive practices of 
governance.  
States in Development explicitly references the work of Mick Moore, Sue 
Unsworth, Joel Migdal, James Putzel and Tom Carothers, among other 
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sources. Structured into five sections, it initially elaborates the distinctive 
terminology that has become associated with statebuilding – state, state–
societal relations, political settlement. It then develops a model of state 
responsiveness based upon the state’s ability to meet social needs and 
requirements. This theme is then developed with reference to political 
settlements, core state functions and public expectations. Finally, the document 
progresses to consider service delivery, institutional frameworks and policy 
reform before outlining a ‘best practice’ framework that establishes a basis for 
future statebuilding interventions in its concluding stages.  
States in Development engages at three key points. Firstly, it strongly 
emphasises the importance of ‘social’ (which is referenced twenty-six times) 
and ‘political’ engagement; secondly, it engages the concept of institutional and 
functional variation; finally, it engages the theme of complexity. Although States 
in Development is focused upon state practice, it ultimately, as has already 
been noted, situates its analysis within a wider social and political context. This 
point is explicitly made when the document asserts that ‘statebuilding is a 
national process, a product of state–societal relations that may be influenced by 
a wide variety of external forces [but which is] primarily shaped by local 
dynamics’ (4). From the outset, States in Development is therefore grounded 
within contextuality: firstly, it grounds statebuilding within local or endogenous 
reference points; secondly, it stresses the importance of social reference points; 
finally, it places clear limitations upon the exertion of external influence.  
States in Development does not approach statebuilding as a technocratic 
exercise which is guided and sustained by external knowledge and expertise. 
Rather, it argues that statebuilding is rooted within the capacities and 
contributions of the host society (6). By virtue of this prior emphasis, the state is 
not understood to be an autonomous political entity, but is instead constituted 
through and within its interaction with the domestic society. In further reiterating 
this point, the document asserts that ‘wider societies are not bystanders in 
political settlements or statebuilding’ (4, 9) and observes that state institutions 
are embedded within a wider range of informal actors and processes. In 
reiterating this point, it further underscores the need for an analysis of context 
(‘context’ is used sixteen times throughout the document).  
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In emphasising the importance of societal reference points, States in 
Development presents statebuilding as an essentially endogenous process. 
However, it does not deny the significance of ‘international drivers’, instead 
according them a secondary significance. It argues strongly in favour of a shift 
of perspective, affirming that statebuilding needs to be viewed from the ‘inside-
out’ rather than the ‘outside-in’. This point is further reiterated when it observes 
that: ‘Much of the recent literature and research analysis on statebuilding has 
focused more on external interventions than on inner logic’ (10).  
I have previously acknowledged this point, observing that even 
contextual engagement has been justified with reference to external priorities. 
There is a clear danger that the specificity of the individual context will be 
subsumed within this generalising impulse. Whaites insists that it is essential to 
break with this level of analysis and instead engage and unravel an ‘inner logic’.  
 In the first sub-section of this chapter I explored how statebuilding texts 
reconciled the internal and external; the second considered the interaction 
between the homogenous and the heterogeneous. This final sub-section will 
now engage the relationship between the general and the specific.  
States in Development touches upon a number of themes that have have 
been engaged over t\he course of this chapter. It develops the theme of 
complexity by considering the interaction between internal and external points 
of reference (23). It also distinguishes governance as a practice by emphasising 
the importance of social or informal reference points: ‘governance is therefore 
about more than government systems and capacities’. Equally significantly, the 
document acknowledges the potential contribution of local knowledge – ‘a 
knowledge of local context is critical to understanding how governance works’ 
(DfID 2006b, 49) – and reiterates that any engagement must be rooted within a 
sound analysis of the local context – ‘[g]overnance initiatives at the country 
level [need to be] based on a much stronger, deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of context’ (DfID 2006b, 69). Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics, which was previously referenced in the preceding 
discussion of deepening, also engages with a number of these reference points. 
It initially establishes a clear distinction between the internal and external 
(2006b, 10, 23), and in reasserting the centrality of a political framework of 
reference it entertains a wider degree of institutional variation – accordingly it 
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defines ‘politics’ as a process in which ‘a society makes choices about the way 
in which people live together’ (ibid, 2, 68).  
Each one of these contributions can be traced back to the core insight 
that there ‘is no single best path’ (ibid, 37). After anticipating a closer alignment 
with local knowledge, stressing the political significance of informal actors and 
reiterating the need to ‘nest’ within the local political settlement, the document 
establishes the basis for a more sustained engagement with the specific 
attributes of the local context. Governance, Development and Democratic 
Politics accordingly asserts that ‘what works in one country to improve 
governance may not work in another’ (ibid, 3). Further clarification on this point 
is provided when it observes that ‘democratic politics cannot be transplanted to 
or imposed upon a country from outside’ (ibid, 3, 20). The essential point is 
clear: democracy should not be conceived at the level of generality; rather, it 
should instead be understood and analysed at its point of application.  
Both States in Development and Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics evidence a clear awareness of the limitations of 
transferability, generalisation and standardisation. For both documents,  
context is a limiting factor which inhibits or restrains the generalising impulse. 
This again brings us back to Whaites’s appeal to an ‘inner logic’ of 
statebuilding. This logic inverts the Weberian autonomous state, taking societal 
integration as the condition of state strength. This enables us to understand 
why ‘governance cannot be constructed simply by transferring institutional 
models or organisational blueprints from rich to poor countries’ (2006, 9, 29). In 
stressing the political character of statebuilding, the document simultaneously 
underlines the essential inadequacy of a technocratic analysis (2006; 4, 37, 68).  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics is, in each of the 
preceding instances, in line with each of the grounding premises of 
contextuality. However, it is relatively straightforward to find instances in which 
there is a reversion to an overarching or generic technical rationality. For 
instance, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform explicitly 
recognises the potential contribution of ‘specialist expertise’ (2002, 11). Far 
from being entirely endogenous, security sector reform is instead depicted as a 
‘lengthy reform process [which is] heavily dependent on external expertise’ 
(2002, 13). This again points out how essentially political objects of 
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engagement (e.g. ‘political management of [the] security sector’) are 
incorporated into a fundamentally technical framework of reference which is 
premised upon ‘improved effectiveness’ (ibid, 14) and functionality.  
Upon a closer reading, these technocratic reference points repeatedly 
come against and conflict with the initial premise of variation and heterogeneity. 
If context is understood to be the initial foundation of engagement, this raises 
clear questions about generalisation across contexts. After all, the framework of 
contextuality initially inculcated the belief that each individual context is 
essentially sui generis. States in Development explicitly reproduces this 
understanding when it observes that ‘some states may never look the same [as] 
our own’ (3, 6) and asserts that ‘[n]one of these [statebuilding] processes 
should be seen as neatly symmetrical or linear’ (5). 
In the Foucauldian chapter I referenced the distinctive attributes of 
technocracy, and drew attention to its essential exteriority, a feature which is 
embodied within the fact that, in the words of Centero, it ultimately aspires to 
the ‘[imposition] of a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application 
of instrumentally rational techniques’ (1993, 314). In insisting upon the 
contingency of the statebuilding process, Whaites breaks with this framework 
and instead situates analysis at the level of contingent interactions within 
society. This is the meaning of his allusion to processes that are ‘messy, implicit 
and non-linear’ (6). The document then asserts the centrality of ‘political’ state–
societal relations and observes that statebuilding cannot be reduced to ‘any 
noble statebuilding ideal’ (10). As a consequence, contingency, specificity and 
the political come to function as the respective features of a discursive triad. 
States in Development reproduces the understanding when it asserts that 
‘statebuilding is a value neutral term’ (4). Here it is implied that statebuilding is a 
neutral instrument that enables the more complete flowering of an inner 
potentiality. Upon this reading, statebuilding cannot be traced back to a 
standardising, rationalising or generalising impulse, but instead enables states 
to be adjusted to the ‘realities of their own contexts’ (3).  
States in Development therefore repeatedly emphasises and reiterates 
the importance of specificity. In initially emphasising the importance of domestic 
capacities and contributions, it asserts that ‘statebuilding efforts need to be 
shaped and led from within if they are to be legitimate and sustainable’ (7, 21). 
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This logically implies that externalised frameworks of engagement will almost 
invariably fail; thus, ‘international actors should not attempt to import and 
impose solutions and policy prescriptions from the outside’ (44). The implication 
is that any solutions should be rooted within the specificity of the individual 
context.  
This assertion of an endogenous process clashes with the suggestion 
that statebuilding rests upon ‘various and sometimes far-reaching degrees of 
external involvement’ (16). In contrast to the proposition of a framework of 
engagement which is open to individual specificity, the document invokes 
‘international efforts [which] also have a particular view of what constitutes an 
effective functioning state’ (16). The significance of the words ‘particular’ and 
‘effective functioning’ in the preceding quotation should be acknowledged – they 
correspond to a clear convergence upon a general model of the functional 
state. A closer reading of Governance, Development and Democratic Politics 
(DfID 2006b) similarly highlights a range of measures that apply independently 
of context. This is true of the framework for capable, accountable and 
responsive (CAR) states (DfID 2006b, 37). It also applies to the discussion of 
the state’s role within the overall development process (ibid, 37), core aspects 
of economic governance and the provision of public services (ibid, 28, 57). 
In directly refusing the proposition of a neutral framework of engagement, 
States in Development explicitly states that ‘the UK is not neutral on questions 
of statebuilding [because it] has explicit commitments to encourage 
statebuilding that ultimately brings benefit to the poor’ (6). These ‘explicit 
commitments’ take the form of a set of general propositions which have direct 
implications for broad swathes of public policy. Although the provision of public 
goods in areas such as education, health and security can be justified in 
objective terms, it is nonetheless clear that this general ‘good governance’ 
framework takes us some distance from the proposition that it is inappropriate 
and counterproductive to impose general frameworks, models or templates onto 
individual contexts (3, 4, 6, 20). 
This contradiction between generality and specificity reoccurs at other 
points within the document. After strongly emphasising the importance of 
context and endogenous agency, States in Development engages with the 
proposition that ‘some institutional arrangements may work better than others’ 
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(16). Here it is particularly telling that these institutional arrangements are 
discussed at a general level of analysis. They are not discussed in relation to, 
but rather in detachment from, the operational context. In this respect, the 
document closely resembles contributions to the literature review chapter (Reilly 
2001; Belloni 2004; Reynolds 2005) which argued that certain electoral systems 
were more conducive to peacebuilding ends than others.  
This generalising impulse is similarly reproduced when the document 
engages with deficits or limitations within the existing knowledge base. After 
lamenting a ‘poverty of knowledge’ (6) the document expresses its exasperation 
with the fact that ‘there is remarkably little sharing of statebuilding experience 
across countries and among donors’ (36, 46). The document does not 
acknowledge, or engage critically, with the fact that, under certain 
circumstances, it is, by virtue of the fact that any ‘solution is context-specific,  
 inappropriate to seek a general remedy of peacebuilding problems. To the 
same extent, the text fails to critically disassemble the proposition that the 
contradictions of statebuilding can be overcome through an enhanced 
knowledge base.  
The recurrence of this fundamental contradiction can also be observed in 
other instances. States in Development expresses its understanding that state 
functions cannot be understood or applied at a general level of analysis (4), 
which suggests that ‘capacity’, ‘strength’ and ‘weakness’ can only be 
understood in their specific embodiment, and not as a general category or 
concept. This point is further developed when the document asserts that the 
model of the social contract in which the legitimisation of the state is linked to its 
provision of certain public goods is not necessarily transferable across contexts. 
However, in other parts of the document the opposite conclusion is instead 
proffered. This is clearly the case when the discussion turns to the question of 
how enhanced state–societal interactions can help to legitimise the domestic 
political settlement (8). In other writings, a clear link is also established between 
improved policy provision (Fritz and Menocal 2007, 5, 13) and heightened 
levels of political legitimacy (Fritz and Menocal 2007, 16).  
States in Development similarly reverts to the level of generality when it 
engages with the ‘core’ features of state functionality. After it first defines ‘core’ 
functions (7), the document then sets out standards and requirements that 
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relate to state performance in a number of key areas (security, revenue, law). 
The very term ‘core functions’ (8, 16) suggests a constriction upon very exact 
and precise set of priorities. The generality of the discussion is further reiterated 
by the document’s use of the word ‘public good’. Whereas contextuality is 
premised upon context specificity, this conception of ‘public goods’ instead 
presents us with a general category that applies irrespective of context. 
Comparable to ‘function’, ‘capacity’ and ‘strength’, the term operates at the level 
of generality.  
After initially establishing the basis for an analysis grounded within the 
‘social’, ‘political’ or ‘contextual’, States in Development establishes a clear 
expectation that the document will correspond to and reproduce the principle of 
specificity. However, it is as if the document is unable to follow it through to the 
logical conclusion implicit in the initial analysis. Ultimately, we encounter 
instances in which the specific goes against the local. A similar observation can 
also be made with regard to the textual treatment of complexity, which is in 
many senses the derivative of an approach premised upon specificity. Whereas 
generalising frameworks of reference seek to simplify, an analysis at the level of 
specificity instead implies an analysis that does not attempt to reduce its object 
of reference to a prior template or design. Upon a closer reading, States in 
Development appears to combine both approaches. This is perhaps illustrated 
most clearly when it attempts to apply a model of the social contract (8), even 
after openly acknowledging that other models of this nature were insufficiently 
adjusted to the complexities and contingencies of the individual context.  
Likewise, the discussion of state responsiveness examines the functions 
of the state and the various ways in which this interaction reinforces the political 
settlement that is in place at the domestic level (11). Although the reference 
points here are obviously political, it is relatively easy to see how their 
interactions could be, and indeed are, recapitulated within a framework that 
reduces them to a range of technical dimensions and attributes. As a 
consequence of this discursive realignment, inherently complex and contingent 
processes and interactions would become reduced to a set of regularities, 
continuities and anticipatable outputs (11).  
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States in Development provides a further illustration of this dynamic 
when it outlines its general conception of statebuilding. It initially highlights the 
volatility of the process by counterpoising the complexities and uncertainties of 
the statebuilding process to the continuities and smooth progressions of 
developmental theory. The essential implication is that statebuilding actors 
should resist the deeply rooted temptation to make the ‘actual’ correspond to 
the ‘ideal’. Their emphasis should instead be upon adjusting and aligning their 
own contributions with the practices, processes and relations that adhere within 
the domestic context.  
This adjustment to the specificities of the local context is in large part 
driven by the core insight that, under conditions of complexity, it is difficult for 
statebuilding actors, whether internal or external ,to act with any degree of 
certainty. Indeed, far from guiding developments at the local level, external 
actors are, to all intents and purposes, responding to them (23). Given each of 
these propositions, it comes as something of a surprise when the document 
suddenly reiterates the potential contribution of sequencing and prioritisation 
(21). Here, in apparent refusal of an inherently complex social reality, we 
encounter the proposition that this reality can be tamed by the application of the 
tools and techniques of rational management. After initially encountering a 
framework of reference that stresses the built-in limitations of generalisation, 
standardisation and rationalisation, we then encounter a framework that 
constructs its foundations on each of these limitations.  
Conclusion 
In the initial stages of this chapter I observed that contextuality is 
essentially concerned with the question of how local specificity can be 
integrated into statebuilding frameworks. Whereas deepening takes a 
broadened framework of democratic engagement as its point of engagement, 
contextuality instead begins from the premise that a more sustained 
engagement with context will mitigate or even overcome the rationalising and 
externalising distortions that have occurred to the detriment of previous 
statebuilding interventions.  
Contextuality therefore corresponds to a fundamental shift within the 
theory and practice of statebuilding. It does not imply a reorientation within the 
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terms of a pre-given framework of reference; it instead implies a different 
framework of reference altogether. Contextuality, in other words, implies a 
qualitative shift which has clear and direct implication for the conceptual, 
theoretical and practical components of contemporary statebuilding. This 
chapter did not seek to engage contextuality as a general proposition; rather, it 
sought to understand how this framework has attempted to overcome tension at 
three points. These tensions adhere within the interaction between: the internal 
and external, the homogenous and heterogeneous and the general and 
particular.  
My discussion of the relation between the internal and external began by 
observing that liberal theory had established and entrenched a definitive 
opposition between these two points of reference. Liberal peacebuilding does 
not question this opposition but rather seeks to reproduce it. I then sought to 
demonstrate how the internal-external divide is, under conditions of neo-liberal 
governance, altered and reconfigured. My core argument was that the internal 
and external should not be understood in opposition, but rather in their mutual 
relation. This implies an analysis that is able to engage with the question of how 
the internal level of governance is co-opted into the consolidation and 
reproduction of an external and neo-liberal agenda. In seeking to engage and 
further develop this proposition, I suggested that the concept of the ‘social’ 
could be of potential assistance. 
At the beginning of the chapter I noted that the ‘social’ is closely 
intertwined with the ‘contextual’. Both ‘social’ and ‘contextual’, in their initial 
formulation within the framework of contextuality, suggested a site of alterity 
and spontaneity. Conversely, when we engaged these points at the level of 
given policy texts, we encountered a series of subtle manoeuvres, in which the 
‘social’ and ‘contextual’ became incorporated into a self-reproducing and self-
replicating framework of reference. In a very similar manner, the internal was 
not rendered as a point of denial or refusal, but rather as a means through 
which external derived priorities and imperatives are embodied and circulated.  
In engaging with the policy texts, my primary sense was of a subtle 
incorporation, in which the ‘free’ agency of domestic actors was adapted, 
aligned and incorporated into a distinctive neo-liberal governmentality. This did 
not imply a denial or restriction of context, but rather its active incorporation and 
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deployment. In stressing this point, I sought to demonstrate how the internal 
and external were conjoined in often complex and contingent ways. From my 
perspective, this is most clearly illustrated in instances where ‘social’, ‘cultural’ 
or ‘informal’ objects become incorporated into broader structures of neo-liberal 
governance.  
I observed that this feature often resulted in a reversion back towards an 
agenda focused upon ‘good governance’ and the reform of the domestic state. 
Although the engagement of informal and social institutions ostensibly 
corresponded to increased variation and heterogeneity, I noticed that there was 
a definite tendency for the discussion to revert back to a more delimited 
agenda. Concepts such as ‘effective participation’ and ‘participation within 
policy processes’ underlined how the agency of social or informal actors had 
become subject to a subtle reconfiguration and alignment. However, this 
influence did not deny or remove the agency of local actors; rather, it sought to 
work through and within it. Contextual engagement, under these conditions, 
becomes divorced from its transformative or emancipatory connotations and 
instead reproduces a range of neo-liberal imperatives.  
This brings me back to my initial proposition, which is that the internal is 
implicit within the external, just as the external is implicit within the internal. This 
echoes contributions from Bleisemann de Guevara, Klaus Schlichte and Joel 
Migdal, who have consistently elaborated and developed this point. Oliver 
Richmond (2011, 14) also presents the ‘local’ as an intermediary point which 
conjoins the internal and external.  
In privileging a very specific model and outline of the state epitomised in 
allusions to the ‘core functions’ of the state, this statebuilding discourse 
reproduces a range of homogenous effects. Similarly, a neo-liberal discourse of 
functionality and efficiency further delimits the discursive range within which 
variation can emerge and consolidate. The emphasis upon Capable, 
Accountable and Responsive (CAR) states results in a convergence upon a set 
of pre-eminent priorities. In addition to producing a range of external 
dimensions and attributes, this also implies a clear delimitation and constriction 
of the range of permissible deviation. A domestic context previously 
characterised by complexity, contingency and variation is now replaced by 
regularities, continuities and foregrounded outcomes.  
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The two categories of generality and specificity relate to the level at 
which the text engages. Contextuality suggests a conscious and deliberate 
orientation away from generalised perspectives and a more sustained 
engagement with the specificity of the local. In engaging with the statebuilding 
texts, I noticed that the specific and the local frequently became functionalised 
and incorporated into broader frameworks of reference. The specific does not 
therefore stand in opposition to the general, but instead appears as a means 
through which it is reproduced and circulated. In engaging with the statebuilding 
texts, the reader may also note the persistence of generality; that is, the 
predisposition to understand and assess statebuilding at a general level of 
analysis. The focus upon governance and policy reform brings the discussion 
back to templates and models which can be generally applied across different 
contexts. Similarly, the repeated recourse to a technocratic discourse returns 
the reader to a general level of analysis. This attribute can also be identified 
within a range of neo-liberal reference points which interject imperatives of 
efficiency and functionality. Even in those instances where informal institutions 
and actors are engaged, the discussion evidences a strong tendency to revert 
back to a formalised agenda focused upon state rationality and functionality.  
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Chapter Six  
Complementarity and Integration 
Introduction 
The Introduction and Literature Review chapters suggested that the 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict peacebuilding emerged in response to 
the complexities and contingencies of contemporary conflict. The so-called 
‘New Wars’, to this extent, provided the backdrop against which the approach 
developed and consolidated. ‘New’ forms of conflict places new demands on 
the international system, thereby necessitating new techniques of intervention 
and engagement. Policy wisdom increasingly converged upon the insight that 
conflict should be engaged within an ‘integrated’ or ‘whole-of-government’ 
approach that addressed itself to a multiplicity of points. Conflict was 
increasingly theorised as a complex system, thereby necessitating flexible, 
adaptive and networked conflict response capabilities. The emergence and 
development of ‘whole-of-government’, comprehensive and integrated 
approaches were intelligible in this context.  
Prior to the development of a practice of post-conflict peacebuilding, 
democracy promotion/ governance, development and security had originally 
been conceived as sectoral concerns. While this specialisation bequeathed  
 obvious benefits, it simultaneously imposed equally obvious limitations and 
constraints, most obviously restricting attempts to engage with the interstices 
between each individual sector. The comprehensive approach therefore 
enabled peacebuilding actors to break down ‘firewalls’ and address concomitant 
contradictions and tensions. The logic of the approach ordained that, under 
ideal circumstances, the respective components of post-conflict peacebuilding 
(democracy, development and security) would be reinforcing. Kofi Annan 
implicitly invoked these interlinkages when he called for ‘a broader focus on the 
nature of sustainable peace and its building-blocks, such as social and 
economic development, good governance and democratization’ (UN 2001). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, international policy actors increasingly 
came to realise the essential interdependence of each constitutive element. By 
the end of the decade this understanding, which I refer to as complementarity, 
had assumed the status of a policy axiom (Jahn 2007). This established a 
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problematic of integration (the circumstances under which integration could be 
most completely realised and embodied) – this explains why the theory and 
practice of peacebuilding became deeply pragmatic, orientated towards 
logistical questions and themes. Paris accordingly observes that: ‘Instead of 
investigating the underlying assumptions of peace-building, most works on the 
subject have sought to provide practical recommendations aimed at improving 
the ability of peace-builders to control local conflicts.’ (2002, 656) 
Institutional actors have worked within this pragmatic horizon, orientating 
themselves towards an ‘appropriate’ ordering of the constitutive elements. 
Chapman and Vaillant observe that: ‘In recogni[sing] that development, politics 
and security are linked, DFID’s strategic approach has consistently involved a 
whole-of-government approach’ (2010, viii). Complementarity takes the three 
component parts of post-conflict peacebuilding – democracy, development and 
security – as its objects of reference. It does not understand each element in 
isolation, but rather within their interrelation.  
Jahn goes as far as to suggest that the ‘fetishisation’ of integration 
(Bellamy 2004, 2; OECD 2010) by peacebuilding actors has produced a 
‘tragedy of liberal diplomacy’ (2007, 226). She suggests that integration is a 
surface-level concern that has diverted attention away from underlying tensions, 
with the consequence that they continually reassert and impose themselves. 
This explains why liberal peacebuilding appears doomed to perpetually repeat 
its own contradictions in subsequent effect.  
In highlighting this feature, Jahn relates one of the abiding perversities of 
liberal peacebuilding; namely, that repeated failure does not undermine the 
conceptual, theoretical or doctrinal base but instead serves to further reinforce 
it. While peacebuilding actors acknowledge the limitations of the integrative 
thesis, they are ultimately unable to escape it. The OECD, for instance, 
evidenced an abiding faith in this article of faith when it issued a plaintive 
appeal for the ‘development of mechanisms for systematically drawing lessons 
learned and building internal capacity to bring political, military and 
development responses into coherent and effective packages’ (OECD 1997, 
27).  
Complementarity therefore originates within the proposition that an 
increased integration of democracy, development and security can overcome or 
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‘reconcile’ deeply rooted contradictions. Preceding chapters have focused much 
more closely upon the first two components, with the deepening chapter 
addressing itself to the theme of democratisation and the contextuality chapter 
concerning itself with the transfer of development paradigms across different 
contexts. Security, in comparison, has only received the most fleeting of 
treatments. In addressing itself to this theme in more detail, this chapter will 
work within a stabilisation framework. Security and Stabilisation: The Military 
Contribution defines stabilisation in the following terms:  
Stabilisation is the process that supports states which are entering, 
enduring or emerging from conflict in order to: prevent or reduce 
violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political 
processes and governance structures which lead to a political settlement 
that institutionalises non-violent conflicts for power; and prepares for 
sustainable social and economic development. (MoD 2014, xi) 
This very closely resembles the definitions of post-conflict peacebuilding 
that were given in the introductory chapter. Both stabilisation and post-conflict 
peacebuilding initiatives engage in the aftermath of violent conflict (it should, 
however, be noted that stabilisation also engages at an earlier stage and that 
‘post-conflict’ has increasingly been dropped in favour of ‘peacebuilding). In 
both instances, the engagement of internal actors has a normative and 
functional basis, being grounded in the first instance as a principled 
commitment and in the second as the anticipation of improved operational 
outcomes. Significantly, prior to 2007 the Stabilisation Unit, an inter-
departmental unit which brings together the contributions of the DfID, the FCO 
and the MoD, was known as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). 
Stabilisation documents therefore enable me to engage with security, the final 
component within the ‘holy trinity’ of post-conflict peacebuilding.  
In discussing the discursive integration of democracy, development and  
security, I highlight the tensions and contradictions that arise when each of 
these components are integrated and aligned. Whereas complementarity is 
essentially an operational imperative directed towards the establishment of the 
conditions under which each element can become mutually reinforcing, critical 
analysis is instead directed towards the point/s at which the respective parts 
come apart. In opposition to the aforementioned logic of inclusion, the 
preponderant dynamic is one of exclusion, breakage and fracture. It can 
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therefore be legitimately observed that core statebuilding concepts ‘mask the 
inherently political and ideological underpinnings of all concepts of state 
construction and reconstruction, as well as the conflict-ridden and dynamic 
nature of such processes’ (Hameiri 2010, 38).  
Hameiri’s contribution traces these tensions back to the ideological 
foundations of statebuilding. This feature helps to explain why liberal 
peacebuilding is caught in a perpetual oscillation, ultimately failing to achieve 
final closure. The essential purpose of statebuilding is to conceal or occlude this 
fact, understating and obfuscating tension in the process. The essential 
contribution of critical analysis is to strip away this façade, revealing tension and 
contradiction in their true significance.  
Whereas the Deepening chapter focused upon democratisation and the 
Contextuality chapter focused upon the integration of context into general 
frameworks, the current chapter is concerned with the question of how the 
constitutive elements of the comprehensive approach are textually aligned and 
integrated. In contrast to the other chapters, I do not structure this chapter 
entirely around individual texts. I begin by providing an overview or summary of 
each individual core text, not with the intention to engage complementarity or 
the comprehensive approach, but rather, to provide a general overview of the 
text. I begin by discussing The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation, 
then engage Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure 
Environments: Lessons Identified (subsequently titled Responding to 
Stabilisation Challenges) and finally conclude with Security and Stabilisation: 
The Military Contribution (subsequently Security and Stabilisation).  
I will then attempt to identify how each text internally structures and 
arranges democracy, development and security. I begin with democracy, 
proceed to consider development and then conclude with security. I will 
primarily focus upon Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution 
because it is far longer than either of its two counterparts (The UK 
Government’s Approach to Stabilisation and Responding to Stabilisation 
Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified). 
However, I also engage the other two documents on a more infrequent basis. 
The first two texts, The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation and 
Responding to Stabilisation in Hostile and Insecure Environments, were 
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published by the cross-department Stabilisation Unit, whereas the final text, 
Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, was published by the MoD.      
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation 
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation is a short, policy-
orientated 11-page document published by the Stabilisation Unit in 2014. It sets 
out the general principles and priorities that underpin the UK’s government’s 
approach to stabilisation and provides a clear framework of reference for 
practical interventions that operate within this framework. It further develops a 
2008 report of the same name and functions as part of a general strategy that 
also incorporates HMG’s National Security Strategy (2010), the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (2010) and the Building Stability Overseas 
Strategy (2011). 
The document defines stabilisation as ‘an integrated, cross-government 
approach to conflict resolution’ (2) which incorporates military and civilian 
dimensions and operates under civilian leadership (5). While The UK 
Government’s Approach to Stabilisation distinguishes between stabilisation, 
conflict prevention, statebuilding and peacebuilding, it observes that the 
Stabilisation Unit is engaged with each one of these activities. This serves to 
further reiterate the inter-connectedness of peacebuilding and stabilisation 
activities.  
Stabilisation interventions are, as this document establishes, undertaken 
within conflict-affected countries – this includes countries that are entering, 
enduring or emerging from violent conflict. Post-conflict intervention is therefore 
one aspect of stabilisation. In exploring the concept of stabilisation in more 
depth, The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation reiterates the central 
role that institutions play in helping to manage, mediate or mitigate conflict. The 
UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation suggests that institutional capacity 
is the central determinant of whether a state will effectively respond to violent 
conflict.  
Violent conflict – and it should be noted that the distinction between 
conflict and violent conflict is crucial – is both a cause and consequence of poor 
institutional performance. The task of institutions is not to absent or remove 
conflict, but to ensure that it is more effectively managed – ‘[social institutions] 
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channel conflict, avoiding recourse to violence and facilitating positive change’. 
This helps us to see how the document discursively links democracy and 
security. By virtue of the fact that insecurity is rooted within relations and 
processes that adhere at the domestic level, it can be said to be a subjective 
condition which is rooted within accountability, inclusivity and responsiveness 
(or the lack thereof). Despite the fact that these are political relations, they are 
ultimately discussed in terms that revert to cause-effect models, with the 
consequence that each component becomes part of an interlocking circle. 
Accordingly, it is established that ‘without some form of legitimate political 
authority immediate stability and security will be compromised and the pursuit of 
longer-term statebuilding will not be feasible’ (7). 
This establishes that the political settlement and the concept of 
governance are of the utmost importance, a point that is reiterated when The 
UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation insists upon a political framework of 
analysis that is grounded within political relations and interactions within the 
host society. The document emphasises that ‘the stabilisation approach [has] 
an intensely political orientation and focus’ (4) before equating stabilisation with 
‘political processes which will deliver long-term stability’ (1, 4, 5). This political is 
further emphasised when the document asserts that ‘the stabilisation approach 
requires people to work together, rather than just provide the output’ (9, 10). 
Again, the relational dimensions of governance are again reiterated, with 
specific attention to social reference points.  
This focus upon the political dimensions of stabilisation is important 
because it draws a whole range of technocratic assumptions into question; this 
is the principal inference that should be extracted from the assertion that  
 ‘progress is incremental and never linear’ (3, 11). Complexity and contingency, 
we are again reminded, are both corollaries of the ‘political’. The absenting of 
linearity brings a host of struggles, contestations and power relations to the 
foreground, reminding us that stabilisation is deeply contingent, being 
predicated upon a whole host of anticipating factors. Stabilisation is open-ended 
and inductive (2, 3). Precisely because stabilisation is concerned with 
interventions within ‘politically messy, violent, challenging and non-permissive 
environments’ (2), abstract or rationalised templates cannot be engineered and 
applied from without; rather, local actors should instead be empowered and 
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provided with the tools that will enable them to adjust to core challenges and 
constraints (2, 3).  
A further point of clarification is provided when the document observes 
that ‘structural stability’ is ‘the longer-term goal to which stabilisation contributes’ 
(1). This suggests that stabilisation is, in contrast to development, a relatively 
short-term commitment (11). ‘Structural stability’ is a rephrasing, in which the 
imperatives of peacebuilding (which is addressed to the structural causes of 
violent conflict) are refracted through a security lens. Stabilisation can therefore 
be said to be the security component of peacebuilding strategy.  
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation makes it clear that 
stabilisation is not a purely internal concern. Rather, it is made quite clear that 
stabilisation is dependent upon various forms of external assistance and 
support. The ability of external actors to bring about positive change is, 
however, limited, and it is social actors that ultimately have the ability to bring 
about positive change. It is therefore openly acknowledged, from the outset, 
that ‘external support cannot create legitimate political authority’ (2). There is a 
clear awareness that excesses of external influence will ultimately act to the 
detriment of peacebuilding goals (2). Coercive power is associated with various 
inefficiencies and pathologies; under optimal circumstances (e.g. when end 
objectives are achieved), power is restricted to the outer extremities or even 
entirely absented (11).  
This economy of power nonetheless rests upon an essential ambiguity. 
After all, the document’s very title – The UK Government’s Approach to 
Stabilisation – takes an external actor as its lead protagonist. In expanding 
upon this theme, the document proceeds to set out the various ways in which  
external influence can help to cultivate positive endogenous developments (2, 
3, 5, 8).   
This oscillation is also evidenced in other instances. In focusing its 
analytical gaze upon each individual society, the document creates the clear 
impression that the specificity (e.g. the precise structures, relations and 
interactions that are in place) of each individual context is its preponderant 
concern (5). After privileging these political objects, the document then 
proceeds to suggest that the core contribution of the Stabilisation Unit is to 
‘bring together expertise’ from each of the three government departments (DfID, 
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FCO, MoD). After bringing the foundations of expert knowledge into question, 
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation then reasserts its importance. 
By way of further elaboration, the document then openly celebrates the 
potential contribution of improved logistical co-ordination and inter-departmental 
co-operation (‘close co-ordination is required across departments (4, 5)). The 
outline of an enhanced liberal peacebuilding is clearly anticipated within 
innovations such as the secondment of experts, more flexible funding 
arrangements and improved practices of inter-departmental co-operation.  
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation engages with a number 
of features and themes that were previously discussed in the chapters 
concerned with deepening and contextuality. It situates its analysis within the 
host society, insists upon a political analysis, rejects technocratic assumptions 
and stresses the inherent complexity of stabilisation interventions. It establishes 
clear limitations upon external influence and stresses that local agents should 
take the lead and assume the initiative. However, each of these emphases and 
assertions is underpinned by a certain ambiguity, and it is relatively 
straightforward to find technocratic reference points, generalising assumptions 
and depoliticised points of reference.  
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure 
Environments: Lessons Identified  
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure 
Environments: Lessons Identified (subsequently Responding to Stabilisation 
Challenges), which was published in 2010, clearly defines stabilisation as a 
foundation which will establish ‘the conditions required for further security sector 
reform’ (26). This clearly resembles the account of stabilisation that is provided 
in The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation. This document seeks to 
develop lessons that can be practically applied in the course of conflict 
interventions. In seeking to extract lessons that can be applied across contexts, 
it appeals to an established monitoring and evaluation system (14) and a 
‘continuous cycle’, which feeds practice into knowledge and practice into 
knowledge (27).  
This practically applicable and transferable knowledge can be utilised 
across a range of different geographical contexts, e.g. the Balkans, Afghanistan 
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and Iraq. And the document appeals to ‘generic lessons that are relevant to 
other conflict environments’ (4). ‘Generic’ implies a set of lessons that apply 
irrespective of context. The document then adapts the core tenet of 
contextuality to argue that any solution must be adjusted to each specific 
context (the initial subsection is entitled ‘All Conflicts Are Different’). Responding 
to Stabilisation Challenges approvingly elevates these ‘generic’ lessons while 
also casting a disapproving glare in the direction of ‘standardised templates’ – 
the very term comes laden with pejorative overtones. In working towards a 
sustainable equilibrium, the document explicitly asserts that: ‘Approaches to 
stabilisation should be tailored to address the specific characteristics of the 
conflict. This requires knowing when and when not to use lessons effectively 
from other contexts’ (1).  
In seeking to reconcile democracy and security, the document 
emphasises the need to focus upon the ‘specific characteristics of the conflict’. 
It suggests that community engagement can overcome universalising biases 
and root stabilisation within the needs, priorities and requirements of local 
communities (15). Engagement with the local community will also enable 
external actors to align their interventions with the specific attributes of each 
individual context. In emphasising the principle of specificity, the document 
ascribes to the need for a more sustained engagement with ‘non-state forms of 
local governance, security, justice and dispute resolution’ and the state–societal 
interface (2, 15).  
However, external actors do not simply seek to reproduce the contextual 
or local. Responding to Stabilisation Challenges does not present any sense of 
a naïve or uncritical romanticisation of the ‘local’. Indeed, precisely the opposite 
understanding is advanced: namely, that external actors will, in transferring 
lessons from another context, actively contest and challenge the ‘perceptions, 
relationships and behaviours of local politically significant actors’ (1, 10). This 
implication is further drawn out when the document discusses the emergence of 
an integrated approach to stabilisation with reference to the efforts of ‘a single 
multi-disciplinary and multi-departmental team’ (9). Here it is noticeable that the 
emergence of an integrated approach is not contingent upon the active 
engagement of local actors but is instead dependent upon the question of 
whether departmental actors are able to sufficiently combine or ‘pool’ their 
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individual capacities or capabilities. It is consequently asserted that: ‘Integration 
is primarily driven by the process of people from different institutions and 
different disciplines working side by side to ensure that their perspectives and 
activities reinforce each other’ (9).  
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges, in stressing the political 
significance of ‘pooling’, similarly places a strong emphasis upon external 
actions and contributions. Even in those instances where this externalised 
framework engages with context, it is ultimately predisposed to reconfigure and 
rearrange it. Similarly, even in those instances when contextual limitations are 
identified, they ultimately give way to the imperative to identify general or 
transferable lessons. 
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation repeatedly 
acknowledges that stabilisation is an essentially political concern (1, 25). 
However, despite granting a central pre-eminence to politics, it evidences a 
clear predisposition to revert to technocratic themes such as improved planning, 
programme management and monitoring (9). This is clearly evidenced when it 
stresses the need to ‘improve the flow of information, contribute to a shared 
understanding of stabilisation challenges and responses [and] reduce policy 
and design “silos”’ (1). Further elaboration, in the form of short and long-term 
objectives, contracting and funding systems and lesson-learning frameworks, 
are duly provided. Again, depoliticisation and a policy fetishisation reassert 
themselves as core textual attributes.  
These attributes clearly contrast with a more political thread which is 
ultimately orientated towards the ‘broad range of deep-rooted, complex political 
problems that cause conflict and insecurity’ (3). Precisely because violent 
conflict is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional, it can only be engaged through a 
political approach that is directly addressed to deeply rooted tensions and 
contradictions. This thread intertwines with its technical counterpart, originating 
a tension that is continually reiterated over the course of the policy document.  
Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (2009) 
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, which is entitled Security and 
Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (subsequently Security and Stabilisation), 
is a document of more than 250 pages which was published in 2009. In its own 
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words, it seeks to engage the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ of stabilisation. It defines 
stabilisation as an intervention that ‘supports states which are entering, 
enduring or emerging from conflict’ (xi). The ‘what’ relates to the internal and 
external dimensions of stabilisation strategy – state fragility, relationships 
between stabilisation actors, the historical development of stabilisation 
frameworks; ‘when’ to the structure of stabilisation strategies – sequencing of 
reforms, establishment of general parameters of engagement, respective 
stages of strategy; and ‘how’ to the practical application of stabilisation strategy 
– implementation, measurement and evaluation.  
Security and Stabilisation defines stabilisation environments as instances 
in which the ‘[c]onflict is severe enough to undermine the relationship between 
state and society’ (13). This fracturing of state–societal relations creates a set of 
circumstances in which institutions are no longer able to function effectively and 
manage conflict. This leads to a situation in which an ‘integrated conflict 
management system’ (53) is no longer capable of meeting the security needs of 
citizens or sustaining and embedding legitimacy.  
Security and Stabilisation engages at this level of analysis when it 
considers interactions between different social actors (27). Stabilisation 
frameworks are essentially concerned with the ‘way that political power is 
organised, and who wields that power’ (76). This explains why security actors 
have evidenced a heightened concern with governance-related themes. If 
violent conflict is deeply rooted within political processes, structures and 
relations, then a conventional military response will fail to address the root 
causes of violence (91). Security and Stabilisation makes this point when it 
asserts that military force is ‘but one element required for the delivery of security 
and stabilisation’ (62). Security, to put it slightly differently, requires a strategy 
which encompasses and incorporates a broad range of security actors. The 
reverse also applies: the promotion of democracy and development can only be 
achieved through a more sustained engagement with security-related 
questions. The document reiterates this point when it observes how ‘military 
forces have been drawn into wider stabilisation tasks that have gone beyond 
the delivery of security’ (20). 
Democracy, development and security are not therefore sectoral 
concerns but can only be sufficiently engaged within a framework that engages 
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at a political level of analysis. This is why Security and Stabilisation asserts the 
‘primacy of political process’ (59) and observes that security sector reform 
(SSR) is a ‘primarily political undertaking’ (92). Stabilisation itself, by virtue of 
the fact that it incorporates broader economic, political and social reference 
points, can be traced back to this insistence upon an explicitly political 
framework of reference. Security and Stabilisation therefore asserts that 
stabilisation can only be achieved by an approach that ‘pursue[s] a workable 
political settlement and create[s] entry points for sustainable development’ (13). 
This creates the clear impression that stabilisation is essentially concerned with 
a set of indirect interventions and with creating a context in which domestic 
actors can achieve and establish a stable political environment. Stabilisation 
interventions therefore attempt to ‘achieve a political settlement between the 
host nation government, competing elites and the wider population’.  
Security and Stabilisation engages within a political framework of 
reference. In working towards more effective strategies and methods of counter-
insurgency, it highlights the potential contribution that democratic reform and 
development can make. Instead of enabling host-society interests and priorities, 
democracy promotion is instead presented as a means through which societies 
can be stabilised in accordance with wider systemic preferences. Exteriority, 
which was understated or nuanced in the Deepening and Contextuality 
chapters, is therefore made explicit (16, 57). Whereas deepening and 
contextuality had rendered a subtle guidance or orientation, the securitisation of 
local agency is voiced in a more coercive vernacular.  
Security and Stabilisation develops a ‘political’ analysis of insecurity 
which is elaborated and developed with reference to a number of intersecting 
and overlapping drivers of conflict; these include insecurity, underdevelopment 
and poor governance (7). Stabilisation is therefore a phased strategy addressed 
to each of these points. Stabilisation actors do not engage each point in 
isolation, but instead direct their attention to core relations and interactions. The 
general theme of integration is in turn articulated in logistical (interaction 
between different stabilisation actors), conceptual (key concepts that underpin 
stabilisation) and temporal (shape, secure, hold and develop) terms.  
In each of these respects, stabilisation appears as a comprehensive 
approach to conflict intervention. The stabilisation framework closely resembles 
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post-conflict peacebuilding. It is composed of three different elements – 
development, governance and security (24) – and draws upon ‘integrated 
security, governance and development efforts to secure a political settlement’ 
(xii). This inclusive and wide-ranging framework also stretches to encompass 
the peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas (110). The conceptual foundations 
of stabilisation frameworks are set out in more depth when the document refers 
to nine core security principles (xvi). These principles reassert the centrality of 
politics, underline the need to focus upon the local level of governance and 
further underline the centrality of close co-operation and alignment. At the level 
of logistics, stabilisation interventions are characterised by close co-operation 
and an integrated, flexible and aligned response framework.  
Democracy 
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014) sets out a 
general framework which both identifies the underlying causes of violent conflict 
and also highlights the means through which violent conflict can be most 
effectively addressed. In operating within this framework, stabilisation actors 
direct their efforts towards reconciling ‘underlying incompatibilities’ (1). The 
smoothing out of contradictions, the amelioration of tensions and the 
reconciliation of opposites, each point reiterates that we are concerned with a 
liberal object of reference.  
The document affirms that the political settlement will play a central role 
in reconciling these ‘incompatible’ elements. The UK Government’s Approach to 
Stabilisation highlights the central role that institutions will make in this respect, 
enabling the management and mediation of deeply rooted contradictions (2014, 
1, 2). In other instances, Security and Stabilisation outlines a political approach 
to security, providing a population-centred approach and emphasising the 
centrality of host-nation governance. Both points of emphasis are consistent 
with DfID’s general efforts to establish a political approach to conflict 
engagement and more ‘inclusive’ systems of political governance (MoD 2009, 
110).  
This approach establishes that democratisation will enable stabilisation 
actors to engage with the underlying causes of violence, thus ensuring that their 
interventions do not reproduce the causes of violence in subsequent effect 
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(Stabilisation Unit 2010, 5, 7). Stabilisation interventions are addressed to the 
political roots of violent conflict (2010, 7; 2009, 13, 14) and ultimately aspire to 
the establishment of a political settlement that combines formal and informal 
attributes (2014, 1; 2009, 110). In anticipating a broad framework of democratic 
engagement, The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation suggests that 
economic power should be approached and conceived of as an attribute of 
political power (2014, 2).  
This broadened framework of democratic engagement is evidenced 
within a more sustained engagement with the ‘informal’ and ‘social’. Security 
and Stabilisation emphasises the importance of social interactions, when it 
recognises ‘the importance of the relationship between the host government, 
competing elites and the local population’ (2009, 26). This preoccupation with 
the ‘social’ can be traced back to the integration of democracy and development 
discourses. The convergence of the two shifts the reader’s attention away from 
a narrow fixation upon formal political rights and instead establishes the basis 
for a ‘broader’ engagement with economic and social reference points (2009, 
110). 
This broadening effect is an important accompaniment of 
complementarity. As stabilisation actors come to perceive the ways in which 
democracy, development and security are interrelated, they will advance 
towards a broader understanding of each component part. This feature was 
clearly evidenced in each stabilisation document, being most vividly illustrated 
in the proposition that security can only be completely perceived through the 
lens of political governance.  
Broadening is perfectly embodied and encapsulated in the term ‘political 
settlement’. A closer engagement with the stabilisation documents reveals that 
this term incorporates economic, political and social dimensions, incorporating 
each element into a sophisticated and multi-dimensional analysis of (in)security.  
‘Security’ is not imposed by force but instead originates within more consensual 
tools and techniques. Even here there is an implicitly coercive subtext, as 
evidenced within the proposition that external influence should work to create 
‘space for internal actors to reach a political settlement’ (Stabilisation Unit 2014, 
3). Again, it is reiterated that it is only through external mediation that internal 
agency is enabled and put into effect.  
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 This serves to reiterate that democratic engagement is not concerned 
with simply reproducing the perspectives of local actors. On the contrary, there 
is a clear intention to bring about a fundamental transformation. This is a 
paradox that is deeply rooted within liberal peacebuilding: it is simultaneously 
committed to the elevation and fundamental transformation of the local. 
Accordingly, it is well-established that ‘local level stabilisation should be aimed 
at changing the perceptions, relationships and behaviours of local politically 
significant actors and groups’ (Stabilisation Unit 2010, 11).  
In Security and Stabilisation this aspect is brought out more completely 
when local-level engagement is reshaped and adapted as a tactic of counter-
insurgency which enables stabilisation actors to shape, secure, hold and 
develop. Democratic engagement, as part of an ‘integrated theatre plan’ should 
therefore aspire to ‘influence the decisive groups in order to enable a political 
settlement’ (2009, 168). Democratic engagement is therefore strategized, 
functioning as part of a wider project that attempts to bring about change at the 
local level (2009, 126, 168). Although the vernacular of ‘empowering’ and 
‘enabling’ presents this agency as ‘local’ (2009, 193), its ultimate exteriority is 
quite transparent.  
Closer inspection therefore reveals that the external is privileged. It is 
external actors that identify the basis of the political settlement and work to 
establish the space within which this settlement can become established (2014, 
5). In certain instances, it is local actors that are cast in a supportive role (2009, 
115). Security and Stabilisation makes this quite clear when it observes that  
‘political analysis may help to identify the elites who should be empowered and 
those which not’ (2009, 137, 193). This clearly corresponds to Richmond’s and 
MacGinty’s stated concern with the ‘instrumental use of the local’ (2013, 771) 
The theme of coercion is brought out in even clearer detail when The UK 
Government’s Approach to Stabilisation refers to the domestic ‘population’ 
(2014, 9) before observing that ‘[security] forces should have a deep cultural 
understanding of the local population, and will need to build robust working 
relationships with them’ (2009, 178). The word ‘population’ is significant 
because it suggests a predilection to approach the domestic context from 
outside (2009, 27, 60) and to conceive it as a totality. It possesses few, if any, 
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of the connotations that might otherwise be attributed to the ‘contextual’, ‘local’ 
or ‘social’.   
It also ascribes a clear passivity to the local population, evoking a clear 
sense of administrative, and possibly even colonial, oversight. This brings to 
mind Richmond’s and MacGinty’s observation that contemporary engagements 
with the local come laden with unfortunate colonial antecedents (2013, 771). 
Security and Stabilisation illustrates this when it observes that  
external actors ‘need to carry [the local population] with us’ (2009, xv, 115). 
Here it is noticeable that the domestic population is not possessed of agency, 
but is instead swept away and carried forth with the tide. Jabri concisely 
summarises the essential dynamic when she relates a ‘clear sense in which 
practices are geared to making full use of local actors, their knowledge of their 
own conditions and their effectiveness as recipients of peacebuilding support’ 
(2013, 13).  
As a consequence of these innovations, the domestic context is 
transformed from the subject to the object of intervention. It is the external 
guarantors of stabilisation who are to be endowed with agency, a point which is 
explicitly made when it is asserted that ‘[t]he population will need to be turned 
away from their dependence on adversarial hostile and belligerent forces by 
fracturing these groups and their linkages to the population’ (2009, 137). 
Coercion presents itself in its full immediacy, assuming form in the level of 
prescription (‘the population will need to be turned away’), pejorative overtones 
(‘dependence on adversarial hostile and belligerent forces’) and open 
celebration of punitive actions (‘fracturing these groups’).  
These accounts attribute a clear pre-eminence to external influence, 
ascribing it a formative and even determining role. However, this general 
characterisation is complicated when The UK Government’s Approach to 
Stabilisation proposes that it is the withdrawal of external influence which will 
enable an endogenous and self-sustaining democratic process to emerge. This 
absenting will create the domestic space within which local actors can 
‘recalibrate the balance of power’ (2014, 11). Responding to Stabilisation 
Challenges makes the same point, albeit in a different manner, when it asserts 
the need to shift responsibility to local actors at as early a stage as possible 
(2010, 25).  
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In Responding to Stabilisation Challenges the convergence of 
democracy promotion and development produces the understanding that local 
communities should play an active and important role within service delivery. 
This document notes that: ‘Community engagement means the capacity to 
communicate with communities, establish the services and opportunities they 
need to achieve stability and then provide the framework in which they can build 
those services and opportunities (2010, 15).’ In this instance, it is functional 
concerns which are pre-eminent, a point which is reiterated when democratic 
engagement is presented as a basis for ‘effective stabilisation support’ (2010, 
15), establishing a means through which external actors can ‘investigate local 
communities’ priorities about what they need, what works, what doesn’t work 
and why’ (2010, 24).  
The document evidences a subtle orientation towards a policy agenda, 
with local ‘demand’ producing functional outputs. Through a more sustained 
engagement at the local level, stabilisation actors will therefore be able to  
‘identify and support local solutions for stability, implement effective stabilisation 
support and understand whether stability is improving in the eyes of the 
population’ (2010, 15). Improved service provision that is aligned with the needs 
of the local community is anticipated within improved forms of analysis, 
communication and implementation.  
Community engagement is similarly redefined with reference to the 
imperative of enhanced functional capacities. Responding to Stabilisation 
Challenges observes that: ‘community engagement [requires] that civilian and 
military actors engage with communities and triangulate analysis to inform 
planning and programming’ (2010, 15). The precise terminology used here – 
‘triangulate’, ‘planning’, ‘programming’ – is strikingly technocratic in form. The 
value of democratic engagement therefore derives from the fact that it improves 
information feedback, heightens responsiveness (‘local knowledge and 
relationships [are] pivotal to timely decision-making at the tactical level’ (2009, 
160)) and aligns the overall intervention with local conditions. In each of these 
respects, ‘[t]he governing imperative of peacebuilding undermines the political’ 
(Jabri 2013, 15).   
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Through a more sustained democratic engagement, stabilisation actors 
can move towards an improved ‘situational understanding’ (2010, 15) and align 
their interventions with local needs and requirements. The technocratic 
undertones are made explicit within allusions to ‘triangulation’, ‘analysis’, 
‘planning’ and ‘programming’. In operating within this framework, democratic 
engagement become focused in upon very precise end objectives, such as the 
heightened accountability of the security services (2010, 2, 10; 2014, 2). While 
this is undoubtedly an important undertaking in itself, it is far from clear how it 
can address the ‘deep-rooted, complex political problems that cause conflict 
and insecurity’ (2010, 3). 
The three stabilisation documents, in rendering the convergence of 
democracy and security, present the tools and techniques of democratic 
engagement as means through which ‘battle’ can be waged. In this form, 
democratic engagement is almost indistinguishable from pacification. This is 
made clear when Security and Stabilisation observes that: ‘Identifying the 
decisive groups and then persuading them to support the government through 
focused campaigns may be more effective than killing and capturing 
adversaries’ (2009, 136). This is redolent of what Jabri has previously referred 
to as a ‘policing rationality’ (2013, 10). It is striking, and more than a little 
sobering, to reflect upon how far this has taken from our initial exploration of 
positive peace.  
It is particularly telling that stabilisation doctrine casts domestic 
populations as passive recipients. ‘Empowered’ domestic populations do not 
change their own material circumstances; rather, it is incumbent upon external 
agencies to lead the domestic population away from temptation and in the 
direction of salvation, an imperative that takes on ecclesiastical overtones. In 
this regard, it is instructive to reflect that the word ‘dependence’ carries a clear 
pejorative, exposing a clear moral failing upon the part of the stabilisation 
subject. Over time, these failings have become deeply entrenched, making it 
incumbent upon external actors to break the binds that chain the domestic 
population to their own deficiencies and assorted ‘spoilers’. However, this brave 
and moral undertaking is substantially complicated by the fact that the dividing 
lines between the two have become blurred and indistinct – at times, it is 
difficult to see where the enemy ends and the population begins. This is a point 
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which Security and Stabilisation explicitly makes when it observes that the 
adversary is frequently only engaged through the local population (2009, 197). 
Far from being the foundation-stone of emancipation and transformation, the 
local has now become an object that elicits distrust and consternation.  
It is equally significant that Security and Stabilisation asserts the 
importance of British interests and priorities (‘the purpose of UK military 
participation in security and stabilisation is the achievement of the desired UK 
political aim’ (2009, 15, 59). In the deepening and contextuality chapters, 
external actors took on an almost neutral form, appearing as a background 
presence whose influence upon the domestic context was understated and at 
times imperceptible. Stabilisation doctrine has however achieved a profound 
inversion, coming to conceive local actors in an assistive, ancillary or secondary 
role. In this respect it is instructive that it is their support, as opposed to direct 
participation, that is solicited and incorporated into stabilisation strategies(2009, 
115). In reiterating a deeply ingrained exteriority, Security and Stabilisation 
observes that ‘influence is the overarching effect that all the elements of a 
stabilisation plan will seek to achieve’ (2009, 56). 
In this respect, it is important to note that democratic participation is most 
frequently conceived as a means through which surveillance and oversight can 
be refined. Democratic participation has become narrowed in upon a very 
precise or exact purpose. Security and Stabilisation reiterates this when it 
conceives the domestic population as a ‘rich source of intelligence’ (2009, 115). 
The population has now become an input into a bureaucratic process, whose 
contribution will diminish the ‘uncertainties’ associated ‘with focused intelligence 
gathering and analysis’ (2009, 60).  We appear to be confronted by an instance 
in which ‘the local is securitised and modernised in Western liberal and 
neoliberal terms’ (Richmond and MacGinty 2013, 776). This is not a minor 
footnote to a more substantial adjustment; rather, as Security and Stabilisation 
observes, it represents a qualitative shift within the overarching rationale of 
intelligence gathering (2009, 222, 223).  
In detailing the intelligence gathering process, Security and Stabilisation 
asserts that ‘[c]ommanders should instil [in their intelligence teams] this idea of 
building the intelligence picture from the bottom-up’ (2009, 115). Democratic 
engagement is viewed as a means that enables intelligence agencies to 
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penetrate domestic host societies and extract information that can be applied in 
the course of stabilisation interventions. We are reminded that ‘[e]ffective 
intelligence gathering is proactive, aggressive and bottom-up in nature’ (2009, 
60).  
In engaging with the encounter between democracy and security I have 
sought to demonstrate how democratic engagement incorporates local actors 
and agencies into stabilisation frameworks. I have sought to demonstrate how 
this integration of the two discursive components has been accompanied by 
various tensions and contradictions or, in the words of Richmond, various 
‘moments of exclusion’ (2011, 9). I sought to demonstrate how the three key 
stabilisation documents reproduced a clear sense of exteriority, sometimes in 
direct opposition to a persistent commitment to local-level engagement. The 
internal-external and technical-political tensions that I encountered in the 
Contextuality chapter were similarly reproduced within these stabilisation 
documents.  
In engaging with the securitisation of local agency, I noted how local 
participation became an essential component within counter-insurgency. In 
contrast to the proposition of a democratic broadening, I encountered a subtle 
reformulation, in which the agency of local actors became aligned with a 
broader counter-insurgency strategy. I suggested that the coercive undertones, 
which had been understated and even occluded in earlier chapters, had now 
become pronounced. The fact that stabilisation is ultimately directed towards 
the realisation of British interests was, for example, quite clearly and openly 
acknowledged. Stabilisation discourse, I suggested, lacked the nuances and 
subtleties that had been encountered in the deepening and contextuality 
chapters.  
Development 
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges (2010) begins by observing that 
stabilisation interventions should be addressed to the underlying ‘drivers’ of 
conflict. The word ‘driver’ reflects a more nuanced understanding, in which 
conflict dynamics are no longer reducible to simplistic cause-effect relations. 
Underdevelopment, for instance, is no longer crudely interpreted as a ‘cause’ of 
conflict; rather it is instead – in a far more satisfactory manner – linked into a 
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wider set of interlocking and interconnecting factors (2009, 30). Responding to 
Stabilisation Challenges therefore establishes a reciprocal interplay which 
conjoins politics and development (2010, 7). 
The concept of ‘driver’ is therefore associated with a heightened degree 
of complexity, uncertainty and contingency and, by virtue of each of these 
features, does not anticipate a direct end product. By virtue of the fact that 
drivers are singular to each society, stabilisation insights can only be 
generalised across different contexts with extreme caution. However, Security 
and Stabilisation does acknowledge that ‘[t]here are some generic tenets which 
underpin success’ (2009, 24). Again, this brings us back to the specific-
general/internal-external tension that reoccurred over the course of preceding 
chapters.  
Security and Stabilisation establishes that ‘development initiatives, where 
possible, should be designed directly to confront the economic and political 
drivers of conflict’ (2009, 105; also see 2014, 5). Development is therefore an 
adaptable and flexible tool that can be applied to the underlying drivers of 
instability and violent conflict (2009, 105; 2014, 5). Under less happy 
circumstances, the reverse applies – developmental shortcomings can obstruct 
or undermine stabilisation objectives.  
By virtue of these pronounced interlinkages, democracy promotion, 
development and security can be approached within a common framework of 
reference (2014, 9). Security and Stabilisation further reiterates that security is 
important because it ‘stimulat[es] economic activity and suppor[ts] longer-term 
development and governance reform’ (2009, 79). Both the statebuilding and 
development agendas further underline this interconnectedness – the reform of 
state institutions, appropriate practices of governance and integration into 
global economic processes all converge upon single points (2009, 9).  
Institutions are a particular fixation, representing a point of convergence 
for a range of disparate concerns and preoccupations. At a thematic level, they 
bring together democracy and development, establishing the basis for a multi-
dimensional agenda focused upon accountability, legitimacy and 
responsiveness which is directed towards the mitigation and management of 
social conflict (2014, 1). Fully functional institutions, both formal and informal, 
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integrate the state into society, establishing the basis for a more stable, secure 
and sustainable political settlement (2009, 62; 2014, 1). 
One of the most noticeable features of the given stabilisation documents 
is that there is a much less pronounced emphasis upon human needs. Needs, it 
will be recalled, were an essential accompaniment to human development and 
human security. However, they are conspicuous by their absence from 
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges; instead, the locus of attention has 
instead shifted towards the ‘multiple human interests’ which guide stabilisation 
interventions. ‘Interest’ is a particularly important signifier because it appears to 
abruptly displace human-centred frameworks, instead elevating a set of 
rationalised and utility-maximising reference points in their place. Invocations of 
‘stakeholders’ (2009, 60; 2010, 15) are significant for precisely the same 
reason. 
This functionalist ethos is similarly reproduced in the discussion of 
statebuilding, with development being presented as the basis of the domestic 
government’s authority. Security and Stabilisation suggests that ‘all actions 
[should be] linked to national priorities, programmes and structures’ (2009, 24). 
National ‘ownership’ of the development agenda is particularly important 
because it strengthens and legitimises the domestic state. This establishes the 
basis for heightened public interaction with the state, thus further consolidating 
the domestic political settlement. Optimised governance presents a circle, with 
each component interlocking and interacting.  
Security and Stabilisation reiterates this feature when it emphasises that 
‘[t]he host nation will need to demonstrate that they can deliver security, justice, 
governance and economic prosperity more effectively than their adversaries’ 
(2009, 127). The integration of democracy, development and security originates 
a series of tactics that can be applied as part of a more general counter-
insurgency strategy. At this point we are reminded of Richmond and MacGinty’s 
allusion to instances in which ‘strategic interests and securitisation [have] 
seeped carelessly into peacebuilding and development’ (2013, 777-778). 
It is similarly noticeable how ‘informal’ and ‘social’ reference points 
(2009, 105) converge back on the statebuilding and ‘good governance’ 
agendas. This is one illustration of a more general trend towards 
standardisation within the peacebuilding field (Richmond and MacGinty 2013, 
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777), a trend which has already been extensively engaged in the deepening 
and contextuality chapters. Just as in my discussion of contextuality, I argue 
that the integration of democracy, development and security should be 
conceived and understood in relation to a wider background of functionality. 
State-societal relations, to take one example, were no longer conceived as a 
site of alterity, but instead served to reproduced generic models and templates.  
While development theory and practice encompasses a wide range of 
reference points, I encountered a clear convergence upon a very precise reform 
of agenda which takes improved state functionality, domestic ownership (of the 
development agenda and enhanced state-societal relations as its key 
preoccupations. Each component feeds into a multi-dimensional and integrated 
counter-insurgency strategy. This incorporation, I suggested, has not been 
without concomitant contradictions, divergences and tensions.  
Security 
Security and Stabilisation sets out the basic components of stabilisation 
doctrine when it references ‘three broad, overlapping areas of progress that 
underpin successful stabilisation efforts: security, governance and development’ 
(2009, 24). This document suggests that security is a foundation which will 
underpin further progress (2009, 20; 2014, 10), alternately presenting it as a 
condition or enabling influence (2014, 7). The UK Government’s Approach to 
Stabilisation further reiterates this point when it observes that ‘[s]ecurity is 
essential to create a conducive environment for non-violent political processes’ 
(2014, 9).  
This contribution again reminds us that stabilisation is grounded within a 
very specific understanding of security. It does not aspire to the removal of 
contradiction, conflict or tension. Rather, it aspires to the establishment of 
institutions through which they can be more effectively managed. The allusion 
to ‘non-violent political processes’ is a synonym for institutions that can manage 
and channel conflict. In instances where ‘non-violent fora’ (2014, 7) break down, 
tensions will ensue and the likelihood of violent conflict will increase. This 
acknowledgement of the institutional dimension is consistent with a ‘broadened’ 
framework of security analysis. As Security and Stabilisation explains: ‘A sense 
of security cannot be maintained by military action alone since it is bound into 
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the wider concept of human security and improving governance’ (2009, 204). 
Frameworks of ‘human security’ and ‘governance’ are therefore presented as 
force maximisers, which will augment existing capacities and capabilities. In 
engaging with these broader agenda, security actors are guided by the insight 
that it is ‘the delivery of focused, comprehensive effect, not purely military effect, 
which will overwhelm adversaries’ (2009, xiii). The challenges of security 
therefore necessitate a broad-ranging and integrated approach which engages 
across ‘security, development and governance lines of operation’ (2009, 2). 
Security and Stabilisation further illustrates how governance can be 
linked into security when it observes that ‘security is usually conditional on a 
degree of popular consent’ (2009, 87). ‘Consent’ contrasts with ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘participation’ because it implies a much more limited or passive form of 
democratic engagement. It also suggests that social actors are to acquiesce to 
measures that have been largely predetermined or foregrounded in advance.  
While the rationale of democratic participation is relatively delimited, the 
range of participants is somewhat wider. To this extent, all three of the key 
documents converge upon the proposition that both formal and informal 
institutions can help to manage and mediate social tensions. In the self-
understanding that Security and Stabilisation advances, this insight derives 
from a more advanced analysis of (in)security. It reflects that ‘[t]he military 
provides only part of the solution to a complex, primarily political problem’ 
(2009, 21). The words ‘complex’ and ‘primarily political’ further distance the 
document from a technocratic framework, situating it firmly within a political field 
of analysis.  
In further analysis of this point, the same document also remarks that 
‘[s]ecurity progress should not just be seen as a sequential series of steps into 
whose footprints civil actors can move’ (2009, 56). By implication, the text posits 
that it is inherently flawed to speak as though security corresponds to linear 
progression and precise graduations. Instead, security actors must learn to 
engage with contingency, flux and fluidity. They must come to think and act 
within a framework of analysis that systematically engages with the economic, 
political and social dimensions of conflict (2009, 56). Security and Stabilisation, 
in engaging this interrelation in more depth, asserts that ‘[t]he stability of the 
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state depends on the manner in which [security, development and governance] 
interact and are mutually reinforcing’ (2009, 5).  
Stabilisation interventions should therefore work in a fluid and integrated 
manner, and engage not only with specific challenges, but also with the points 
at which they intersect and overlap. Stabilisation actors operate in a highly 
uncertain environment, in which the exertion of influence at any one point will 
produce a whole range of subsequent effects. Degradation in one respect can 
contribute to ‘an erosion of the others’ (2009, 7).  
In working within this framework of reference, The UK Government’s 
Approach to Stabilisation expands upon the interaction between politics and 
security in some detail (2014, 7). It observes that the convergence of the 
democracy and security agendas has resulted in a heightened emphasis upon 
open and accountable security services (2009, 90; 2014, 7). However, 
accountability is not privileged in and of itself – rather, its value is instead 
understood to derive from the range of efficiency benefits that it produces 
(2010, 24). This point is clearly addressed by the fact that Responding to 
Stabilisation Challenges makes accountability a condition of efficiency (2010, 
24). 
In engaging with each of the stabilisation texts, we also encounter a 
repeated assertion of the proposition that security is not a technical concern 
that can be guaranteed through appropriate adjustments and amendments 
within the established terms of reference. Security and Stabilisation outlines the 
range of activities that are grouped under the Demobilisation, Disarmament and 
Reintegration (DDR) rubric before asserting that it is not a technical framework 
of reference. In further reiterating this point, it observes that ‘DDR is not just a 
technical, military activity, but a political process with economic and social 
consequences’ (2009, 93).  
Significantly, Security and Stabilisation attributes the emergence of 
stabilisation frameworks to this paradigm shift. This is shown in its allusion to 
‘wider stabilisation activities that have gone beyond the delivery of security’ 
(2009, 20). Stabilisation, in this understanding, represents a hugely significant 
shift within the conceptualisation and theorisation of security.  
Here it is clearly reiterated that security cannot be reduced to more 
effective forms of technocratic management and mediation. However, upon 
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closer reflection, this ‘political’ framework rests upon a certain ambiguity, and to 
this extent, ‘political’ reference points become intelligible in their functional 
relation: the agency of informal actors is considered in relation to a series of 
policy outputs (2010, 23, 110). To an equivalent extent, the encounter between 
democracy and security does not substantially reduce or qualify external biases 
or distortions. This point is explicitly reasserted when it is observed that ‘military 
operations need to focus upon the population in order to ensure human and 
physical security’ (2009, 173). The recurrence of the word ‘population’ again 
reiterates that we are concerned with an externalised framework which is 
predisposed to approach its referent object from without. Although the human 
security framework suggests that human needs and priorities are the 
preponderant preoccupation, a closer analysis suggests that human security is 
only ensured through interventions that act upon the given population. This 
point is firmly reiterated when the need to ‘re-establish and maintain control of 
key populations’ (2009, 199) is again (re)asserted.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused upon the points at which discourses of 
democracy, development and security encounter each other. In engaging at 
each of the interrelated points I have worked within the framework of 
complementarity, which is premised upon the understanding that the integration 
and alignment of each constitutive element will produce reinforcing effects and 
the amelioration of deeply rooted contradictions and tensions. In engaging with 
the broad theme of stabilisation, I sought to establish precisely how each of the 
constitutive elements of post-conflict peacebuilding was textually related, 
aligned and reconciled.  
After engaging with the question of how integration was achieved, my 
analysis frequently reiterated that the respective components were aligned in 
ways that were conflictual or contradictory. As with both the chapters on 
deepening and contextuality, I noted a pervasive functionalism. In this instance, 
however, this feature was more abrupt and was therefore less underpinned by 
subtle nuances, mitigations or qualifications. Exteriority, the predisposition to 
approach peacebuilding questions from an external perspective, to take one 
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example, was clearly held as a central corollary and implication of the given 
stabilisation documents.  
I suggested that the word ‘population’ perfectly embodied this attribute. 
The word implies a malleable form which can be reformulated and adapted 
through external intervention. At times, I suggested, these external interventions 
assumed coercive overtones. The perceptions, relations and behaviours of 
domestic actors became, as a consequence, the object of external mediation 
and oversight. Although reforms and initiatives were enacted at the domestic 
level, their impetus and momentum ultimately derived from external sources. 
The word ‘population’ also implies a certain objectification or passivity. Far from 
rendering the active subject of peacebuilding theory, stabilisation instead seeks 
the ‘consent’ of a depoliticised and passive population, whose acquiescence is 
an invaluable resource within the ‘politico-strategic’ struggle.  
The three key documents evidenced a residual sense that local agency 
should be incorporated into stabilisation frameworks. Each one furthers the 
impression of a political framework of reference which is predicated upon a 
‘deepened’ understanding of democratic engagement. In engaging at all three 
points, we repeatedly encountered the assertion that democracy is more than a 
formal means of decision-making or a mechanism of optimal service delivery. 
However, upon a closer engagement with the three texts we encounter a 
negotiation of political and technocratic reference points. The tensions between 
these two points are not overcome but are instead discursively qualified, 
mitigated and managed.  
In the initial stages of this chapter I noted that complementarity 
corresponds to the general proposition that one of the constitutive components 
of post-conflict peacebuilding is essentially reinforcing: democracy feeds into 
development which in turn feeds into security. Each element is intelligible in its 
mutual relation and interaction. My analysis has instead suggested a slightly 
different order of discourse, in which democracy and development are refracted 
through the lens of security. In engaging with the three key texts I observed how 
local agency and development become securitised, that is, incorporated into a 
wider framework of reference. This closely corresponds to Richmond’s allusion 
to instances in which empowerment and emancipation are ‘carried out in the 
shadow of security’ (Richmond 2011, 30).  Upon engaging with the reproduction 
 233 
of complementarity within the three given texts, I would be predisposed to 
suggest a pervasive securitisation, in which democracy and development are 
reconfigured as ‘technologies of security’ and recast as means through which 
securitising agendas are discursively and materially (re) produced.   
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Chapter Seven  
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis has sought to engage and resolve the question of how the 
comprehensive approach has enabled the British government to overcome the 
contradictions and tensions of liberal peacebuilding. I defined the 
comprehensive approach as a means through which a range of actors – 
international, regional and state – could reconcile the tensions of liberal 
peacebuilding and work towards a broadened framework of reference.  
In looking to engage with this agenda of comprehensiveness in more 
depth and detail, I first identified three separate dimensions of the 
comprehensive approach: deepening, contextuality and complementarity. My 
analysis did not question whether these three dimensions were evidenced 
within texts; rather, it sought to identify how they were reproduced and to what 
extent this reproduction succeeded in overcoming the three key tensions of 
liberal peacebuilding.  
The integration of liberal peacebuilding discourse, I argued, partially 
overcomes or mitigates the tensions of liberal peacebuilding. The three different 
dimensions of the comprehensive approach were clearly identified and traced 
within the policy documents; however, their form did not clearly correspond to 
initial expectations. Rather, I encountered the continual occurrence and iteration 
of certain tensions and contradictions. Upon engaging with the policy 
documents I encountered an oscillation between each of these respective 
points: the technical and political, the internal and external. Ultimately, the texts 
did not produce final closure or reconciliation, but instead reconfigured or 
realigned pervasive tensions and contradictions.  
In direct opposition to the ostensible rationale of policy documents, I did 
not therefore read them as the unfolding of policy knowledge or as an 
incremental progression towards a more complete reconciliation of theory and 
practice. I instead suggested that they should be encountered as a series of 
discursive manoeuvres which subtly qualify, mitigate or understate underlying 
tensions. Deepening, contextuality and complementarity were all evidenced, but 
in forms which clearly diverged from their initial iteration.  
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In engaging with the proposition that liberal peacebuilding had advanced 
beyond technocratic points of reference, for instance, I sought to highlight the 
recurrence and reiteration of ‘surpassed’ reference points. As one illustration, 
civil society engagement became articulated within a technical vernacular, 
being directed towards the achievement of optimal policy outputs. Similarly, in 
advancing the claim that interventions were grounded within the local context, 
policy documents would frequently orientate back towards general or external 
reference points, often doing so in ways that were subtle, understated or 
occluded. From my perspective, this (re)confirmed the centrality of a critical 
reading that would seek to engage resultant tensions in their true meaning and 
significance.  
In this chapter I will develop this critical contribution by returning to 
material that was initially engaged in both the Literature Review and Theory 
chapters. I do so in the belief that these contributions can help to bring out 
important aspects of my empirical findings by situating them within a wider field 
of critical analysis.  
I will initially return to the three dimensions of the comprehensive 
approach. In engaging with each of the three empirical chapters, I will 
summarise key research findings and observations. In engaging at each point, I 
also attempt to incorporate contributions to the literature in order to clarify key 
points and link the discussion back to themes that have already been engaged. 
I will then set out my research contribution. I understand my contribution to be 
situated within a wider set of contributions. This requires me to answer a 
number of questions: How has it filled existing gaps in the literature? What 
points has it clarified? How does it interact with other contributions to the 
research field?  
Finally, the further research sub-section initially engages with the 
limitations of my research – the points of potential engagement that, for a 
variety of reasons, it has been unable to engage in sufficient depth or detail. In 
highlights points of oversight or omission, it anticipates the outlines of future 
research.  
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Deepening, Contextuality and Complementarity: Three 
Dimensions of the Comprehensive Approach  
The comprehensive approach has three separate dimensions: 
deepening, contextuality and complementarity. Each dimension is linked into an 
associated specific proposition. Deepening originates within the proposition that 
peacebuilding actors have come to acknowledge the inherent limitations and 
perversities of ‘top-down’, ‘technocratic’ or ‘managerial’ frameworks of 
engagement. This has resulted in a shift towards a ‘deeper’ or more substantive 
model of democracy promotion. Contextuality can be traced back to the 
proposition that practitioners have come to acknowledge the limitations and 
constraints of ‘top-down’ forms of managerialism. Through learning the lessons 
of past failure, peacebuilding actors have internalised the axiom that 
peacebuilding interventions should be contextually rooted within societal 
institutions, practices, structures and capacities. Finally, complementarity can 
be traced back to the proposition that internal tensions have acted to the 
detriment of previous peacebuilding interventions. In acknowledging the 
potential for each peacebuilding component to conflict, peacebuilding actors 
have actively strived to balance democracy, development and security within 
their peacebuilding strategies and approaches.  
Deepening originates within the assumption that peacebuilding actors 
have ‘learned’ the deficiencies of ‘minimalist’ (Bermeo 2003, 153-154) or 
‘circumscribed’ (Labonte 2003, 262) frameworks of democracy promotion. While 
these frameworks have not been entirely disposed with, they have been 
subordinated to a more ambitious agenda focused upon social transformation.  
In slightly different terms, we might speak of a shift of emphasis that has 
re-orientated from a formal to a substantive model of democracy promotion. 
This clearly recalls Pouligny’s suggestion that ‘politics and statehood must be 
understood in their substantial aspects, their diverse conceptions and 
properties, and not only in their formal appearances’ (2005, 505). In 
operationalising the insight that the formal political process provides a very 
limited basis of engagement (DfID 2006, 6, 68), peacebuilding actors have 
proactively committed to a deepened democratic agenda (Newman 2009, 2010; 
Richmond 2005).  
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This shift further embeds the sense that peacebuilding is a linear 
progression, continually striving towards enhanced methods of conflict 
engagement and intervention. Liberal peacebuilding is in perpetual motion, 
continually adapting, adjusting and realigning. This feature is deeply rooted, 
presenting itself as an intrinsic attribute. Liberal peacebuilding proceeds, in 
anticipation of a deepened democratic commitment, a more sustained 
engagement of context and a heightened integration of constitutive elements.  
My reading of key policy documents instead sought to ‘vulgarise’ these 
linear progressions, indicating an abrupt reversion to ‘surpassed’ reference 
points. I continually returned to a sense of contradiction, of recurrent tension.  
To take one example: deepening became tied up with state functionality (Torres 
and Anderson 2004, 9; DfID 2006, 11, 19), and therefore part of a wider 
framework of reference. Claire Barnes encapsulates this development when 
she refers to ‘participation in policy processes’ (2009, 6). Whereas the initial 
terms of deepening had corresponded to emancipation and social 
transformation, the focus upon policy outcomes ultimately returns the 
discussion to what Barnes describes as a ‘discourse of functionality’ (2009, 3, 
11). In being refracted through this discourse, deepening becomes a means 
through which improved levels of policy performance can be achieved. It 
ultimately becomes comprehensible in its relation to, and implications for, this 
reform agenda.  
In being refracted through this lens, democratic deepening no longer 
corresponded to a sense of alterity or subversion; on the contrary, it instead 
became a means through which general neo-liberal imperatives such as 
efficiency and functionality were embedded and circulated: civil society 
engagement, to take another example, became focused in upon a very specific 
set of functional outputs. he terms of discourse became noticeably more 
general and homogenised in the process. The freedom of the domestic subject 
became exercised in a way which further reinforced the overarching structure of 
neo-liberal governance, recalling Foucault’s allusion to the ‘considerable 
extension of procedures of control, constraint, and coercion which are 
something like the counterpart and counterweight of different freedoms’ (2010, 
67). To put it differently, heightened participation within this framework does not  
mitigate or remove control; rather, it further intensifies the reach and disciplinary 
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scope of neo-liberal governance. This recalls Richmond’s previous allusion to 
‘agencies of both emancipatory and repressive character’ (Richmond 2010, 
200).  
Upon engaging with other policy documents, I encountered further 
instances in which emancipation or transformation became discursively 
‘bounded’, being situated within a wider field of reference. My discussion of 
empowerment, in direct opposition to the proposition that ‘there is no advance 
blueprint’ (OECD 1997b), found that the empowerment of the domestic subject 
was frequently centred in upon a clearly defined set of expectations. In 
opposition to open-ended frameworks of democratic engagement, such as 
Lederach’s ‘process structure’ (1997, 84) and de Guevara’s ‘process-orientated’ 
(2010) model of state formation, ‘social’ engagement instead became fixated 
upon a very precise and exact set of ‘core functions’, with improved capability, 
accountability and responsiveness being openly celebrated and elevated as 
core priorities (CAR) (DfID 2001, 11; DfID 2006, 11). Participation, 
empowerment and ‘social’ engagement therefore became, through a subtle 
adaptation, reconfigured as a set of inputs. This brought to mind Pouligny’s 
depiction of a ‘fundamental ambiguity’ in which civil society engagement 
became reduced to ‘to highly technical dimensions, depriving it of all political 
substance’ (2005, 505).  
Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DfID’s Work in 
Developing More Effective States similarly situates social engagement in 
relation to statebuilding processes. In further reiterating this point, it asserts that 
‘it is this wider political economy of institutions that determines state 
effectiveness’ (2006, 6; Whaites 2008, 11). The preoccupation with efficiency 
ultimately returns the reader to a very general level of discussion. Allusions to 
the ‘quality’ of state–societal relations, to take one example, are clearly 
contingent upon a general measurement or standard against which the specific 
instance can be measured. This feature is also put into effect when the active 
incorporation of informal institutions into governance networks is presented as a 
means through which a set of positive general effects, such as heightened 
accountability, transparency or state functionality, can be concretely realised. 
This complex hybridisation recalls Chandler’s previous allusion to instances in 
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which emancipatory points of reference such as ‘empowerment’ become 
subsumed within a technocratic vernacular (2006, 20-21, 64).  
As a direct consequence, the agency of domestic actors becomes 
functionalised or instrumentalised. Improved accountability, transparency and 
openness are the beneficial by-products derived from this rationalised politics. 
Devoid of any contingency or unpredictability, the political agency of domestic 
actors instead becomes reconfigured and recapitulated as a technique of good 
governance. The empowerment of local actors does not anticipate alterity or 
variation, but rather reproduces the dimensions of the overarching governance 
framework. Under these circumstances, ‘every empowerment of individual 
subjects [becomes] matched by the growth of subjectifying capacities of 
government’ (Simons 1995, 47, 50). 
The tension between the technocratic and political is overcome by the 
formation of these hybrid forms, which fuse the two dimensions in ways that 
internalise the essential tension. The political no longer appears as the point at 
which the technical is denied or refused, rather it instead provides the means 
through which it is reproduced and circulated. Deepening therefore serves to 
further embed ‘sound policies’ (DfID 2007, 18) and entrench a ‘dominant set of 
policy aspirations’ (Torres and Anderson 2004, 10). Fraser (2005) notes this 
shift in his previous discussion of poverty reduction strategies, which he 
presents as a mechanism that integrates local actors into external frameworks 
of governance. Although the vernacular of empowerment and participation 
implies variation and heterogeneity, it would be more appropriate to speak of 
variation within clearly established limits (Fritz and Menocal 2007, 39). 
Peacebuilding documents frequently push against the outer boundaries of 
‘peace-as-governance’ (Richmond 2009, 57; 2011, 12), but ultimately slip back 
into its comforting embrace.  
My initial discussion of contextuality highlighted a reform agenda focused 
upon the specific, the local and the contextual (Call and Cook 2003, 238; Call 
and Cousens 2008, 15). In rejecting universalisation or generalisation, the 
discourse of contextuality draws strongly upon the ‘social’ (Migdal 2001; Lemay-
Hebert 2009). Precisely because the ‘social’ varies across and between each 
individual context (‘indigenous mechanisms for the creation of [democratic 
governance] may vary from one society to another and may not coincide with 
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the precise institutional forms of Western democracies’ (Malloch Brown 2003, 
145)), contextuality is closely associated with heightened heterogeneity and 
variation (DfID 2006, 3, 13, 20). It establishes the basis for a ‘sociologically or 
anthropologically orientated approach [that] emphasise[s] the particularities of 
each state and its societal context’ (Lemay-Hebert 2009, 28; also see Doornbos 
2002).  
In each of these contributions, context appears as an imperative, a form 
to be concretely realised and manifested. Thus, I sought in my analysis to 
disassemble context, and to break it down into its constitutive parts. This 
analysis was very similar to my engagement with deepening: I critically engaged 
with this general proposition of contextuality in order to illustrate how it was 
linked back into externalised and generic frameworks of reference. In engaging 
with Governance, Development and Democratic Politics, for instance, I noted a 
persistent tendency to refer back to an agenda focused upon ‘growth, service 
delivery and the environment’ (DfID 2006, 49). Rather than imposing limitations 
or constraints upon these general points of reference, ‘context’ more frequently 
came to serve as a means through which it was reproduced; as with deepening, 
the active involvement of informal institutions became reconceived as a means 
through which transparency and accountability could be realised or reinforced 
(2010, 9, 22, 45).  
In this instance, context does not provide the a priori foundation of 
engagement, but is instead subsequently incorporated into a prior reform 
agenda. This feature is evidenced, for instance, when context is presented as a 
consideration which external actors should take into account (DfID 2007, 9), 
being proposed as a unit of analysis to be factored into cost-benefit analyses 
(DfID 2006, 39). This again presents a clear functionalisation, in which local 
context is adapted and operationalised by external actors. Context is not denied 
or restricted, but is instead made to function in a way that reinforces and 
reproduces wider reform agendas and priorities. Building Peaceful States and 
Societies speaks, in precisely these terms, of a ‘virtuous circle’, in which 
interactions between social and political actors produce a range of beneficial 
effects or outputs (DfID 2010, 7).  
Although context is taken as the immediate object of engagement, our 
attention ultimately flickers back towards a general optimisation of state–
 241 
societal relations and state functionality (Torres and Anderson 2004, 9). Again, 
we are reminded of Oliver Richmond’s critical indictment of engagements which 
seek to homogenise or instrumentalise the local (Richmond 2011, 46). In direct 
opposition to a context that establishes the basis for ‘alterity and difference’, this 
emaciated ‘context’ instead anticipates a range of normalising and 
standardising effects (Zanotti 2006; also see MacGinty 2012, 300).  
In bringing the internal and external together within a range of hybrid 
formulations, the documents I examined did not situate the internal and external 
in diametric opposition. The internal did not appear as a point of limitation, at 
which external influence was refused or denied; instead it more frequently 
appeared as a means through which these external dimensions were  
circulated and embodied. My analysis of contextuality therefore repeatedly 
sought to overcome the sense of binary opposition and to demonstrate the 
ways in which the two levels of governance were intertwined and interrelated. 
The internal was no longer defined in opposition to the external, but was instead 
constituted through and within it.  
Thus, I sought to demonstrate that ‘context’ is not a pristine essence 
unstained by external impurities; rather, it is constituted through and within the 
external. As Jabri observed, ‘even where the lens shifts to the local, it is already 
deeply imbricated with the international’ (2013, 11). In similarly emphasising the 
constitutive dimensions of this relationship, Richmond has similarly spoken of 
instances in which liberal peacebuilders ‘produce political subjects or citizens 
best suited to fulfil their policies, agendas, interests and ideologies’ (2011, 12). 
The contours and outlines of context are therefore constituted within the 
interaction between the internal and external. 
In seeking to demonstrate this point in more depth and detail, I explained 
how externalised and generalised reference points repeatedly tended to reoccur 
within the given policy documents. In discussing States in Development, for 
example, I observed that the document openly speculated, in very general 
terms, upon whether specific institutional arrangements may be preferable to 
alternatives (2008, 16). Similarly, the use of ‘transferable’ terms such as 
‘development effectiveness’ and ‘minimal standards’ (Torres and Anderson 
2004, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13) derives from a ‘functional and sometimes technocratic 
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view of politics that seeks to ‘measure’ the success of political processes in 
terms of pre-conceived institutional benchmarks’ (Hameiri 2010, 11).  
In this respect, contextuality more frequently appears to correspond to a 
textual negotiation of two separate points. In the first instance, readers are 
directed towards a set of reference points which are grounded within the local, 
specific or contextual; in the second instance, they are instead concerned with 
an overarching ‘discourse of functionality’ (Barnes 2009, 3, 11) which 
corresponds to ‘effectiveness’, ‘standards’ and ‘quality’ (DfID 2001, 9). Their 
attention therefore flickers between variation and standardisation, heterogeneity 
and homogeneity.  
This tension is not ultimately overcome or ‘reconciled’. Instead, the 
reader encounters a perpetual assertion and retraction of transferability, 
generalisation and standardisation. Appeals to a neo-liberal rationality (as 
evidenced in references to the ‘quality’ of state–societal relations and ‘effective’ 
participation) are foregrounded, but are not then pursued to their logical 
implication or conclusion. Just as deepening rendered a hybridisation of the 
political and the technical, contextuality provides a hybridisation of the internal 
and the external. 
Finally, I engaged with complementarity, and sought to identify how each 
of the internal components of post-conflict peacebuilding (democracy, 
development and security) are integrated in a way that overcomes internal 
tensions and contradictions. In engaging with a proposition that I had initially 
explored in the chapter on deepening, I highlighted a clear convergence upon a 
‘deepened’ form of democratic engagement. This reiterated that democracy is 
more than just an instrument of good governance or improved service delivery 
(MoD 2009, 21, 59 76, 110). The reader nonetheless encounters a reversion or 
oscillation towards a range of technical reference points (Stabilisation Unit 
2010, 15, 24; 2014, 2, 9).  
The given stabilisation documents also sought to further the 
understanding that stabilisation is essentially an endogenous concern, which is 
guided by local contributions and capacities. In keeping with this general 
proposition, the document repeatedly asserted that local actors should take the 
lead in stabilisation interventions (Stabilisation Unit 2010, 25; 2014, 2, 11). 
However, a closer engagement with the text revealed an essential inversion, in 
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which local actors were cast in a supportive or assistive role (DfID 2009, 115; 
Stabilisation Unit 2014, 3, 5). In contrast to my engagement with deepening and 
contextuality, where external influence was subtle and understated, the 
stabilisation documents instead presented external influence in a much clearer 
and less ambiguous form, with local actors instead appearing as objects of 
stabilisation (MoD 2009, 115, 137).  
The interrelation and integration of these three discursive components 
also clearly diverged from another initial expectation that had been established 
by complementarity. As one illustration, ‘bottom-up’ approaches to security do 
not fundamentally alter or reconfigure the terms within which security is 
conceptualised and theorised; rather they instead provide an alternative means 
through which it can be pursued and realised. In corresponding to this outline, 
democracy and development became ‘securitised’ when they were refracted 
through the lens of security.  
As a result of this internal realignment, the emancipatory or 
transformative connotations of a deepened form of democracy become lost. 
The local, which was previously depicted as the repository of an unrealised 
potential, is instead cast aside as a site of potential corruption and deviation. 
Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution expresses a clear concern 
that local populations, having been led astray by the malign intentions of 
various ‘spoilers’, may be corrupted (MoD 2009, 197). It is therefore incumbent 
– and here the essential exteriority of stabilisation is again reiterated – to break 
chains of ‘dependence’, swiftly curtail potential temptations and ensure that 
‘appropriate’ forms of conduct are upheld (Stabilisation Unit 2010, 1, 10, 11).  
In engaging with the textual reproduction of the three dimensions of the 
comprehensive approach, I am tempted to suggest that complementarity merely 
makes its ultimate intent and purpose clearer and more explicit; it lacks, to this 
extent, the nuances and subtleties that characterise its two predecessors. In all 
three instances, the essential implication of a regulatory or disciplinary 
framework of reference is nonetheless the same. This regulatory structure, 
which inculcates ‘appropriate’ and ‘proportionate’ practices, does not seek to 
deny or restrict the agency of the local; rather, it operates through and within it.  
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Research Contribution 
This research breaks with the assumption that the practice of 
peacebuilding should be the primary focus of analytical engagement. Instead, I 
have sought to engage with the discursive structuring and theoretical 
underpinnings of liberal peacebuilding. This has required me to take a step 
back, and to critically engage with assumptions that have otherwise been taken 
for granted, which effectively function as articles of faith. In engaging with 
deeply embedded and essentially implicit assumptions, I have drawn upon the 
contributions of Paris (1997), Haugerudbraaten (1998) and Bellamy (2004), 
each of whom stressed the need for precisely this type of engagement.  
The research literature, however, tends to be more narrowly concerned 
with the question of how peacebuilding is practiced – that is, how it is 
implemented by specific institutional actors. As each of the preceding 
contributors observe, this suggests that practice has proceeded in advance of a 
sustained analysis of underpinning assumptions. As an inherently pragmatic 
enterprise, peacebuilding has consequently remained under-theorised. My 
research is valuable because it consciously and deliberately seeks to overcome 
this particular defect.  
In this respect, my research also has implications for the object of my 
study – namely, the British government. My research questions the assumption 
that the tensions or contradictions can be overcome within the existing terms of 
reference; it highlights the fact that established approaches, far from reconciling 
or overcoming tension, essentially reproduce them. This provides a further 
reiteration of the need to question underpinning assumptions and to 
acknowledge the limitations of a problem-solving framework. A critical analysis 
is required which does not take ‘empowerment’ or ‘participation’ for granted. It 
is, in these circumstances, necessary to first offer a critical analysis that asks 
precisely what form of ‘empowerment’ or ‘participation’ is on offer.  
My institutional focus upon the British government also provides a 
significant innovation. Within the research literature, there is a deeply ingrained 
assumption that the UN, as the institutional actor with primary responsibility for 
the development of peacebuilding practice, should be the main focus of 
attention. In accepting this premise, Karen Barnes (2010), Catriona Gourlay 
(2010) and Maria Neophytou, to take a few examples, have all engaged with 
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different dimensions of the UN’s peacebuilding initiatives. Increasingly, the EU 
has also emerged as an important research focus (Kappler 2012; Bouris 2011). 
In contrast, there are few studies that focus upon the question of how national-
level actors have developed peacebuilding capabilities.  
A large number of the contributions to the research literature also tend to 
be case studies of specific interventions which are focused upon specific 
instances of interventions. While this focus can easily be justified in its own 
terms, it does nonetheless limit the transferability and wider application of key 
research findings. Although my own analysis focuses upon a single policy actor 
it does potentially have a broader application by virtue of the fact that the 
comprehensive approach framework and research findings can conceivably be 
applied to other practitioners of liberal peace. 
In addition, this project does not seek to work within a problem-solving 
framework. It does not seek to identify how specific components or aspects of 
peacebuilding could be more effectively implemented. This is important 
because a number of contributions to the research literature (Orsini, 2001 is one 
example) take this as the basis of their engagement. They are therefore 
predisposed to evaluate, to assess, and to feed back into an improved practice 
of post-conflict peacebuilding. While these preoccupations provide a clear basis 
for applied research, they also represent a certain delimitation or restriction of 
the terms of reference.  
I have identified how my research diverges from established and 
predominant trends within the research literature. However, it is equally 
important to consider points of convergence. Within the critical research 
literature, my contribution most closely resembles Pol’s (2014) assessment of 
bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. In this contribution, he highlights the 
range of power effects that are associated with emancipatory or bottom-up 
contributions. In acknowledging the shift that has occurred within peacebuilding 
practice, he acknowledges the significance of the ‘local turn’, in which 
peacebuilding actors have come to recognise the limitations of managerial and 
top-down approaches to peacebuilding. He argues that this, however, has 
served to legitimise external interventions that operate from below – that is, 
through and within the agency of local actors.  
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In addition, my research findings also closely overlap with contributions 
that consider the bureaucratisation and functionalisation of peacebuilding. 
Goetschel and Hagmann (2009), to take one example, have considered the 
bureaucratisation of peacebuilding. They suggest that bureaucratisation is of 
particular interest because it highlights how the emancipatory and 
transformative components of peacebuilding are – through their incorporation 
into bureaucratic structures and processes – subject to various reconfigurations 
and realignments. In a manner which clearly recalls my own analysis, they 
directly address themselves to ‘prescriptive’ and ‘instrumentalist’ logics, thereby 
establishing how peacebuilding practice has diverged from its ostensible 
pretensions and representations. As an additional benefit, their contribution also 
highlights how the incorporation of local actors into the liberal peace framework 
frequently (re) produces tension and contradiction (2009, 64, 65; also see 
Bjӧrkdahl and Hӧglund 2013). Williams and Mengistu (2015) offer a similar 
analysis when they highlight the tension between bureaucratisation and the 
explicitly stated objectives of liberal peacebuilding.  
In a similar way to Pol’s contribution, my analysis has sought to examine 
what occurs when participatory and ‘bottom-up’ frameworks are incorporated 
into neo-liberal structures and frameworks. In engaging at the interface between 
the internal and external, I sought to demonstrate how ‘domestic’ agency 
became subject to a pervasive reconfiguration. In stressing the pre-eminence of 
the wider context, I sought to draw attention to the percolation of 
‘instrumentalist’ and ‘prescriptive’ logics. I observed that internal innovations 
within liberal peacebuilding had, in the terms set out by Pol, put in process a 
whole host of innovative and subtle disciplinary and regulatory techniques.  
Further Research 
My research has established the basis for a critical framework of analysis 
focused upon the tensions and contradictions of liberal peacebuilding. The 
research findings have broad-ranging implications, which extend around the 
broad circumference of liberal peacebuilding. I have already discussed the 
potential contribution of my own research, and will now proceed to highlight 
some of its key limitations – this will, I anticipate, help to establish the basis for 
further research.  
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The most obvious occlusion derives from the fact that I have offered a 
purely textual analysis. I have not therefore gone beyond the text to engage 
with the wider context in which texts are produced. For this reason, the process 
of policy formulation – the interactions, relations and structures through which 
policy is produced – could conceivably provide the basis for further research. 
This research could engage at both the departmental and interdepartmental 
levels, tracing key interactions and their manifestation at the level of the policy 
document. Given the wider context in which ‘domestic’ policy is formulated, 
analysis could also engage at the regional and/or international level. Each of 
these contributions would bring an added dimension to the current research, 
bringing out features and attributes that, for reasons of space and coherence, 
have hitherto remained unexplored.  
The relationship between materiality and discourse is another question 
that my research does not engage. This is the question of how material or extra-
discursive influences relate to, and impact upon, discourse. My analysis has 
focused exclusively upon discourse, and it has not, to this extent, sought to ask 
how this reference point is situated within a wider set of interactions and 
relations. Two intriguing questions have therefore remained unaddressed: What 
is the relationship between discourse and material practices? What does it 
produce and what does it enable?  
My analysis has sought to understand how the products of liberal 
peacebuilding are constituted, being brought together in unstable and volatile 
compounds. In teasing out tensions and contradictions, I sought to demonstrate 
that the comprehensive approach could be understood with reference to its 
points of breakage, both potential and actual. This represented a clear 
departure from the established policy imperative, which instead proposes to 
engage the approach at points of reconciliation. This has important implications 
for how the text is approached and engaged. Conceivably, this approach could 
be productively applied to other products of liberal peacebuilding. For instance, 
concepts such as ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ are fragile compounds, virtually 
inviting the push that shatters them into pieces. In engaging at these points, 
researchers would find new grounds for a critique of liberal peacebuilding.  
The respective components of the comprehensive approach framework 
could also potentially be applied in other instances. Deepening, contextuality 
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and complementarity have, to this extent, a potential and relevance that 
extends beyond the current study. The main benefit of this framework is that it 
explicitly and concisely articulates principles that have previously been 
internalised and implicitly assumed. Peacebuilding actors would, to this extent, 
recognise the significance of deepening but not the precise term itself. The 
main benefits of the comprehensive approach framework are therefore that it 
provides clear, explicit and transferable terms of reference that can be applied 
in different settings and to separate objects.  
Additionally, my research has only focused upon a single policy actor. 
Although the British government has provided my main point of focus, I have 
also intermittently referred to other policy actors. For reasons of parsimony, I 
have not been able to engage these broader actors in any great depth or detail. 
However, conceivably they could also provide the basis for an analysis which 
asks how the comprehensive approach framework has been adapted and 
applied by international, regional and national actors.  
In general terms, my research can be said to be part of a critical project 
which consciously and deliberately seeks to challenge the epistemic and 
practical basis of liberal peacebuilding. In questioning grounding assumptions 
and challenging deeply embedded tenets and axioms of truth, it contributes to 
further research engagements that seek to take apart the power relations that 
adhere within the heart of liberal peacebuilding. It strongly argues against the 
proposition that liberal peacebuilding should be understood within a delimited or 
narrow framework of reference and instead insists that it must be perceived, 
understood and analysed within a broader framework of reference. This is an 
important insight which establishes a firm basis for further research.  
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